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Historically, little attention was paid to the execution of sentences passed at the level of international courts and tribunals. Capital punishment was still used, and custodial sanctions were imposed in the relevant states. It was not 
until the 1990s, with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals, that the execution of sen-
tences also became a task for international tribunals, in cooperation with, and by 
means of transferring the sentenced person to, a state which had committed itself to 
executing the sentence. The basic principles of these vertical transfer, or execution 
of sentence, procedures, as is also the case at the level of the ICC, are characterized 
by a system logic, with a limited role for the sentenced person. Nonetheless, min-
imal human rights and international standards for the execution of sentences (as 
agreed upon at the level of the UN) are respected.
The authors investigate if and to what extent the interests of the sentenced person 
could be better pursued and enhanced during vertical procedures for the execution 
of sentences; they therefore take a clear-cut rehabilitation and social integration 
perspective.
Given the dominant representation of EU member states among states willing to 
execute sentences passed by international tribunals and courts, the authors more-
over wonder whether practice should not evolve towards reflecting the obligatory 
compliance of these states with, besides the UN standards, additional (sometimes 
wider, more precise and higher) Council of Europe and EU standards. This would be 
reflected in the policies of the tribunals and courts (especially the ICC) relating to 
the conclusion of sentence execution agreements with states, as well as in the actual 
case-based decisions in which particular sentence execution states are chosen.
The authors further plead for the conclusion of a bilateral EU-ICC agreement on the 
execution of sentences, since this would constitute an important contribution to 
international justice, and one that is likely to make the reintegration and rehabilita-
tion of offenders (a greater) part of it.
Prof. dr. Gert Vermeulen is full professor of international and European crim-
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director of the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) and 
extraordinary professor of evidence at Maastricht University.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, (infra, under II) little attention was paid to the execution 
of sentences passed at the level of international courts and tribunals. 
Capital punishment was still used, and custodial sanctions were im-
posed in the relevant states. It was not until the 1990s, with the crea-
tion of the ad hoc tribunals, that the execution of sentences also be-
came a task for international tribunals (and, recently, for the UN 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT)), in coopera-
tion with, and by means of transferring the sentenced person to, a 
state which had committed itself to executing the sentence. The basic 
principles of these vertical transfer, or execution of sentence, proce-
dures (infra, under III), as is also the case at the level of the ICC, are 
characterized by a system logic, with a limited role for the sentenced 
person. Nonetheless, minimal human rights and international stan-
dards for the execution of sentences are respected (infra, under IV.A). 
This book investigates whether, and to what extent, the interests of the 
sentenced person could be better pursued and enhanced during verti-
cal procedures for the execution of sentences; it therefore takes a clear-
cut rehabilitation and social integration perspective. 
This book essentially draws on doctoral research on the transfer of 
prisoners, conducted by Eveline De Wree (De Wree, 2011) under the 
supervision of Gert Vermeulen, and on a research project on the 
cross-border execution of judgments involving the deprivation of lib-
erty in the EU (JLS/2009/JPEN/PR/0031/E4; principal: European 
Commission, DG Justice) (Vermeulen et al., 2011). The latter shed 
light on the compliance by EU member states with international and 
European standards relating to detention conditions, including stan-
dards relating to offenders’ reintegration and prospects for rehabilita-
tion. A detailed overview of the standards concerned and the compli-
ance of EU member states with those standards features as an annex 
to the body of this book. Legally speaking, the practice of the execution 
of sentences at the level of international tribunals and courts is only 
required to comply with universal minimum standards (such as the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (hereafter: Universal Decla-
ration)). However, the question arises whether practice should not 
evolve towards reflecting the obligatory compliance of EU member
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states with additional (sometimes broader, more precise and higher) 
binding and non-binding Council of Europe and EU standards. This 
would affect the tribunals’ and courts’ (especially the ICC’s) policies 
relating to the conclusion of sentence execution agreements with 
states, as well as the actual case-based decisions that stipulate a par-
ticular state for the execution of a sentence. This question seems all 
the more relevant because fourteen out of the seventeen states that 
have concluded agreements with the ICTY for the execution of sen-
tences are EU member states (and twelve out of the thirteen states to 
which the ICTY has transferred convicted persons are EU member 
states), because the only three non-African states that have concluded 
agreements with the ICTR for the execution of sentences are EU 
member states, and because five out of the eight states that have so far 
concluded agreements with the ICC for the execution of sentences are 
EU member states. 
The very limited practice of the UN Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT), which in 2010 has been set up by the UN 
Security Council in the context of the completion strategies for both 
ad hoc tribunals and has taken over responsibility from the ICTR and 
ICTY inter alia as far as the execution of sentences and the supervision 
thereof are concerned (since 1 July 2012 respectively 2013) is not re-
flected in the book. Essentially, the MICT has not prompted any fun-
damental changes (nor will it) when it comes to the principles of verti-
cal execution of sentences pronounced by the ICTY and ICTR. Its task 
is to continue the function of execution of sentences of both institu-
tions. Mutatis mutandis, the relevant rules embedded in its Statute1, its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence,2 its Practice Direction on the Proce-
dure for Designation of the State in which a Convicted Person is to 
Serve His or Her Sentence3 and its Practice Direction on the Proce-
dure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation 
of Sentence and Early Release of Persons Convicted by the ICTR, the 
ICTY or the Mechanism4
                                                            
1 Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (December 
22, 2010), UN Security Council Resolution 1877 (July 7, 2009), U.N.Doc. 
S/RES/1966 (2010) and  
http://www.unmict.org/files/documents/statute/101222_sc_res1966 _statute_en.pdf. 
 have merely substituted those embedded in 
2 http://www.unmict.org/files/documents/rules/120608_rules_en.pdf. 
3 http://www.unmict.org/files/documents/practice_directions/pd_mict2_en.pdf. 
4 http://www.unmict.org/files/documents/practice_directions/pd_mict3_en.pdf. 
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the corresponding ICTY and ICTR texts, which consequently are still 
being referred to throughout the book. Essentially, it suffices to bear 
in mind that the jurisdiction to designate states for the execution of 
sentences is currently with the MICT, including for persons convicted 
by the two tribunals after 1 July 2012 respectively 2013. In addition, 
from the same dates onwards, the MICT president has inherited from 
the ICTR and ICTY presidents the jurisdiction to supervise the execu-
tion of sentences and to decide on requests for pardon or commuta-
tion of sentence, including for convicted persons already serving their 
sentences. 
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II. HISTORY 
The tracing, prosecution and punishment of offenders has always 
been the main objective of international courts and tribunals. The 
stage of the execution of a sentence was often nothing more than ‘ac-
cessory’. For a full understanding of the basic principles of the execu-
tion of a sentence after conviction by an international court, it is nec-
essary to examine the origin of international courts and tribunals fur-
ther. The underlying motives in their development largely explain the 
general lines of the chosen system for the execution of sentences and 
the historical evolution of that system up to the present day.  
A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
Both these ad hoc tribunals were created after World War II with the 
support of national governments that realized the importance of an 
international accountability mechanism with a view to preserving 
world order and restoring peace (Bassiouni, 2000). The tribunals 
broke the monopoly of states in respect of the prosecution and judg-
ment of international crimes: for the first time, organizations of a 
non-national or multinational nature were created to prosecute and 
punish crimes with an international dimension (Cassese, 2003). The 
nation state was no longer exclusively responsible for crime control. 
The strict linkage between geography and political power was broken. 
As the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were created, a formalized 
international criminal law system was achieved (Findlay, 2008). 
Prominent individuals, not states, were convicted for crimes of ag-
gression, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Beigbeder, 2005). 
In this way, the recognition of individual responsibility, as regards 
punishment for those crimes, became a fact.  
Concerning the execution of sentences, these tribunals did not take 
much action. The sentence was considered nothing more than a logi-
cal consequence of a conviction by these courts. Besides, capital pun-
ishment was the only sentence actually imposed by the Nuremberg 
tribunal, even though it was also possible for the tribunal to impose 
another sentence that it considered to be ‘right’ (Sebba, 2009). In 
October 1945, twenty-four Nazi leaders were accused; their trial – ‘The 
Trial of the Major War Criminals’ – started a month later. After one
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year, nineteen of the accused were convicted of crimes against human-
ity; twelve were sentenced to capital punishment. But otherwise the 
tribunals of Tokyo and Nuremberg did not consider it their task to 
provide for the execution of the sentences they imposed. Sentences 
had to be enforced in the country where the crimes were committed 
(i.e. Germany and Japan), and, moreover, where the tribunals them-
selves were located (Klip, 1997). 
B. The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) 
Subsequently, the international community remained silent for a long 
time.5
For the ICTY, unlike the post-war tribunals, it was assumed that the 
execution of sentences was also the task of the tribunal. Moreover, the 
tribunal is different from the post-war tribunals because it is not lo-
cated in the conflict area itself, but in a host country, i.e. the Nether-
lands. The tribunal’s host country does not, however, have to ensure 
the execution of the sentences. Also, the countries in which the con-
flict had taken place were not considered for the execution of sen-
tences. A way to execute the sentences imposed by the international 
courts and tribunals had to be found, with few precedents to rely on. A 
 Bassiouni concludes that, although internal conflicts were still 
happening and regimes still existed that were characterized by viola-
tions of human rights, no prosecution or other accountability mecha-
nism was in place. Instead, the aim was for a political solution, with 
impunity often being the price people had to pay for the ending of a 
conflict (Bassiouni, 1996). In the 1990s, there was goodwill, regard-
ing a few events, for reverting to the creation of ad hoc tribunals. The 
ICTY and the ICTR were the first international tribunals after those of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo (Balint, 1996). 
                                                            
5 However, the United Nations, or more specifically the International Law Commis-
sion, searched for a more permanent and impartial mechanism to mete out interna-
tional punishment (Cassese, 2003). To do this, it started with the idea of clearly de-
fined norms which would be applied consistently by a permanent international crimi-
nal court (Bassiouni, 2000). After the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals had accom-
plished their tasks, the first acts towards the creation of a permanent international 
criminal court were, however, quickly put aside as the Cold War began. The impulse 
existing at the end of World War II was thus not used for the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court (Broomhall, 2003).  
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specific criminal legal system was therefore required, supported by 
the entire international community. In the ICTY Statute of the ICTY6
Concerning the execution of sentences, the ICTR chose a similar sys-
tem to that of the ICTY. The execution of sentences in Tanzania (the 
host country) was in any event out of the question. The execution of 
sentences in Rwanda was not excluded as such. Moreover, the Statute 
(and the Rules) of the ICTR stipulate: ‘Imprisonment shall be served 
in Rwanda or any of the States on a list of states which have indicated 
to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted persons, 
as designated by the International Tribunal for Rwanda’ (Article 26 
ICTR Statute). The possibility of the execution of sentences in Rwanda 
was thus preserved, as well as the system of spreading the execution 
over different countries that was also used for the ICTY. For this rea-
son, the goodwill of other countries to accept convicted persons in 
their prisons has to be examined here as well.  
 
a first indication can be found of the system the authors had in mind, 
namely research by the Security Council into the willingness of differ-
ent countries, and then the passing of this information to the registrar 
of the tribunal so that a list of states in which the execution of sen-
tences could take place could be created. This was the final design of 
the system for the execution of a sentence after a conviction by an 
international court.  
This difference between the two tribunals can be understood in the 
light of the context in which they were created. The government of 
Yugoslavia was against the creation of the ICTY from the beginning, 
but the Rwandan government supported the creation of the ICTR and 
participated in the negotiations. Eventually, however, Rwanda voted 
against Resolution 955, because it did not agree with the time delimi-
tation and the consistency and structure of the tribunal (Magnarella, 
2000). Rwanda’s rejection also related to the execution of sentences. 
It could not accept that convicted persons would be detained outside 
Rwanda, and that these countries would have the responsibility for 
decisions concerning these people. Rwanda argued that this responsi-
                                                            
6 Statute of the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (May 25, 
1993, last changed on July 7, 2009), UN Security Council Resolution 1877 (July 7, 
2009), U.N.Doc. S/RES/1877 (2009) and http://www.icty.org/sid/135 (hereafter: 
ICTY Statute). 
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bility belonged to the international tribunal or, at least, to the Rwan-
dan people. There was a fear that the countries taking responsibility 
for the execution of sentences would release the convicted persons 
(too soon). Because of this concern, the Statute later included a provi-
sion that the Rwandan government had to be informed of modifica-
tions to any penalty. There was also a thought that there was a dispar-
ity because capital punishment could not be imposed on people sen-
tenced by the tribunal, but it could on people prosecuted before the 
Rwandan courts. Finally, people were displeased by the fact that the 
ICTR would be located in Rwanda itself (Akhavan, 1996).  
C. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The ICC reflects an innovative development in international law. The 
creation of the ICC was preceded by the ad hoc tribunals, which – in 
retrospect – figured as laboratories in which the feasibility and the 
workability of this form of international justice could be tested. How-
ever, never before had the international community tried to create a 
court with a similar general range and general application (Schabas, 
2004). 
Therefore the ICC also faced a new challenge concerning the system 
for the execution of sentences. The ICC considers the execution of 
sentences as its own task, in the same way as do the ICTY and the 
ICTR. In line with the choices made within the ICTY and the ICTR, a 
distribution of the sentencing load among different states was chosen. 
A new element is, however, that there is an explicit effort to distribute 
the load as evenly as possible, illustrated by the reference in the Stat-
ute to the principle of ‘equitable distribution’ (Schabas, 2004). This 
means that the number of convicted persons already received by a 
state is taken into account, and that it is assumed that every state 
should be granted the opportunity to receive convicted persons (Rule 
201, Rules of Procedure and Evidence). The main aim of this principle 
is a proper distribution between different states, keeping in mind the 
number of people and the length of their punishments. ‘Equitable 
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geographical distribution’ was not previously a legal principle, but was 
used by the ICTY as a ‘guiding principle’ in its decisions.7
D. Conclusion 
 
In the past century there was the beginning of an international system 
of punishment, whereby the international community considers itself 
responsible for the prosecution and adjudication of – the most serious 
– crimes. During the past century, the lines were therefore laid down 
and the structures evolved over time. Eventually, this process culmi-
nated in the creation of a permanent international criminal court.  
On this basis, it could be reasoned that greater importance is attached 
to the idea of an international community (Gardocki, 1992). Once the 
tribunals and the ICC had been created, international reaction against 
behaviour considered as harmful for the entire international commu-
nity has grown. The underlying supposition is that there is an interna-
tional community, a social and moral order common to all countries 
(a ‘civitas maxima’). With this, the international criminal law functions 
as a way to confirm and strengthen the feeling of solidarity. The insti-
tutionalization of the punishment of these crimes signifies the expres-
sion of a universal aversion (Wise, 1999). The international commu-
nity institutionalized the reaction to these crimes that lay at the heart 
of her interests and concerns. It is doubtful that a genuine interna-
tional community is in place. As the existence of a shared and collec-
tive consciousness at the level of the nation state (or, to put it better, in 
a national context) is already doubtful, doubts are even more obvious 
at the international level.  
Concerning the execution of sentences, this means that the idea of a 
‘community’ played a role in how sentences were executed after con-
viction by an international court. As the execution of sentences did not 
at first (with the post-war tribunals) belong among the tasks of an in-
ternational tribunal, giving the task to the tribunal was considered to 
be necessary with the ad hoc tribunals. It was not considered oppor-
tune to appoint a precise country for the execution of all sentences: the 
                                                            
7 Manual on Developed Practices of the ICTY, 2009,  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_develope
d_practices/icty_manual_on_developed_practices.pdf. 
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host country was not generally willing to do this and the country or 
countries in which the conflict had taken place were (at first) consid-
ered to be inappropriate. Therefore a pragmatic model for the execu-
tion of sentences was chosen, in which countries had to declare them-
selves to be willing to ensure the execution of sentences. The ICC 
went one step further: for this tribunal, an administrative logic is ap-
plied to the execution of sentences by including the desire for ‘equita-
ble geographical distribution’ in the requirements of the system for 
execution of sentences.  
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III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF VERTICAL EXECUTION OF           
SENTENCES 
In this review of the basic principles, the main focus will be on the 
ICTY and the ICTR, as these tribunals already have a wide practice for 
the execution of sentences. A review of the execution of sentences 
within the ICC, by contrast, remains limited to the official documents.  
A. The ‘system’ for the execution of sentences passed by international 
tribunals and courts 
1. Cooperation with states 
The international courts and tribunals themselves do not possess the 
capacity to detain people in order to execute their sentences. The de-
tention units to which they have access are meant for the custody of 
defendants during the prosecution and trial stages. As these detention 
units are not (officially) used for the execution of sentences, the inter-
national courts do not have their own prisons. Moreover, the execu-
tion of a sentence within the state where the court is situated is not 
necessarily an option. It is an option for the ICC if no other country is 
prepared to execute the sentence (see later), whereas the agreement 
established with the host country (Tanzania) for the ICTR stipulates 
that convicted persons will be dismissed from Tanzania.  
A way had to be found to execute sentences imposed by international 
courts and tribunals, but there were few precedents on which to rely. 
The Statute of the ICTY stipulated that the Security Council would 
research the willingness of several countries and subsequently would 
report this information to the registrar of the tribunal so that a list 
could be drawn up of the countries in which sentences could be exe-
cuted. This model crucially influenced the execution of sentences 
within the ICTR and the ICC. 
The statutes of all international courts, including that of the ICC, 
stipulate that the sentence has to be served in a country which has 
declared itself willing to accept convicted people. All international 
criminal courts therefore appeal to a decentralized network of states 
for the execution of their sentences (Mulgrew, 2009). Countries are 
expected to engage in the execution of sentences because they support
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the international court (and, more widely, the ‘rule of law’). This de-
rives from the underlying idea about the international courts: they are 
a part of a much larger network of actors who are striving for the same 
purpose, namely international justice. In that respect, states are all 
members of this community and have to help the criminal court, 
which itself does not possess any mechanisms for the execution of 
judgments. The execution of sentences is, in that sense, not very dif-
ferent from the other stages of the criminal procedure, as interna-
tional courts also appeal to national authorities and legal systems for 
the execution of decisions.  
States must offer their services voluntarily by declaring that they are 
willing to accept these prisoners in their prisons. They were also en-
couraged by the Secretary-General to declare themselves willing.8 Af-
ter all, there is no general obligation to cooperate (Cassese, 2003). 
While states have many obligations to cooperate with international 
courts (by, inter alia, handing over suspects and providing evidence), 
the execution of sentences is a matter in which states cooperate volun-
tarily (Tolbert & Rydberg, 2000). Goodwill is probably the most 
pragmatic framework, but it is still clear that many states do not want 
to contribute voluntarily to the international transfer of convicted per-
sons and, moreover, do not want to be forced to do so. Only a few 
countries, and not the superpowers (see later), have declared them-
selves willing to execute punishments. In the case of the ICTR, it ap-
peared that initially no countries of their own accord reported to the 
Security Council their willingness to accept prisoners.9
A prison sentence is executed in the state appointed to that end by the 
court from a list of states that have stipulated, to the Security Council 
(for ad hoc tribunals) or to the court itself (for the ICC), their willing-
ness to receive convicted persons. A state can inform the registrar that 
it wishes to withdraw from the list. This, however, will not have any 
effect on the persons already imprisoned in the country concerned.  
 
                                                            
8 Report of the Secretary-General related to Paragraph 2 of Resolution 808 (1993) of 
the Security Council (3 May 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
9 Interview with Roland Amoussouga, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief of External Rela-
tions and Strategic Planning Section (ERSPS) and ICTR Spokesperson, held Septem-
ber 23, 2009. 
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2. Sentence execution agreements 
International courts conclude bilateral agreements with states willing 
to execute their sentences. In these agreements, a framework is cre-
ated for the acceptance of persons convicted by the court. As only a 
few countries were willing to execute sentences, it gradually became 
the case that the ad hoc tribunals initiated the forming of agreements. 
In practice, the initiative to conclude an agreement can be taken either 
by the international court itself or by the country concerned.  
The ad hoc tribunals adopted a policy concerning the creation of 
agreements, in the sense that a certain group of countries was clearly 
preferred. The policy of the ICTY10
To date, eight countries have been found willing to oversee the execu-
tion of custodial sentences pronounced by the ICTR: Mali and Benin 
 is, in accordance with the Manual 
on Developed Practices, mainly based on the human rights standards 
in the countries concerned: the circumstances of the detention have to 
be adequate. For humanitarian reasons, for instance geographical 
considerations, agreements are mostly concluded with European 
countries. The aim is to ensure that the distance between the coun-
tries and the region of the former Yugoslavia is not too great, so that 
there is no obstacle preventing family and friends from visiting pris-
oners. The ICTY has concluded sentence execution agreements with 
seventeen countries: Italy and Finland (1997), Norway (1998), Austria 
and Sweden (1999), France, Spain and Germany (ad hoc) (2000), 
Denmark and Germany (ad hoc) (2002), the UK (2004), Belgium, 
Ukraine and Portugal (2007), Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Albania and 
Germany (ad hoc) (2008) and Germany (ad hoc) (2011). It is clear that, 
initially, agreements were mostly concluded with countries from 
Northern and Western Europe. In recent years, however, some 
agreements have been concluded with Eastern European countries. 
Fourteen out of the seventeen countries concerned are members of 
the EU – which explains why, later on in this book (and in particular 
in the annex), not only UN but also EU sentence execution standards 
are reviewed. There have so far been no agreements with non-
European countries.  
                                                            
10 The responsibility for identifying states suited to the execution of sentences lies 
with the registrar.  
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(1999), Swaziland (2000), France (2003), Italy and Sweden (2004), 
Rwanda (2008) and Senegal (2010). The first agreements were there-
fore concluded with African states. The ICTR indicated that, for socio-
cultural reasons, the execution of sentences in African states was ap-
propriate (Magnarella, 2000). Secondly, European countries (all three 
of them EU countries) were added to the list – countries that had also 
declared their cooperation quite rapidly to the ICTY. Later, however, 
sentence execution agreements were again concluded with African 
states, including Rwanda itself.11
The agreements concluded by the ICTR and ICTY remain in force for 
the MICT, which itself has not (yet) concluded any new agreements. 
 
It is the case that persuasive efforts from international courts are nec-
essary to motivate countries to make this commitment (Tolbert & 
Rydberg, 2000). Some countries remain reluctant, for instance be-
cause their governments are not inclined to take measures which 
could cause a strong public reaction, or because they do not want to 
have foreign inspections of their own prisons (see later). Likewise, 
legal amendments are sometimes needed to permit the execution of 
sentences imposed by an international court, for instance regarding 
clemency12
                                                            
11 The ICTR initially faced problems in finding countries that were willing to execute 
sentences. Nevertheless, in the course of 1998, many countries declared themselves 
willing to do so: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
 and penalty reduction, or the inspection regime provided 
by the court (Tolbert & Rydberg, 2000). Some countries also fear that 
they will be flooded with people convicted by the international courts. 
So, for example, Finland told the ICTY that it did not want to hold 
more than five convicted persons in its prisons at one time, and Italy 
demanded that it be asked to accept no more than ten prisoners dur-
ing the three years after its declaration of willingness (Klip, 1997). The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter: SCSL) also had to deal with 
competition from the other international courts. Finally, states re-
mained worried about the possibility of the family of the convicted 
person asking for asylum in the country agreeing to execute the sen-
tence (Mulgrew, 2009). The ICC is still working on concluding 
agreements for the execution of sentences. To date, the ICC has con-
12 Clemency can usually only be granted by, e.g., the president or the queen of the 
country and, if permitted, is recorded as such in the Constitution.  
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cluded eight such agreements (and it is again striking that, in five 
cases, these are with EU member states): with Austria (2005), the UK 
(2007), Belgium, Denmark and Finland (2010), Serbia and Columbia 
(2011) and Mali (2012).13
In any event, each country has the right to refuse to agree to execute 
sentences. The negotiation of treaties on the execution of sentences 
therefore requires a necessary dose of creativity to overcome the cau-
tion. Negotiations are, according to the Manual on Developed Prac-
tices of the ICTY (Manual on Developed Practices, p. 152), character-
ized by continuous pressure, by regular deliberations and by an in-
crease in the awareness of the needs of the tribunal in the area of the 
execution of sentences. Normally it is remarked that there cannot be 
justice if the sentences that are imposed cannot be executed.  
 
Other elements can also put a brake on the negotiation of treaties: for 
example, the execution of sentences involves a relatively large expense 
for the less developed countries. A few African developing countries 
were apparently willing to cooperate with the ICTR, but were con-
fronted with the problem that they could not comply with the mini-
mum international standards. 
The contents of the agreements concluded by the tribunals and courts 
concerning the execution of sentences are almost the same. For the 
first agreements of the ICTY, a model agreement14
                                                            
13 Further states that have declared their willingness to accept sentenced persons un-
der certain circumstances are: Andorra, Czech Republic, Honduras, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland. 
 was created, partly 
because the UN further determined the framework for the execution 
of sentences (Tolbert & Rydberg, 2000). A state can include a few 
conditions to its commitment to execute sentences. The Statute of the 
ICC stipulates that states can link conditions to their willingness to 
execute sentences (without it being possible to derogate from the 
terms of the Statute). There is therefore not complete freedom over 
the terms of the agreements (Mulgrew, 2009). If there is no agree-
ment on the conditions stipulated by a country, the country concerned 
will not be included in the list. Moreover, a state can withdraw the 
conditions it has stipulated. Changes or amendments concerning 
14 The agreement between the ICTY and Norway is mutatis mutandis identical to the 
model agreement. 
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those conditions have, however, to be acknowledged by the president 
of the court.  
The fact that an ‘agreement’ is still required between the court and the 
state has to do with the fact that there is no obligation for states to 
cooperate with the execution of sentences. In some cases it turned out 
that countries were not prepared to conclude a general agreement, but 
were prepared to consider executing sentences on a ‘case-by-case’ ba-
sis (Manual on Developed Practices, p. 152), notably when a convicted 
person was one of their citizens or was a resident, and even then un-
der the condition that the sentence imposed did not exceed the corre-
sponding national maximum sentence. Currently this is the case for 
another eight countries.  
3. Execution of sentences in country of origin not obligatory and may even 
be excluded 
The execution of a sentence after conviction by an international court 
or tribunal takes place in one of a few countries which have declared 
their willingness, and in that way does not necessarily take place in 
the country of origin of the convicted person. This development is 
recent, and only arose with the ad hoc tribunals. At the time of the 
post-war tribunals, it was still understood that sentences had to be 
served in the country where the crimes were committed (in casu Ger-
many and Japan), and where the tribunals were located (Klip, 1997). 
However, it is interesting that, concerning the ICTY, the execution of 
sentences was not possible in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. 
The UN Secretary-General judged that ‘given the nature of the crimes 
in question and the international character of the tribunal, the en-
forcement of sentences should take place outside the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia’. 15
                                                            
15 Report of the Secretary-General relating to paragraph 2 of Resolution 808 (1993) of 
the Security Council (3 May 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia did, however, 
initially declare their willingness to execute sentences (Klip, 1997). 
This possibility was excluded due to the continuing conflict in the 
region. Over time, however, it became possible to transfer cases to the 
national institutions. The sentences arising from these transferred 
cases were in any event executed in the countries of the former Yugo-
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slavia itself. The existing system of the ICTY itself remained un-
changed, and the punishments of the leaders thus had to be executed 
elsewhere. In the judgment concerning Erdemovic this was confirmed 
by the trial chamber (Schabas, 1997); the jurisprudence of the ICTY 
therefore follows the report of the Secretary-General (Manual on De-
veloped Practices, p. 157). 
The Statute (and the Rules) of the ICTR do not exclude detention in 
Rwanda. According to the Statute (Article 26), imprisonment shall be 
served in Rwanda or any of the states on a list of states which have 
indicated their willingness to accept convicted persons. For a long 
time, none of the prisons in Rwanda complied with the internationally 
accepted minimum standards for detention, so the execution of sen-
tences was not possible in Rwanda (Schabas, 1997).  
The ambiguity and difficulties regarding the execution of sentences in 
the country of conflict itself are also noted for the mixed tribunals. 
Concerning the SCSL, a mixed tribunal, the initial aim was to execute 
the sentences in Sierra Leone itself. This was also stipulated in the 
SCSL Statute. At first, the SCSL was reluctant, as it feared that the 
presence of certain prisoners would have a negative influence on the 
stability of the country and the region. However, after the deaths of 
two of the ‘high profile’ prisoners, this consideration lost its impor-
tance (Mulgrew, 2009). Two other concerns did, however, remain: 
security in the prison system of Sierra Leone, and the fact that the 
prisons did not meet the international standards (as a consequence of 
overpopulation and a shortage of nourishment, water, sleeping places 
and adequate sanitation). Because of this, the execution of sentences 
in another state was preferred. The solution that was found was that 
sentences were executed in one of the states that had concluded a sen-
tence execution agreement with the UN tribunals, if the state in-
formed the SCSL registrar that they would also accept persons con-
victed by the SCSL (Mulgrew, 2009). The government of Sierra Leone 
desired that all sentences of the court should be executed in Africa. 
The African states that had already concluded agreements with the 
ICTR pointed out that they were not interested in cooperating with the 
SCSL. Therefore the SCSL broadened its field of interest beyond Af-
rica. The SCSL concluded treaties on the execution of sentences with 
Sweden (2004), the UK (2007) and Finland (2009). Eventually, also 
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in 2009, a sentence execution agreement with Rwanda was estab-
lished, and Rwanda eventually became the country where in practice 
the execution of sentences takes place.  
4. State for the execution of a sentence appointed by the tribunal or court 
The court determines the state where the sentence will be executed, 
and is able to change this at any time (Cassese, 2003). The procedures 
for the indication of the state are largely the same in all the different 
international courts and tribunals. The framework for these proce-
dures can be found in the Statutes and the Rules of the tribunals. 
Concerning the ICTY and the ICTR, these procedures are further de-
veloped in the ‘Practice Directions on the procedure for the interna-
tional tribunal’s designation of the state in which a convicted person is 
to serve his/her sentence of imprisonment’.16
After a sentence has become final
  
17 or – as often happens in practice – 
shortly before sentencing,18
During this consultation stage, the ICTY and ICTR provide the neces-
sary documents (copy of conviction, details of any part of the sentence 
 the registrar makes preliminary enquiries 
with states about their willingness to execute the sentence (Practice 
Direction Designation ICTY, p. 2). In the Practice Direction of the 
ICTR the equivalent provision reads: ‘[…] the registrar shall engage in 
a communication process with any of the States that have declared 
their willingness to accept convicted persons and have signed an 
agreement with the Tribunal’ (Practice Direction Designation ICTR, p. 
1). 
                                                            
16 ICTY’s Practice Direction on the procedure for the international tribunal’s designa-
tion of the state in which a convicted person is to serve his/her sentence of impris-
onment (1 September 2009), ICTY IT/137/Rev. 1 (1998) and 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Practice_Directions/it_137_rev1_en. pdf 
(hereafter: Practice Direction Designation ICTY) and ICTR’s Practice Direction on the 
procedure for designation of the state in which a convicted person is to serve his/her 
sentence of imprisonment (September 23, 2008), 
http://www.unictr.org/Legal/PracticeDirections/tabid/96/Default.aspx (hereafter: 
Practice Direction Designation ICTR). 
17 In an attempt to abbreviate the timescale as much as possible, the normal practice 
within the ICTY is to make preliminary enquiries with states before the judgment is 
final.  
18 Interview with staff of the ICTY Registry, held August 25, 2010. 
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already served and copy of identity card) so the state is able to take an 
informed decision. Reports and information about behaviour during 
custody and medical history can also be provided if asked for by the 
state. Furthermore, three countries (Sweden, Denmark and the UK) 
request that the tribunal (in casu the ICTY) provides documents con-
firming that the convicted person has connections with that country.19
The president of the court will eventually indicate a state in which the 
sentence will be executed. Therefore, the registrar gives the president 
a confidential memorandum. The memorandum contains informa-
tion concerning the conviction and the sentence, a list of all countries 
which will execute sentences or have executed them for the tribunal, 
and background information concerning the civil status and family 
relationships of the convicted person (inter alia their place of residence 
and – if appropriate – information concerning the resources available 
for prison visits). Moreover, the memorandum indicates whether the 
convicted person still has to act as a witness before the tribunal or if 
he/she will be relocated as a witness (and, in this case, which states 
have concluded relocation agreements with the tribunal); medical and 
psychological reports about the convicted person are delivered (if ap-
propriate); and information about the convicted person’s knowledge of 
languages, and, if possible, the general detention conditions and regu-
lations relating to ‘security and liberty’ in the state is given (Practice 
Directions Designation ICTY, p. 3 respectively ICTR, p. 2). Based on 
this information, the president of the tribunal determines where the 
sentence will be served. According to the Practice Direction of the 
ICTY, the president should pay special attention to the ‘proximity’ of 
the convicted person’s relatives when executing this discretionary 
power. In the Practice Direction of the ICTR this becomes: ‘[…] the 
president will take into account the desirability of serving sentences in 
states that are within close proximity or accessibility of the relatives of 
the convicted person’. Nevertheless, in practice other factors, such as 
whether the convicted person will still figure as a witness in another 
 
The UK also does this in its agreement with the ICC.  
                                                            
19 The UK specifies that it wants to be given the name, date and place of birth and 
possible family or other existing connections with the UK or any other reason why the 
request should be made to the UK. 
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case, will often be given weight in the choice of the state in which the 
sentence will be executed.20
The president can consult the sentencing chamber, or the judge-
president. He can also ask for the opinion of the convicted person 
and/or of the prosecutor. Moreover, the president can decide not to 
reveal the possible state. If the state accepts, the convicted person is 
informed of the chosen state, the content of the agreement between 
the tribunal and the state and other relevant questions.  
 
However, the Manual on Developed Practices shows that the registrar 
of the ICTY does not notify all states, but itself identifies potential 
states for the execution of the sentence, based on the minimum and 
maximum duration of the sentence that can be passed,21
Regarding the ICC, the Statute stipulates that, when designating a 
state, the court has to take into account: the application of widely-
accepted international treaty standards concerning the treatment of 
prisoners, the opinion of the convicted person (see later), the national-
ity of the convicted person and other factors concerning the circum-
stances of the crime or the convicted person or the effectiveness of the 
execution of the sentence (Article 103, Rome Statute). Moreover the 
Statute refers to the principle that states should bear the responsibility 
for the execution of the sentence, in accordance with the principle of 
 the maxi-
mum number of punishments, the compatibility of the socio-cultural 
environment for the convicted person and the geographical accessibil-
ity for relatives. Each time only one state is notified, rather than more 
than one state at a time, because of concerns that a state that had de-
clared itself to be willing would have to be rejected (Manual on Devel-
oped Practices, p. 155). The Practice Direction stipulates that the 
memorandum includes a list of countries, and that the president of 
the tribunal chooses (Practice Direction Designation ICTY, p. 2). 
However, given the fact that only one state is notified at a time, the 
memorandum is mainly created so that the president can decide 
whether or not to honour the choice of state.  
                                                            
20 Interview with staff of the ICTY Registry, held August 25, 2010. 
21 The length of the sentence is thus an important factor, as it determines whether a 
sentence will be fully executed in a certain country or will need to be distributed over 
two different countries.  
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‘equitable distribution’ (Schabas, 2004). Therefore the court must 
consider the principle of equitable distribution in its decisions on the 
indication of a state. This means that the number of convicted persons 
already received by a state is taken into account, and that it is assumed 
that every state should have the opportunity to receive convicted per-
sons (Rule 201, Rules of Procedure and Evidence). This principle 
mainly aims at the equitable distribution of costs, bearing in mind the 
number of persons and the length of their sentences (Manual on De-
veloped Practices, p. 154). How exactly it should be followed is hard to 
tell (and thus also hard to evaluate). For instance, it is not clear if there 
should be a distinction between bigger and smaller countries. ‘Equita-
ble geographical distribution’ was not previously a legal principle, but 
was used by the ICTY as a ‘guiding principle’ in its decisions. More-
over the application of the principle also arose in practice, as states 
that already had some convicted persons in their prisons invoked the 
principle to show that there were problems with a new indication. 
The appointed state is notified of the decision, and a few documents 
are passed to it (documents showing name, nationality, place and date 
of birth; a copy of the definitive judgment (with details of the length 
and starting date of the punishment and the rest of the sentence); and, 
after consultation with the convicted person, any necessary medical 
information) (Rule 204, Rules of Procedure and Evidence). When a 
state is appointed, it must immediately respond to say whether it ac-
cepts the appointment. If a state declines the indication, the president 
can appoint another state (Rule 205, Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence). If no state is appointed, the prison sentence will be served in a 
prison facility made available in the host country, in casu the Nether-
lands. In this case the costs arising from the execution of the sentence 
will be borne by the court (Article 103, Rome Statute). 
At the date of writing,22
                                                            
22 This was the situation on January 15, 2014.  
 the ICTY had convicted 69 persons, of which 
one is awaiting transfer to the state in which he will serve his sen-
tence. The others are serving their sentences in a state appointed for 
this purpose (16), died during the execution of their sentence (3) or 
have already served their sentence (49), either after transfer (31) or in 
the ICTY detention facility itself, the latter because the duration of the 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF VERTICAL EXECUTION OF SENTENCES 
 
28 
 
sentence imposed did not exceed the period during which they had 
been remanded in custody, or only barely exceeded that period so that 
the transfer was no longer necessary, useful or meaningful (18). The 
total number of convicted persons who have been transferred (49) 
turns out to be quite equitably distributed between the different coun-
tries (Austria and Norway: 6; Italy, Finland and Spain: 5; France, 
Germany and Denmark: 4; the UK and Sweden: 3; Estonia: 2; Bel-
gium and Portugal: 1). Relatively speaking, the countries that prom-
ised their cooperation first in an official agreement have also received 
the most convicted persons. The countries that have more recently 
made their official commitment, except for Estonia and Portugal, have 
not yet received any convicted persons.  
With a few exceptions, the people convicted by the ICTR appear until 
now mainly to have been transferred to two countries for sentence 
execution: 20 to Mali, 16 to Benin, 1 to Italy and 1 to Sweden.23
5. Consultation with the person concerned 
 
With regard to the tribunals, a (possible) consultation with the person 
concerned was envisaged before the final appointment of a state for 
the execution of the sentence. The Practice Directions provide for the 
possibility that the convicted person may declare his opinion, if re-
quested by the president, within the timeframe set by the president 
(Practice Direction Designation ICTY, p. 3,24 respectively ICTR, p. 325
                                                            
23 Transfer for the service of a sentence can moreover be postponed. In the case of 
Ruggiu, for instance, the convicted person stayed in the ICTR detention facility for a 
longer time for the sake of providing help as a witness in current proceedings (see: 
ICTR, The president’s decision on the prosecutor’s ex parte application for the con-
tinued detention of Georges Ruggiu in the Tribunal’s detention facility in Arusha 
(January 17, 2003). 
). 
The consultation mainly aims to obtain the views of the convicted 
person before the making of a decision that will eventually have a 
great influence on the detention process. The president inquires in 
particular whether there are previously unknown elements that make 
it undesirable for the sentence to be served in the country concerned. 
In its present form, this cannot be considered a legal right to be heard. 
Instead, it is a possibility offered to the convicted person to raise fun-
24 ‘The President may, furthermore, request the opinion of the convicted person […]’ 
25 ‘The President may request the submissions of the convicted person concerned […]’ 
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damental objections. However, this does not mean that the convicted 
person can ‘choose’ the country in which he/she will serve his/her 
sentence. Therefore the consultation is seen as important to allow the 
court to become aware of particularly serious obstacles (for instance 
death threats).  
The jurisprudence of the ICTY has made it clear that, according to the 
Statute, the Rules and the Practice Direction, there is no question of a 
right for the defendant to be heard about the state where he/she will 
serve his/her sentence. There is no formal right of appeal against the 
decision regarding the appointment of a state. Of course, convicted 
persons are free to notify the president of their objections, but no 
formal procedure is set out. Some convicted persons, both from the 
ICTY and the ICTR, have however asked for a transfer to a certain 
state or to a state other than the one appointed. As the convicted per-
son does not have the right to demand this directly from the president, 
these requests were not followed up. The president can, however, 
choose to consider the convicted person’s opinion, at his discretion. 
So far, however, there are no cases known at the ICTR level in which 
consultation with the person concerned has led to the appointment of 
another state.26
While consultation with the person concerned is still optional, it be-
came a requirement for the ICC: ‘The Presidency shall give notice in 
writing to the sentenced person that it is addressing the designation of 
a State of enforcement. The sentenced person shall, within such time 
limit as the Presidency shall prescribe, submit in writing his or her 
views on the question to the Presidency’ (Rule 203, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence). The president may also be allow the convicted 
person to give ‘oral presentations’. Moreover, the president will allow 
the convicted person to be assisted by a competent translator in order 
to express his opinion. In addition, appropriate time and facilities 
have to be provided for the preparation of the presentation of his opin-
ion.  
 
 
 
                                                            
26 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 4, 2009. 
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B. Actual execution of the sentence 
1. Execution of the sentence in line with the ‘general law and regulations’ 
of the state concerned 
When a state executes a punishment pronounced by an international 
court or tribunal, the state is bound by the duration of the sentence 
and cannot modify this in any way.  
The fact that the state cannot modify the nature or the duration of the 
sentence indicates the truly international character of the sentence. 
Yet accepting the duration of the sentence seems to be an important 
issue in the sentence execution agreements concluded with the inter-
national courts. The ICTY’s agreements with some countries stipulate 
that the countries will not execute sentences that exceed the absolute 
maximum number of years that can be served in that country (the 
longest sentence for any kind of crime). This is the case in the agree-
ments with Spain, Estonia, Portugal and Slovakia. The agreements 
with Poland and Ukraine stipulate that, if the ICTY sentence is longer, 
then only a part of the sentence is executed, namely the part of the 
sentence that does not exceed the highest sentence under the internal 
law, and that the convicted person is then transferred to the tribunal 
or to another country afterwards. This means that the sentence can 
only be enforced until the time when release is compulsory under the 
national legislation (Mulgrew, 2009). None of the ICTR’s agreements 
contain such terms.  
The states thus do not have any decision-making power concerning 
the sentences (Cassese, 2003), but international prisoners are consid-
ered as national prisoners during their detention in the state of execu-
tion and are subject to the national rules. This applies to all courts. 
The ICC Statute stipulates explicitly that the detention conditions may 
never be more favourable or less favourable than the circumstances of 
prisoners convicted for similar facts in the country of execution 
(Cassese, 2003). 
2. Detention conditions consistent with international standards 
The circumstances of the prison sentence are regulated by the law of 
the state of execution, but must be compatible with international 
standards. This requirement was not incorporated explicitly in the 
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Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, but is implicitly present in the 
whole system. The agreements concluded between the tribunals (both 
the ICTY and the ICTR) and the states normally stipulate that the 
‘conditions of detention shall be compatible with the Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners [hereafter: Standard 
Minimum Rules], the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Per-
sons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (hereafter: [Body 
of Principles] and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners 
[hereafter: Basic Principles]’. However, four countries (Austria, the 
UK, Germany and Poland) preferred vague provisions in the agree-
ments they concluded with the ICTY. These agreements refer to ‘rele-
vant human rights standards’. With the exception of Germany, these 
countries also added that the detention conditions have to be equiva-
lent to those of persons serving a sentence in accordance with the 
national law. This latter requirement was not included in any agree-
ment concluded by the ICTR.  
The Statute of the ICC (in Article 106) also requires that ‘the condi-
tions of imprisonment […] shall be consistent with widely accepted 
international treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners’ It 
further that ‘in no case […] such conditions [shall] be more or less fa-
vourable than those available to prisoners convicted of similar of-
fences in the state of enforcement’. In the (preambles of the) agree-
ments drawn up by the ICC, there is also reference to the Standard 
Minimum Rules, the Body of Principles and the Basic Principles. The 
agreements with Austria and the UK, though, respectively require that 
the detention conditions are ‘consistent with widely accepted interna-
tional treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners’ and ‘in ac-
cordance with relevant human rights standards governing the treat-
ment of prisoners, including any obligations of the UK under the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms done at Rome on 4 November 1950’. The reference to the 
three specific instruments (Standard Minimum Rules, Body of Prin-
ciples, and Basic Principles) has thus been removed from the texts of 
the agreements themselves. The texts only record that the detention 
conditions cannot be ‘more or less favourable’ than those of persons 
convicted of similar crimes in their own country (or equivalent to 
those applicable to prisoners serving a sentence in accordance with 
national law). This stipulation is exceptional for this type of agree-
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ment, and would be hard to permit in certain circumstances (for in-
stance when sentences of the ICTR are executed in Mali and Benin). 
Notwithstanding the fact that, legally speaking, the execution of the 
sentences of international tribunals and courts only needs to comply 
with universal minimum standards (such as the Universal Declara-
tion), the question arises whether practice should not evolve towards 
reflecting the obligatory compliance of EU member states with addi-
tional (sometimes broader, more precise and higher) binding and 
non-binding Council of Europe and EU standards. This would affect 
the policy of the tribunals and courts (especially the ICC) relating to 
the conclusion of sentence execution agreements with states, follow-
ing the example of the agreement with the UK.  
3. Inspections of the detention conditions organized by the tribunal or 
court 
As the execution of the sentence has to be consistent with the widely 
accepted international treaty standards on the treatment of prisoners, 
the state of execution must allow inspections of the detention condi-
tions – at any time and on a periodic base.  
The detention circumstances can be reviewed by the court, or by an 
entity appointed by the court. However, the authority responsible for 
the review depends on the circumstances. The international courts 
have concluded an agreement with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), in which they allow the latter to carry out reviews 
in the country of execution, if the country concerned agrees. Many of 
the agreements concluded by the ICTY therefore provide for review by 
the ICRC, and all the agreements concluded by the ICTR stipulate that 
the reviewing will be done by the ICRC. In addition, the agreement 
between the SCSL and Sweden also does this. 
The purpose of the inspections is to examine whether the detention 
facility in the country concerned is adequate and whether the con-
victed person is in good condition and, for instance, is receiving any 
necessary medical care. The reviews take place regularly: about once a 
year and additionally if requested. The agreement concluded by the 
ICC and the ICRC explains that the purpose of the reviews by the 
ICRC is purely humanitarian: it is to make sure that all prisoners are 
treated humanely and in accordance with ‘widely accepted interna-
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tional standards governing the treatment of persons deprived of lib-
erty’ (Article 3).27
A few countries objected against the inspections by the ICRC, and, for 
these, alternatives were sought. There are therefore countries that 
preferred a review by the CPT,
 The ICRC examines the material conditions of the 
detention, such as the psychological and physical condition and treat-
ment of the prisoner. If appropriate, the ICRC can ask the court to 
take measures necessary to ameliorate the detention conditions. The 
ICRC can also formulate suggestions if problems concerning judicial 
guarantees occur, although there is an explicit stipulation that the 
ICRC cannot question the grounds for the detention. During the in-
spections, the ICRC asks for unlimited access to all prisoners and all 
parts of the prisons; moreover it demands the possibility of talking in 
private with the prisoners. The prisoners have the right to express 
themselves freely and without any limitation. The ICRC can also con-
tact the family of the prisoner or other persons assumed to hold rele-
vant information. 
28 such as the UK, Portugal, Albania, 
Ukraine and (in the Galić case) Germany in their agreements with the 
ICTY, and the UK in its agreement with the ICC.29 In the agreement 
between the ICTY and Spain, a ‘Parity Commission’ of the ICTY and 
state officials was chosen for reviews.30
Moreover, the ICC Rules of Procedure stipulate that, as part of the 
supervision, regulations should be adopted to guarantee the right of 
the convicted person to communicate with the court. Besides, the 
court can ask for information, reports or expert opinions from the 
state of execution and any other reliable source. If appropriate, the 
president can delegate a judge or another employee of the court to 
 The agreement between Aus-
tria and the ICC only mentions ‘the court or an entity designated by 
it’.  
                                                            
27 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross on visits to persons deprived of liberty pursuant to the juris-
diction of the International Criminal Court, 13 April 2006, ICC-PRES /02-01-06. 
28 The European Committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
29 The UK also included this in its agreement with the SCSL.  
30 The Manual on Developed Practices of the ICTY, however, clearly stipulates that 
monitoring by independent authorities is preferred to monitoring by joint commit-
tees, to maintain credibility.  
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meet the convicted person and to hear his opinions – without the na-
tional authorities being present (Cassese, 2003). If appropriate, the 
state of execution will be offered the opportunity to comment on the 
opinion of the convicted person (Rule 211, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). 
A confidential report, based on the findings, will be sent to the coun-
try concerned and to the president. The state of execution and the 
president will consult each other about it. Subsequently, the president 
can demand that the state of execution reports on any changes that 
have occurred concerning the detention conditions described in the 
report.  
Some countries call the reports ‘monitoring’ (this is the case, for in-
stance, in the agreements between Austria, Spain and Portugal and 
the ICTY) and some ‘visits’ (for instance, in the various ad hoc agree-
ments between Germany and the ICTY), which – probably – illustrates 
the sensitivity of this issue. The UK ensured that it is written, both in 
the agreement with the ICTY and in the agreement with the ICC, that 
the report cannot be published without the approval of the govern-
ment of the UK. Reports of the CPT can be published (theoretically), 
but those of the ICRC cannot (Mulgrew, 2009).  
4. Modification of the sentence decided by the tribunal or court only 
The terms of the international courts allow punishments to be modi-
fied during the time the sentence is being executed. Three conditions 
are discussed in the legal instruments of the international courts. The 
Practice Direction Early Release of the ICTY31 and the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the ICTR32
                                                            
31 Practice Direction on the procedure for the determination of applications for par-
don, commutation of sentence and early release of persons convicted by the interna-
tional tribunal of the ICTY (September 1, 2009), ICTY IT/146/Rev.2 (2009) (hereaf-
ter: Practice Direction Early Release). 
 contain terms concerning clemency, 
penalty reduction and early release. Clemency is granted if the court 
judges the crime should be forgiven, or if a judicial error has occurred, 
or if the sentence should not have been imposed in the first place. 
32 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR (29 June 1995, last changed on Octo-
ber 1, 2009), http://www.unictr.org/tabid/95/default.aspx (hereafter: Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the ICTR). 
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Penalty reduction means that the punishment is substituted by a 
lesser punishment, which can also mean that the court acknowledges 
that the original punishment was too severe. Early release includes all 
kinds of release, measures and programmes (Tolbert & Rydberg, 
2000).  
The decisions on this matter are taken by the international court itself. 
In any case, the state of execution may not release the convicted per-
son before the completion of the sentence as set down by the court. 
Only the court has the right to decide on any reduction of the sen-
tence.  
The procedures of the tribunals and the ICC differ here and there. For 
the ICTY and the ICTR, the state of execution informs the tribunal 
when the convicted person, according to the rules of the state of exe-
cution, is eligible for a revision or reduction of the sentence, 45 days 
before the date of ‘eligibility’ at the latest (Rule 124, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the ICTR). Consequently, no prison term is fixed 
by the international court itself; the terms of the individual states 
count as the point of reference. This is not the case with the ICC. The 
Statute of the ICC stipulates that, in any case, a person convicted by 
the ICC is only eligible for a revision of the sentence in order to re-
duce it after two-thirds of the sentence has been served, or after 25 
years in the case of life imprisonment. A revision of the sentence will 
not occur before this date (Article 110, Rome Statute). 
Regarding the tribunals, after the tribunal is notified by the state con-
cerned,33 the convicted person is informed about the fact that he/she is 
eligible for clemency, penalty reduction or early release.34
                                                            
33The ICTY Manual on Developed Practices clarifies the fact that the notification is 
also given by the convicted person himself (who believes he is eligible because his 
situation is comparable with other persons punished by the ICTY who have been 
released). Although the convicted person does not actually have a right to demand his 
release, there is in practice a reaction by the court to the convicted person’s asking for 
the materials mentioned in Article 2 of the Practice Direction and enquiring about the 
position of the state of execution.  
 The regis-
34 The agreements between the ICTY and the countries where the sentence is exe-
cuted, besides commutation and pardon, which are integrated into the text by default, 
also refer to early release. A few countries however preferred to describe their sentence 
execution modalities in more detail: for instance ‘non-custodial measures’, ‘working 
activities outside the prison’, and ‘conditional release’ in the treaty with Italy; ‘release 
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trar requests reports from the competent authorities of the state of 
execution about the behaviour of the convicted person, psychologi-
cal/psychiatric evaluations of his/her mental condition during the 
detention, and reports concerning the general detention conditions. 
From the prosecutor he requests a detailed report of the cooperation 
of the person concerned with the office of the prosecutor and the im-
portance of this cooperation. Furthermore, the registrar collects all 
information considered by the president to be important (Practice 
Direction Early Release, p. 3). A copy of this information is sent to the 
president and also to the convicted person himself. The person con-
cerned has ten days to consider all the information mentioned,35 and 
subsequently is heard by the president (in writing, by telephone or by 
video link) (Practice Direction Early Release, p. 3). Afterwards there is 
a round of consultations with the members of the sentencing chamber 
and of the bureau. They receive all the information mentioned above, 
accompanied by comments of the president on the demonstration of 
the convicted person’s rehabilitation. The Rules of the ICTR also 
stipulate that the government of Rwanda should be informed (Rule 
125, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR), so that it can also 
give its opinion. The victims are not involved in these procedures at 
all. This is in line with the fact that the role given to the victims in the 
tribunals is rather limited. The legal framework of the tribunals 
mainly considers victims as witnesses.36
The final decision is taken by the president, who at this stage also con-
siders the general standards of, respectively, Rule 125 and Rule 126 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY
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on parole or any other measure altering the conditions or length of detention’ in the 
treaty with France; and ‘half-open or open prison’ in the agreement with Poland. 
However, all the modalities described require a notification to the tribunal, except that 
in the treaty with Belgium it is additionally stipulated that it ‘shall notify the ICTY if 
the convicted person is granted a sentence enforcement method other than early 
release, or if this method is revoked or suspended’. 
 and the ICTR (‘In 
determining whether pardon or commutation is appropriate, the 
president shall take into account, inter alia, the gravity of the crime or 
crimes for which the prisoner was convicted, the treatment of simi-
35 The registrar has to ensure that he/she is assisted by an adviser.  
36 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 8, 2009. 
37  Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY (December 10, 2009), ICTY 
IT/32/Rev. 44 (2009) and http://www.icty.org/sid/136. 
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larly-situated prisoners, the prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation, 
as well as any substantial cooperation of the prisoner with the Prose-
cutor’). Clemency, a reduced sentence or early release are only possi-
ble if the president of the tribunal, in consultation with the judges, 
decides to grant this because of the legal position and the general 
principles of the law (Article 28, ICTY Statute). If release is not 
granted, the decision will mention a date on which the convicted per-
son will be eligible for a new consideration of his/her early release 
(unless this date is fixed in the law of the relevant state) (Practice Di-
rection Early Release, p. 4). 
The decision of the president is final, and no appeal is possible (Prac-
tice Direction Early Release, p. 5). The decision is notified to the rele-
vant authorities of the state of execution, to the convicted person and 
eventually to other interested parties. If there is a decision to grant 
release, the registrar will, if appropriate, and if the president insists, 
notify the people who gave evidence during the trial of the release, the 
destination of the person concerned and other information considered 
to be relevant (Practice Direction Early Release, p. 5). 
The procedure of the ICC at some points differs from the procedures 
mentioned above for the ad hoc tribunals – for example, the elements 
to be considered when a decision on reducing a penalty is made are 
stipulated in the Statute. Notably, the ICC can decide to revise the 
sentence in one of the following circumstances: the early and con-
tinuous willingness of the person to cooperate with the investigations 
and prosecutions of the court; the voluntary cooperation of the person 
to enable the execution of the sentence, in particular concerning the 
whereabouts of money so that the collection of fines, seizures and 
compensation becomes possible; or the existence other factors which 
make it clear that there is an obvious change of circumstances suffi-
cient to motivate a reduction in the penalty (Article 110, Rome Stat-
ute). Moreover, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulate that the 
following criteria will also be considered: (a) behaviour during deten-
tion that shows a dissociation from criminal behaviour; (b) the pros-
pects for successful reintegration of the convicted person; (c) whether 
the early release would induce significant social instability; (d) signifi-
cant actions undertaken by the convicted person for the benefit of the 
victims and the possible impact of the early release on victims or their 
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families; and (e) the individual situation of the convicted person, inter 
alia worsening physical or mental health or advanced age. These pro-
visions are more specific than those of the ad hoc tribunals and, more-
over, they complement them on a few points.  
An ICC decision to revise a sentence is not made by the president (as 
is the case with the ad hoc tribunals), but by three judges of the ap-
peals chamber, who conduct a hearing. The hearing is held in the 
presence of the convicted person, who can be assisted by an adviser 
(and a translator). The prosecutor, a representative of the state of exe-
cution and the victims are invited to join this hearing, or to file written 
observations. The three judges will decide and communicate the rea-
sons to all of those who participated in the hearing, as quickly as pos-
sible. If reduction is refused, the three judges of the appeals chamber 
will reconsider the question every three years, unless a shorter interval 
is set. In the case of a significant change of circumstance, the three 
judges can allow the convicted person to ask for a revision before the 
end of the period (of three years) (Rule 224, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). 
5. Consequences of the tribunal’s or court’s decision on the execution of the 
sentence 
The way the decisions on clemency, penalty reduction and release are 
handled was normally set out in a flexible way in the treaties between 
the court and states, and also differs between the tribunals and the 
ICC. It also differs between the states with which agreements are con-
cluded.  
For the tribunals, different consequences can be attached to the presi-
dent’s decision that the alteration of the sentence is not suitable (‘ap-
propriate’). If the president of the tribunal decides that no early release 
should be allowed, but the country concerned nevertheless wants to 
release the convicted person, the situation is described as 'an impossi-
bility to execute the sentence'. In such a case, the convicted person is 
transferred to the tribunal or to another state appointed by the tribu-
nal. This regulation is recorded in the agreements of the ICTY with 
Italy, Spain and Portugal and in the ad hoc agreements with Germany, 
and in the agreement of the ICTR with Italy. A variant in this case is 
that, after the decision of the tribunal, it is again up to the country 
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concerned. The tribunal formulates its vision on the question of 
whether or not early release is appropriate. Sweden, Denmark (, Bel-
gium)38
Other countries however follow a different path: when the president of 
the tribunal judges that early release is not appropriate, the state of 
execution acts upon this decision. This regulation is recorded in the 
agreements between the ICTY and Finland, Norway, Austria, the UK, 
Ukraine, Poland and Albania. The agreement between the SCSL and 
the UK stipulates that the UK will act upon the decision of the court 
regarding release. This is inter alia also the case with the agreements 
between the ICTR and Mali, Benin, Swaziland and Rwanda (i.e. all the 
African states that have concluded an agreement with the ICTR). 
 and Estonia then consider the tribunal’s opinion and give an 
answer. Based on this answer, the tribunal can demand the transfer of 
the convicted person to another state or to the tribunal. 
Lastly, there are also a few countries which preferred not to choose 
structurally between the two options, but to act on a case-by-case basis. 
Slovakia and France, for example, do not make the choice in their 
agreements with the ICTY: if the president of the tribunal stipulates 
that the person concerned is not eligible for release, these countries 
announce whether they will continue to execute the sentence under 
the same circumstances, or will transfer the convicted person to the 
tribunal. France also does this in its agreement with the ICTR, just 
like Sweden.  
The provisions on the consequences of these decisions are strongly 
influenced by the (practical) possibility of the state concerned allowing 
the rules of the international court to take precedence over its internal 
legislation. The way compromises are achieved between these two 
thus differs.  
The state of execution cannot reduce or modify the sentence, nor re-
lease the convicted person before the end of the imposed sentence. 
Only the international court itself can make changes in the sentence. 
                                                            
38 The treaty with Belgium stipulates that if the tribunal protests against the parole 
decision and this is nevertheless awarded, the tribunal will transfer the convicted 
person to another state or to its headquarters within 24 hours of receiving the deci-
sion. After this deadline, Belgium can implement the decision on the release.  
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But, even though the countries cannot grant clemency, a penalty re-
duction or early release against the will of the tribunal, they can make 
sure that the person concerned will serve his sentence in another 
country. It is striking that there are a few regional preferences regard-
ing the way of dealing with negative decisions concerning early re-
lease: the countries of Southern Europe show less of a tendency to 
continue to execute the sentence, while the countries of Northern and 
Eastern Europe and also the African states are more likely to obey the 
decision of the court and to make the international court take the final 
decision on release.  
In general, the countries make similar regulations on clemency and 
penalty reduction: if no clemency/penalty reduction is awarded by the 
president of the tribunal, the rules provide for the transfer of the con-
victed person to another place, or the state of execution agrees to obey 
this decision. Yet in this case there are more ‘followers’ than in the 
case of early release: in their agreements, ten countries agreed to obey 
the decision of the tribunal, whereas only seven agreed to obey in the 
case of early release. Belgium, Portugal and Germany are more flexi-
ble regarding negative decisions on clemency and penalty reduction in 
their treaties with the ICTY. France and Slovakia choose not to obey 
negative decisions and to opt for transfer (whereas they left the door 
open regarding release). In the agreements of the ICTR, the African 
states agree to obey the decision, whereas Italy, France and Sweden 
prefer in that case to transfer the person concerned to the tribunal.  
At the ICC, the consequences of negative decisions on the different 
measures were worked out in less detail than in the agreements con-
cluded by the tribunals. The general rule is clearly that only the court 
can decide on the revision and reduction of sentences, and this is also 
stated in the agreements with the UK and Austria. Besides that, 
though, it is stipulated that ‘when a sentenced person is eligible for a 
prison programme or benefit available under the national law […] 
which may entail some activity outside the prison facility’, the neces-
sary information has to be passed on to the court. One specific stipula-
tion on the consequences of a negative decision can however be 
found, concerning ‘any circumstances which could materially affect 
the terms of extent of the imprisonment’. In this case the state of exe-
cution is expected to notify the court. If the court cannot agree to these 
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circumstances, the state of execution is notified and the convicted 
person is transferred to another state. (This applies to the agreements 
between the ICC and Austria and the UK).  
6. Possibility of (requesting) a change to the sentence execution state 
On the initiative of the president or of the prosecutor, the ICC can 
decide at any time to transfer the convicted person to the prison of 
another country. Moreover, a convicted person can at any time request 
the court to allow him to be transferred from the state of enforcement 
(Article 104, Rome Statute). The requests by the prosecutor and the 
convicted person have to be written and must mention the reasons 
why transfer is demanded (Rule 209, ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). Before the president makes a decision, he can (a) ask for 
the opinion of the executing state; (b) consider written and oral pres-
entations by the convicted person and the prosecutor; (c) consider 
written or oral expert opinions concerning, inter alia, the convicted 
person; and (d) obtain other relevant information from reliable 
sources. If a request to change the state is rejected, the convicted per-
son, the prosecutor and the registrar will be notified as quickly as pos-
sible of the decision and the reasons for it. The state of execution will 
be notified as well.  
C. Conclusion 
Cooperative associations between states are used in respect of the pro-
cedures for the international transfer of convicted persons who have 
been convicted by an international court or tribunal. The cooperation 
is regulated in (bilateral) agreements. Within the tribunals, there 
seems to be a relatively ambiguous attitude towards the possibility of 
the sentence being served in the conflict region. In theory, the tribu-
nals do not like the sentence to be executed in the conflict region. 
However, it can be seen that this attitude has been modified as the 
years have passed by. Within the ICTR, an agreement with Rwanda 
was indeed concluded after several years. In the discussions and prac-
tices, a parallel can be found with the transfer of cases to national ju-
risdictions. The gradual return or transfer of responsibilities to au-
thorities in the conflict region is therefore not specific to the execution 
of sentences.  
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The country where the sentence is served is appointed by the court. 
The international court can exercise great discretion in this. However, 
in the present situation, the choice is very limited, as the number of 
countries which have declared themselves prepared to take responsi-
bility for the execution of sentences is not very high. As was shown 
above, the majority of states that have volunteered to execute sen-
tences are EU member states. 
The opinion of the convicted person plays a very small role in all of 
this, especially in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. At the tribunals, 
the convicted person does not really have the right to be heard, so the 
decision that the sentence should be executed in a certain country is 
made without the person concerned, and, moreover, apart from that, 
few personal points of reference are applied. At the ICC a very prag-
matic framework remains in place for decisions on sentence execu-
tion, even though the right to be heard has been introduced.  
Concerning the execution of the sentence itself, it appears that two 
basic principles are applied. First, the execution of the sentence is 
regulated by the national law of the executing state. Secondly, the sen-
tence must be executed in accordance with international standards. 
Sometimes (for instance in the agreements with Austria, Germany 
and Poland), equivalence with prisoners convicted in accordance with 
national regulations is also required, but this is certainly not the case 
in all agreements and, moreover, is difficult to achieve in certain situa-
tions (for instance in the execution of sentences for the ICTR in Mali 
and Benin). The modifications that are allowed to be proposed to the 
sentence also differ. For the tribunals, it was stipulated that the inves-
tigations into the desirability of early release and other changes were 
launched by a national trigger, namely the date when the convicted 
person would be eligible for this according to national law. At the ICC, 
this system was abandoned, and they reverted to a system of a central 
trigger in order to create more uniformity. 
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IV. THE CONVICTED PERSON AS A SUBJECT IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE VERTICAL EXECUTION OF A SENTENCE? 
In this part, we evaluate the degree to which the convicted person can 
be considered as a subject in the context of the international execution 
of sentences, and we consider in particular the question of whether 
his/her personal interests should or can be given minimal or maximal 
weight. After the historical contextualization of the execution of sen-
tences at the level of the international tribunals and courts, and the 
extensive analysis of the system logic controlling vertical sentence 
execution (in which the convicted person plays a limited formal role), 
we analyse in depth the extent to which attention is (or should ideally 
be) given to the interests of the convicted person by the choices made 
in the international execution of sentences.  
Minimum or maximum attention can be given to the interests of the 
convicted person by, respectively, watching over his/her (fundamen-
tal) interests and pursuing his/her integration (or his/her subjective 
interest or advantage), as the starting point.  
Minimum consideration is given to the interests of the convicted per-
son when his/her (most fundamental) interests are not harmed by the 
instruments. In the penal chain, and particularly in the phase of the 
execution of the sentence, this means that certain fundamental stan-
dards are respected, and that the way in which the sentence is exe-
cuted (and all procedures that form a part of this) corresponds to cer-
tain rules.  
The interests of the convicted person are maximally protected when a 
certain advantage for him/her is pursued. In the light of the execution 
of penalties, the pursuit of advantages within the execution of a sen-
tence is obviously always associated with the sentence itself. Regard-
ing the international execution of sentences, it is vital that the differ-
ent instruments focus on the continued execution of the sentences. 
Therefore, in any event, the sentence remains in place. The interests 
of the convicted person, or the advantage he/she has, are affected by 
the sentence itself and the differences following from execution in one 
state or another. Within the phase of the execution of the sentence, 
the potential advantages for the convicted person should therefore also
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be tied to the aims of the sentence itself and to the impact it has on 
the life of the convicted person.  
A. Minimal individual interest: Non-violation of fundamental        
interests 
Not violating the fundamental interests of the convicted person is a 
very important aspect of the execution of a sentence and, as men-
tioned before, this has been recognized in human rights and deten-
tion-specific basic instruments.  
Vertical instruments for the execution of sentences certainly protect 
the role of the convicted person very minimally. Furthering his or her 
interests is in no way the primary objective. International courts and 
tribunals mainly aim to achieve reciprocal aims in prosecution and 
judgment. Few explicit aims are associated with the stage of the execu-
tion of the sentence. The fact that the interests of the convicted person 
do not hold a central position in the activities of an international court 
or tribunal does not mean that no attention is paid to them. There is 
an obvious effort to create a fair system which does not violate the 
international human rights and sentence execution norms. In this 
way, even though the aim is not to further the interests of the con-
victed person, the aim is not to violate the fundamental rights which 
the convicted person – according to international standards – has in 
the sentence execution phase. International courts include respect for 
the (fundamental) rights of convicted persons in the most important 
instruments regulating the execution of sentences.  
The norms concerning human rights and/or sentence execution will 
serve as a touchstone for the minimal protection of the convicted per-
son’s interests. Those interests that definitely cannot be violated have 
been recognized by the international community. They reflect a com-
promise, with a striving for a balance between the claims of the differ-
ent parties involved in the criminal proceedings (offender, victim and 
the wider community). These assessment criteria concentrate on indi-
vidual rights (and the role of the convicted person), but not in such a 
way that they influence other interests that have a role to play in the 
punishment phase. 
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The first group of evaluation norms that need to be considered are 
human rights norms, as they have been the ideal touchstone for many 
years. Human rights norms for this evaluation are: the Universal Dec-
laration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). European, North and South American and African human 
rights instruments are left out of account here, for they concern re-
gional actions (Rehman, 2002). 39
Human rights norms are, however, insufficient per se to assess the 
question of whether or not fundamental interests are violated. After 
all, human rights are in general seen as a set of norms applied to an 
existing legal system in order to judge whether a minimally acceptable 
level is reached. Yet, the achievement of minimal norms is not neces-
sarily sufficient if a system is created which has to meet ‘international 
standards’. Human rights norms are therefore too basic per se to be 
evaluated by international courts and instruments (Johnson, 1998).  
 Given the EU member states’ 
dominant representation among the states in which sentences may be 
executed, however, it is argued elsewhere in this book that interna-
tional practice for the execution of sentences at the level of interna-
tional tribunals and courts (in particular the ICC) should probably 
take into account the supplementary (and sometimes higher) stan-
dards to which EU member states adhere because of their compliance 
with both binding and non-binding Council of Europe and EU stan-
dards. 
Other imposed standards therefore have to be taken into account in 
the consideration of this international system for the execution of sen-
tences. The second group of international standards considered in this 
evaluation is formed of international instruments for the execution of 
sentences and consists of the Standard Minimum Rules, the Body of 
                                                            
39 This certainly does not imply that we are underestimating the relevance or impact 
of regional human rights systems. After all, an important advantage of the regional 
systems is that, in Europe and in the Inter-American system, for instance, there is 
provision for a court to enforce human rights. So, even though the regional systems 
complement the global ones, the framework of human rights is formed at a global 
level, by the instruments mentioned in the text. Regional systems often function as an 
intermediary enforcement mechanism, and are supported in this by the geographical 
proximity and common traditions within the region (Mugwanya, 2003).  
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Principles and the Basic Principles. The Standard Minimum Rules 
were adopted by the UN in the 1950s and reflect the penology applica-
ble at that time, which was built on a rehabilitation philosophy. The 
two subsequent documents, the Body of Principles and the Basic 
Principles, focus more on the dignity and autonomy of the prisoner. 
This is more in line with the other convention adopted in that period, 
namely the ICCPR (1966).  
These instruments, and the Standard Minimum Rules in particular, 
state that they reflect the general consensus on the execution of sen-
tences at the time at which they were created. Therefore, the aim was 
to name the essential elements of those systems that were considered 
to be the most adequate at the time, so that it would be clear what was 
included in ‘good principle and practice’ in the treatment of prisoners.  
As a whole, these instruments set standards concerning the condi-
tions of the detention and the rights of the person concerned. The 
basic principles that are proposed for the conditions of detention are 
as follows: the essence of a sentence is the deprivation of freedom, the 
conditions of detention should be adequate (including the prohibition 
of torture and inhumane treatment), and the sentence should be 
served as close as possible to the prisoner’s home (the latter only if the 
person concerned asks for it). Concerning the rights of prisoners, a 
great deal of attention is paid to the non-discriminatory protection of 
these rights, and the right to complaint and inspection and to contact 
the outside world (for a detailed overview of additional European prin-
ciples and standards, see the annex). In what follows, we evaluate the 
extent to which the law and practice applicable to the vertical execu-
tion of sentences satisfy these basic principles.  
The entire function of tribunals and courts is characterized by the 
explicit choice of the enforcement of the law in the context of the rule 
of law. Following a fair process is therefore crucial.40
                                                            
40 At the ICC, this is not stipulated as such in the objectives, but it is clearly indicated 
by the fact that the case is only admissible if the country concerned cannot or does not 
want to judge the dispute itself. This is assessed, inter alia, according to standards for 
due process.  
 Besides, the fact 
that procedures are followed in a fair way is important, as the individ-
ual is set up against the entire community (Meernik, 2003). Individual 
THE CONVICTED PERSON AS A SUBJECT IN THE VERTICAL EXECUTION OF A SENTENCE? 
 
 
47 
 
rights and freedoms should therefore be protected appropriately 
against arbitrary actions taken in the name of the international com-
munity (Henham, 2003). Working legitimately is of great importance 
to the international courts. They want to ensure legitimacy, independ-
ence, impartiality and effectiveness, with a view to the long term. The 
norm of judicial independence is very important for the legitimacy of 
the courts, which in any event have the difficult task of judging people 
accused of international crimes in a fair and independent way 
(Meernik, 2003).41
                                                            
41 The actors in the international courts have a relatively large discretion. Since a 
minimum sentence and a maximum sentence are stipulated for each crime in na-
tional penal codes, this became the subject of discussion in the international penal 
rules. The first debates about this were held under the auspices of the International 
Law Commission in the 1950s. In the Rome Statute, a maximum is stipulated, but the 
decision on a specific case is for the greater part left to the judge. Accordingly, this is 
therefore a relative exception to the general principles of the court which aim to give 
limited judicial discretion (Schabas, 2004). As an example, the judges of the ICTY 
adopted their own Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Meernik, 2003). Proceedings 
before the international courts and tribunals are thus looked at critically. Until now, in 
respect of the determination of sentences, they have passed the test. Meernik investi-
gated whether judges used a legal model in their determination of the sentence, 
namely whether variables that were particularly legally relevant were used in the de-
termination before extra-legal factors. For the international courts, this particularly 
concerns legal criteria based on widely accepted international conventions (for in-
stance the ICCPR) and standards of due process (Meernik, 2003). Meernik found that 
the judgments were affected most by legal factors: the seriousness of the crimes, the 
number of crimes and the defendant’s responsibility for those crimes were the most 
important factors in deciding on the punishment, and accordingly there was little or 
no influence from political factors.  
 Fair proceedings contribute to the development of 
the international system in itself, but moreover function as an exam-
ple for the national systems (in development) (Haveman, 2005). A 
sentencing system carried out and promoted by the entire interna-
tional community may therefore serve as an example. It is not un-
thinkable that the legal system of the international courts will serve as 
an example for developing national penal law systems (Knoops, 2003). 
Bearing this in mind, it is extremely important, for the legitimacy and 
the credibility of the entire system, to respect and incorporate the 
most important international norms (Henham, 2003).  
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Concerning prosecution and justice, general principles, such as the 
rule of law, the presumption of innocence and equality of arms were 
gradually converted from the national to the international level, and 
they are now strongly integrated into this(Cassese, 2003). As an ex-
ample, the statutes of the tribunals and the courts are clearly influ-
enced by Article 14 of the ICCPR, which covers fair trial guarantees 
(Schabas, 1997). The Secretary-General also confirmed that ‘it is 
axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect interna-
tionally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all 
stages of its proceedings. In the view of the Secretary-General, such 
internationally recognized standards are, in particular, contained in 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
(Meernik, 2003). The question now arises whether all conditions 
normally required in the sentence execution phase were integrated 
into this international system to the same degree. When these interna-
tional penal systems are evaluated, the initial focus lies on the prose-
cutions and judgments of these international courts. The focus rarely 
lies on the system for the execution of sentences passed by these 
courts, even though this is an important and essential part of the in-
ternational punishment mechanism, and cannot be neglected. A sys-
tem for the execution of sentences, supported by the entire interna-
tional community, must also be a fair system that is in line with the 
standards imposed by the international community on itself. The way 
a punishment is executed has a significant influence on the legitimacy 
of the system. Not only does the execution of the sentence directly 
influence the convicted person himself and his environment, but the 
victims and everyone directly or indirectly involved with the facts also 
has an interest in the sentence execution stage. A sentence execution 
stage that appears to be too ‘gentle’ may give rise to certain questions, 
since the tribunals in the first place were set up for reciprocal pur-
poses. By creating the tribunals, the international community wanted 
to ensure that offenders were tried and actually sentenced. The stage 
of the execution of sentences is also important because it may take 
more time than the procedural stage and requires the support of the 
entire international community.  
The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC do not stipulate ex-
plicitly that the (execution of) sentences should be in accordance with 
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human rights norms. International courts and tribunals are techni-
cally not strictly legally bound by human rights instruments.42
These instruments are also mentioned in the decisions of the tribu-
nals. In the decision concerning the execution of the sentence en-
forced by the ICTR in the Ruggiu case, it is clearly stipulated that 
‘other instruments also apply to the enforcement of sentences […] 
namely: the Standard Minimum Rules […], the Body of Principles […] 
and the Basic Principles […]. Although these instruments are not bind-
ing acts, and the rules and principles therein stated are not in effect in 
all states, they nonetheless constitute what the States have agreed on 
as being the minimum best practices in imprisonment. […] Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals ought to adhere to these agreed standard 
minimum rules.’ 
 Still, it 
seems unthinkable that the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
and the ICCPR would not be respected. There is reference, in the 
agreements with the states concerning the execution of sentence and 
elsewhere, to the Basic Principles, which themselves refer to the Uni-
versal Declaration and the ICCPR. The most important international 
norms regarding the execution of sentences are mentioned as such in 
the legal instruments of the international courts and tribunals, with 
the explicit purpose that the rights of the convicted person should not 
be harmed, thus making the circle complete. 
For these reasons, the vertical execution of sentences will mainly be 
assessed against these international standards. The balance between 
individual fundamental rights and the reciprocal purposes of the in-
                                                            
42 The hierarchy of the legal norms binding on the ICC, especially at the stage of 
prosecution and the determination of sentences, was clearly stipulated. The Statute 
assumes that there is a threefold hierarchy. At the top, of course, is the Statute itself, 
together with the Elements of Crime and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Sec-
ondly, there are the applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international 
criminal law. There is no explicit reference to the international human rights treaties. 
Nonetheless, Article 21 (3) mentions that the application and interpretation of the law 
has to be in line with internationally recognized human rights. The third stage is 
made up of general principles of law, deduced from the national legislation of the 
states that would normally be responsible for judging the crimes. Article 21 invites the 
Court, if the issues cannot be resolved from the legal sources already mentioned, to 
turn to general principles of law deduced from national legislation. 
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ternational criminal law system should create a balanced international 
system.  
1. Detention conditions 
a. Deprivation of liberty as the essence of punishment 
The Standard Minimum Rules stipulate that the prison system cannot 
aggravate the suffering inherent to the imprisonment (Article 57). The 
regime to which prisoners are subjected must therefore reduce the 
difference between life in prison and life in freedom. The main aim is 
a humane detention, with respect for the inherent dignity of the per-
son (Principle 1, Body of Principles). Article 10 of the ICCPR reads: 
‘All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’. 
The aim for a humane punishment is shown by the international 
courts in a few aspects. There is an attempt to produce a humane de-
tention by making sure that the detention conditions are as good as 
they can be. The ICTY wanted to conclude agreements only with 
countries that attach great importance to human rights. The ICTY has 
confirmed, in its Practice Direction, that, in this regard, it mostly 
sought sentence execution agreements with European countries. Until 
this time, no agreement has been concluded with a non-European 
country (Klip, 1997). The ICTR eventually sought to make sentence 
execution agreements with African countries. Moreover, special atten-
tion was paid to the detention conditions, so that they would be in line 
with international standards (see further).43
                                                            
43 Note that that the aim meet out humane punishments may also appear from the 
fact that life imprisonment functions as an upper limit. When the ICTR was created, 
there was a dispute about whether the tribunal should be able to impose the death 
sentence. After all, Rwandan law provides for the death sentence in case of murder. 
The fact that this was not possible at the ICTR created a certain dissociation, with two 
speeds of trials in the conflict regions: the ICTR applied life imprisonment as the 
maximum sentence, whereas the Rwandan national courts eventually did pass the 
death sentence on lower level officials. Therefore it was argued that there was a funda-
mental injustice, because the masterminds of the genocide were ‘only’ sentenced to 
life imprisonment (Roberts & McMillan, 2003). The representative of Rwanda at the 
Security Council stated that this would not contribute to national reconciliation. This 
dissociation ended when Rwanda stopped imposing the death sentence, and later 
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In practice, there are differences in the circumstances of the depriva-
tion of freedom, as the punishments are executed in a decentralized 
system. The determination of the sentence and the indication of the 
country where the sentence will be served are two different proce-
dures. The judges do not know in advance where the sentence will be 
executed. Nevertheless, as the location of the detention indicates the 
conditions under which the sentence will be executed, this is a crucial 
element of the decision to impose the sentence. This decision deter-
mines the detention regime, the political environment in which the 
prisoner will live, the early release rules, the distance from the conflict 
region and the international human rights supervision mechanisms 
that are applicable (Klip, 1997). Schabas therefore argues that it is 
important for the tribunal to evaluate the detention conditions, be-
cause they influence the severity of the sentence (Schabas, 1997).  
In the Erdemovic case, the trial chamber of the ICTY took a closer look 
at this. Even though the trial chamber is aware of the fact that respon-
sibility for the execution of the sentence is given to the registrar and 
the president, ‘the Trial chamber will, however, take account of the 
                                                                                                                                      
abolished it. For cases the Rwandan courts tried themselves, death sentences were 
initially imposed and a few people were also executed. The executions took place in 
large stadiums and were massive public affairs.  
Strictly speaking, the death penalty cannot be considered an inhumane punishment. 
Article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates that the death penalty can only be imposed for the 
most serious crimes, and that each person sentenced to death must have the right to 
ask for clemency or a reduction in the penalty. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on 
the death sentence. Western countries in particular have appeared to be in favour of 
the abolition of the death penalty in recent decades. It was not until the second half of 
the twentieth century that the death penalty was removed from the penal codes of 
these countries. In the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the desire for retribution over-
took the purpose of imposing a humane punishment, and this is also evident from 
the frequent use of the death penalty (Schabas, 1997). The fact that the death penalty 
was not imposed by the recently created international courts means that one form of 
punishment, whose humanity is questioned by a few countries, was not accepted. 
Nevertheless, Rwanda, supported in this by the US, strongly fought for the death 
penalty. It cannot be forgotten that previous history may have played a role in this, 
too. The fact is that the prohibition on the use of the death penalty was still uncontro-
versial when the ICTY was founded. Not integrating the death sentence into the ICTR 
Statute made these norms take precedence over those of the Rwandan people (Akha-
van, 1996). The fight for humanity in the sentence that is imposed has therefore 
become an essential part of international justice. 
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place and conditions of enforcement of the sentence in an effort to 
ensure due process, the proper administration of justice and equal 
treatment for convicted persons’. In practice this appears to be impos-
sible as the registrar would not by the sentencing stage have deter-
mined where the sentence should be served. The trial chamber ac-
cepted as an alleviating circumstance the fact that the punishment 
would be served in a prison far away from the convicted person’s own 
country (Schabas, 1997).  
b. Adequate detention conditions 
Article 7 of the ICCPR points out that ‘no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration also contains an absolute prohi-
bition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, just like Principle 6 of the Body of Principles. This stipulation 
is relatively vague, and the interpretation given to it has evolved 
through the years. The Body of Principles says that cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment ‘should be interpreted so as to 
extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical 
or mental, including the holding of a detained or imprisoned person 
in conditions which deprive him, temporarily or permanently, of the 
use of any of his natural senses, such as sight or hearing, or of his 
awareness of place and the passing of time’ (Note to Principle 6). The 
prohibition of torture is the absolute lower limit in the realization of 
adequate detention conditions.  
The prescription for adequate conditions of detention is, however, not 
limited to this. The Standard Minimum Rules stipulate that different 
categories of prisoners have to be put in different institutions. In any 
event, persons in custody have to be separated from persons already 
convicted (Article 8). There is no preference for individual cells over 
dormitories, but if there are individual cells it is required that each 
prisoner should sleep in his own cell. Otherwise, the rules suggest 
that prisoners should be carefully selected for their ability to sleep in 
the same dormitory (Article 9). It is also required that nourishment 
with a sufficient nutritional value is provided, that unlimited drinking 
water is available and that prisoners should, at the minimum, have an 
hour of exercise in the open air (Articles 20 and 21). All prisoners are 
THE CONVICTED PERSON AS A SUBJECT IN THE VERTICAL EXECUTION OF A SENTENCE? 
 
 
53 
 
supposed to work, if they are found suitable for this by a doctor (Arti-
cle 71). After all, significant and paid work will facilitate the reintegra-
tion that is assumed (Basic Principle No 8). A possibility for all pris-
oners to be educated has to be provided. Recreation and cultural activi-
ties have to be arranged in all institutions (Article 78, Standard Mini-
mum Rules; Basic Principle No 6). 
The tribunals examine whether the detention conditions correspond 
to the standards, in the areas of nourishment, medical care, right of 
access, possibilities of correspondence, and so on. 44 The detention 
conditions nonetheless differ greatly between countries that have de-
clared themselves willing to execute sentences. Countries from all 
over the world have declared themselves willing to execute sentences, 
and not all of them could or can comply with the requirements men-
tioned above. The execution of sentences in African states after convic-
tion by the ICTR seemed to be especially problematic. The ICTR pre-
ferred sentences to be executed in African states, but the detention 
conditions did not comply with the international standards. Starting 
from the argument that they are not responsible for the general deten-
tion conditions in a certain country, but only for the specific condi-
tions in which international convicts are held, specific regulations on 
this were recorded in the agreements with African states. The agree-
ments with Mali, Benin and Swaziland stipulated that ‘the tribunal 
undertakes to approach donor countries and agencies with a view to 
securing financial assistance’, so that the detention conditions could 
be brought into line with international standards for persons con-
victed by the tribunal.45
                                                            
44 Interview with Roland Amoussouga, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief of External Rela-
tions and Strategic Planning Section (ERSPS) and ICTR Spokesperson, held Septem-
ber 23, 2009. 
 Normally only the costs of the transfer itself 
are borne by the tribunal, and all other costs relating to the execution 
45 This possibly also has more substantial consequences for these countries, as it leads 
to further debate on detention conditions. After all, the rights granted to these inter-
national prisoners may possibly influence other prisoners, who may also claim these 
rights. In Benin this has led to a search for donors to ameliorate the detention condi-
tions in other facilities too.  
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of the sentence are borne by the state itself.46
Detention conditions still remain an important area of attention, espe-
cially within the ICTR. It was stipulated that sentence execution must 
also be possible in Rwanda, but in the ‘Rule 11bis’ jurisprudence it 
appears that there are worries concerning the detention conditions in 
Rwanda. Rule 11bis stipulates that cases can be referred to a national 
jurisdiction if the court is convinced that the person concerned will 
receive a fair trial and that the death sentence will not be imposed. 
The decisions also examine whether the country which asks for the 
transfer of jurisdiction possesses an adequate structure for the execu-
tion of sentences. Detention conditions are therefore also evaluated: 
‘Case law has established that conditions of detention in a national 
jurisdiction, whether pre- or post-conviction, are a matter that touches 
upon the fairness of that jurisdiction’s system’.
 Mali and Benin received 
considerable sums of money to upgrade their prison facilities. The 
agreement with Rwanda stipulates that the tribunal will bear the costs 
related to ‘upgrading of the ICTR quarters in the designated prison 
facility in Rwanda, upon mutual agreement, to international standards 
for imprisonment conditions under which convicted persons are to 
serve their sentences pursuant to this Agreement’ (these costs are 
mainly for accommodation, but also for nourishment, communication 
and medical care). Rwanda will bear all other costs related to the exe-
cution of sentences, including the costs of safety and surveillance, the 
remuneration of prison staff and fundamental resources (water, elec-
tricity, etc.). 
47 It is confirmed that 
the conditions for detention ‘must accord with internationally recog-
nized standards’.48
                                                            
46 Moreover, the agreements with Mali, Benin, Swaziland and Rwanda stipulate that 
repatriation after the sentence has been served and repatriation of the body in case of 
death is funded by the tribunal. If the person concerned returns to a country other 
than Rwanda, ‘where he/she is lawfully resident’, Rwanda has to provide for all neces-
sary travelling documents and has to authorize the emigration from Rwanda in accor-
dance with Rwandan law; this applies to all Rwandan subjects. 
 Rwanda had recorded in its transfer law that ‘Any 
47 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis (June 6, 2008). 
48 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis (May 28, 
2008). 
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person who is transferred to Rwanda by the ICTR for trial shall be 
detained in accordance with the minimum standards of detention 
stipulated in the […] Body of Principles […]’. Moreover, there is also 
provision for inspections by the ICRC. All of this ensured that a spe-
cial regime was created for these persons. The trial chamber does not 
consider it probable that prisoners under this special regime would be 
subjected to torture or inhumane treatment. Nevertheless, in the light 
of these proceedings there are some worries concerning the service of 
life imprisonment in solitary confinement,49 which comprises a viola-
tion of Article 7 of the ICCPR. The Munyakazi decision states that 
‘human rights bodies have consistently held that imprisonment in 
isolation is an undesirable penalty and should be used only in excep-
tional circumstances and for limited periods’, and that ‘States must 
ensure that where individuals are imprisoned in isolation, effective 
safeguards are in place to guarantee that such isolation is consistent 
with the right to humane treatment and respects the inherent dignity 
of the person’.50 The trial chamber also considered that there was a 
risk that prisoners would have to serve their life imprisonment in soli-
tary confinement in Rwanda, given the vagueness of the legal provi-
sions in this respect and the absence of certain guarantees. The re-
quest for the transfer of the prosecution of Munyakazi to Rwanda was 
declined inter alia for this reason, just like the request for the transfer 
of the prosecution of Kanyarukiga.51
c. Sentence execution near home 
 
The Body of Principles stipulates that a prisoner, if he so requests, will 
be imprisoned ‘reasonably near his usual place of residence’, if possi-
ble (Principle 20). In practice, it is often not the case that people, after 
                                                            
49 According to the Rwandan Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 on the Aboli-
tion of the Death Penalty, ‘life imprisonment with special provisions is imprisonment 
with the following modalities: 1. A convicted person is not entitled to any kind of 
mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, unless he/she has served at least twenty 
(20) years of imprisonment; 2. A convicted person is kept in isolation’. 
50 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis (May 28, 
2008). 
51 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis (June 6, 2008). 
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having being convicted by an international court, can serve their sen-
tence near the place where they resided before custody. After all, it is 
not possible to serve a sentence imposed by the ICTY in a country that 
was previously a part of Yugoslavia. At the ICTR this only became 
possible recently, after the agreement was concluded with Rwanda. 
The ICC has only concluded two agreements yet, but as the court as-
pires to ‘equitable geographical distribution’ regarding the execution 
of sentences, for a prisoner to serve his sentence in his home country 
is certainly not a paramount objective.  
Clearly, the structure of the international decentralized system is not 
in accordance with the recommendation in the Body of Principles. 
Moreover, the difference between this and the established practice of 
horizontal international transfer of convicted persons to their home 
country, where the starting point is that the sentence is best executed 
in the home country of the person concerned, is striking. However, 
the issue is of course more complicated in vertical procedures than in 
horizontal ones, for in vertical procedures the home country is usually 
the country of the conflict itself. At the time that a vertical criminal 
procedure is initiated, the conflict is possibly still (latently) continuing. 
But even at a later stage, the execution of a sentence in the home 
country can have both advantages and disadvantages.  
An important advantage is that the court can respond to the criticism 
that proceedings before an international court are too far from the 
conflict region, with the result that such trials are insufficiently visible 
to the local community and are less ‘accessible’ to the victims. For 
instance, the ICTY is located in The Hague, and thus is far from the 
conflict region, which creates a physical and psychological distance 
from the population of the former Yugoslavia. The fact that the sen-
tence would be served in the country of origin also brings the pun-
ishment closer. 
The proximity to victims and survivors can also be a disadvantage 
(Mulgrew, 2009), not least for the convicted persons themselves. It is, 
for instance, noticeable that within the ICTR, where the execution of 
sentences in Rwanda was not excluded, this theme is a very sensitive 
one. Convicted persons declare in letters that they do not want to serve 
their sentence in Rwanda, because they fear that their lives would be 
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in danger – because of the threat of reprisals of their enemies from 
the time of the conflict.52 This is the case even while Rwanda itself 
strongly insists on its ability to execute sentences: each time it is in-
formed of an allocation procedure, it lets the ICTR know that it is will-
ing to execute the sentence. Rwanda declares that it attaches great 
importance to the principle that ‘justice is seen to be done’, which 
means that the victims can see that the offenders are really punished. 
Moreover, it thinks that Rwanda should receive priority in this, as it is 
mentioned first in Article 26 of the Statute; however, the ICTR how-
ever does not follow Rwanda in this view.53
This system of the international transfer of convicted persons is thus 
not based on the principle that prisoners should serve their sentences 
in their home countries. The question remains: what is the para-
mount objective of this international system for the execution of sen-
tences? In practice it seems that this type of international transfer of 
convicted persons is strongly influenced by pragmatism.  
 Other courts, such as the 
ICTY (but also the SCSL), also feared that former supporters would 
consider the prisoners as ‘heroes’ and that this would influence the 
execution of their sentences. It is also noticeable that the conflict re-
gions do not necessarily – always – have a good working relationship 
with the tribunal: the Serbian authorities were reluctant to cooperate 
with the ICTY or even to prosecute Serbian war criminals under the 
national penal system. The relationship between the ICTR and 
Rwanda has been uncertain more than once. After Carla Del Ponte 
announced in 2000 that the ICTR would start research into crimes 
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (which was in power in 
Rwanda), the traffic of witnesses and employees of the ICTR between 
Rwanda and Tanzania was obstructed (Zaum, 2009).  
The execution of sentences is the subject of international relation-
ships, a domain in which discretion and politics play an important 
role. Klip wondered if the execution of sentences should really be the 
task of the international courts – since, as he noticed, the tribunals of 
                                                            
52 Interview with Roland Amoussouga, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief of External Rela-
tions and Strategic Planning Section (ERSPS) and ICTR Spokesperson, held Septem-
ber 23, 2009. 
53 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
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Tokyo and Nuremberg did not feel obliged to undertake this task 
(Klip, 1997) – and it seems that this is also the opinion of numerous 
countries. A limited number of countries have concluded agreements, 
but here also the ‘political’ factor still plays a role. By way of example, 
the existence of good personal ties seems to have influenced the con-
clusion of the first agreements by the ICTR (for instance with Mali). 
In contrast, the conclusion of an agreement by the ICTR has been 
blocked by the UN Office of Legal Affairs because of problems con-
cerning democracy and good governance in the country concerned. 
Some countries also do not want to conclude an agreement so that 
they do not introduce further tensions with the country concerned, in 
casu Rwanda.54
Moreover, it appears that the power and the possibility of making de-
cisions on a case-by-case basis are also of great importance to the 
states involved in the execution of sentences. Whereas it could be as-
sumed that the conclusion of an agreement with the tribunal on the 
execution of sentences is an expression of the country’s overall will-
ingness to execute the punishments of the tribunal, in practice the 
execution happens on a case-by-case basis. Although the decision of 
the president in the case of Ruggiu does stipulate that ‘the president 
considers that the existence of such an agreement complies with the 
requirement in Article 26 that the State indicates to the Security 
Council its willingness for such enforcement’,
 
55
At the ICTR it is clear that there are many problems in executing the 
sentences. States are very reluctant. African states, especially, partici-
 an additional approval 
for each individual is still required. The agreements function as 
‘framework agreements’, which allow decisions to be made on the 
execution of sentences on a case-by-case base. Some countries chose 
to record their restrictions and conditions in the agreements, but 
other countries chose not to record their intentions (regarding, for 
instance, the rejection of requests concerning high profile prisoners or 
punishments longer than the maximum sentence in the national leg-
islation) (Tolbert & Rydberg, 2000).  
                                                            
54 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
55 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Decision on the enforcement of sentence, Case 
No. ICTR-97-32-A26 (February 13, 2008). 
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pate in the system because the UN pays for the building of adequate 
detention facilities, and only a few other countries have declared 
themselves willing. The latter group of countries mainly seem inter-
ested in certain convicts and therefore only accept convicts on a case-
by-case base. To be precise, these countries continue to think that the 
sentence is best executed in a country connected to the convict. For 
this reason, Italy accepted a person convicted by the ICTR because he 
was part Italian. The other European countries have not so far ac-
cepted anyone convicted by the ICTR. Nevertheless, Sweden has de-
clared its willingness to accept convicted persons who have strong ties 
with Sweden.56 De facto this means that the choice of place for the 
execution of sentences at the ICTR is limited to Mali and Benin,57 
where prison facilities have already been built.58
2. Rights of the convicted person 
 Although the Ruggiu 
decision ambitiously states that ‘the President shall take into account 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person in his/her deci-
sion-making process’, this is less obvious in practice. The considera-
tion of individual circumstances is therefore more of a theoretical 
issue if the choice of place for the execution of the sentence is so lim-
ited.  
a. Non-discriminatory application of the law 
In all human rights and norms for the execution of sentences, a non-
discriminatory application of the law is an important foundation. The 
Universal Declaration simply says ‘all are equal before the law’. Article 
14 of the ICCPR stipulates that ‘all persons shall be equal before the 
courts and the tribunals’. The specific norms for the execution of sen-
tences stipulate that the norms have to be applied ‘impartially’ and 
that there can be no question of discrimination. The Body of Princi-
                                                            
56 Note that some countries do not follow this reasoning and explicitly declare this to 
be the case – see, for instance, the provision in the agreement between the ICTY and 
Poland: ‘enforcement is possible also when the convicted person is not a Polish na-
tional and not permanently residing within the territory or when he/she does not 
consent’. 
57 A few convicted persons have also served their entire sentence in the detention 
facility of the tribunal itself.  
58 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 8, 2009. 
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ples stipulates that the principles have to be applied to all persons 
‘within the territory of any given state’ (Principle 5) without any dis-
tinction. Though all stipulations refer to equality, there are differences 
in the type of equivalence promoted. Whether it is equivalence within 
the territory of a certain state that is required, or equivalence regard-
ing the proceedings of a certain court, causes a fundamentally differ-
ent situation in the context of the international courts. (In)equality 
can, moreover, be important in respect of detention conditions on the 
one hand and early release on the other hand. 
Detention conditions 
The stipulation in the Body of Principles could be interpreted as a 
recommendation that states should strive for equality in execution of 
sentences between those convicted by the international court and 
those convicted in the country where the sentence is executed. In the 
context of the international courts, this would not, however, be the 
most logical form of equality. After all, the place where the prisoner 
has to serve his/her sentence has, in practice, until now been more of 
a consequence of a ‘pragmatic’ decision, based on the existing possi-
bilities (see earlier), than the result of a rationally motivated choice. 
There are rarely specific ties between the convicted person and the 
country where he will serve his sentence. Tying the requirement of 
equality to the country where the sentence is executed therefore has 
no foundation. A required equality between all those convicted by the 
international court or tribunal itself is common sense to the tribunals 
and the courts. Nevertheless, this type of equivalence with national 
prisoners is sometimes required (for instance in the agreements be-
tween the ICTY and Austria, Germany and Poland). 
Moreover, this creates an inequality between the various people con-
victed by the court, even though an international court strives for the 
creation of a certain uniformity in punishment (Findlay & McLean, 
2007). The jurisprudence of the ICTY mentions this explicitly in the 
Erdemovic judgment, in which it is stated that the court strives for the 
realization of an equal treatment of all convicted persons (Klip, 1997). 
The differences in detention conditions and the modalities for the 
execution of sentences, inherent to a decentralized system, possibly 
constitute a weakness of the system that has repercussions for the 
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tribunal itself. The wish to realize an equal treatment requires that 
there is no significant disparity between states (Klip, 1997).  
Choosing to realize equality between those convicted by the courts 
therefore seems the most logical choice. For this reason it is also 
rather strange to see that the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR state 
that ‘imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of 
the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International 
Tribunal’. The fact that sentences are executed in different countries 
may mean that two people given similar sentences by the tribunal will 
eventually serve two totally different punishments (Mettraux, 2005). 
The international courts can only achieve a certain degree of consis-
tency. There is a certain risk of discrimination, of unequal treatment 
in the way sentences are executed. As an example: in a Scandinavian 
country, a prisoner has the right of access by his family or undisturbed 
visits by his partner, whereas this is not the case in Benin. It is very 
hard to eliminate this kind of inequality in treatment.59
Nevertheless, the courts and tribunals operate under the fiction that 
detention conditions are similar worldwide. The varieties in detention 
conditions are not taken into account when appointing the country in 
which the sentence will be executed. It is assumed that the detention 
conditions are always adequate and that there are no important differ-
ences. It is also assumed that all facilities used are suitable for the 
execution of sentences, although the standard varies, at best, between 
adequate and good. The tribunals choose a country based on a fair 
balance, working on the assumption that all countries from which 
they can choose are sufficiently equal, with no specific reason to 
choose one country or another.  
 
In her analysis of the execution of sentences passed by the SCSL, 
Mulgrew called for the preservation of the detention facility of the 
court, as this meets the international standards and the staff are ex-
perienced regarding the implementation of those international stan-
dards. The prison regime meets human rights and current principles 
of penology. According to her, this internationalized model constitutes 
a good combination of national and international support: it has a 
                                                            
59 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 8, 2009. 
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national location, but the staff, management and supervision are in 
accordance with international standards. Moreover, she reasons that 
nowadays the detention facilities of the international tribunals are also 
used as ‘prisons’, as sentences are executed there. Some people serve 
their sentence there, in anticipation of their transfer to another state, 
and others are even released from these facilities (Mulgrew, 2009). 
Mulgrew states that the ICC must consider preserving the detention 
facilities of the temporary tribunals, so that an instant and permanent 
detention capacity is available. Prisoners can be imprisoned in their 
region of origin, and a network of internationally controlled prisons is 
created. According to Mulgrew, this is a further step towards the reali-
zation of an international penal system (Mulgrew, 2009). Financially, 
this does not seem to be an option (Klip, 1997). Moreover, the deten-
tion facilities also know their limitations: at the ICTR detention facil-
ity, for instance, the possibilities for work are limited (to the prisoner 
cleaning his/her own cell), and the only possibility for education is 
taking English classes.60
Early release 
 Moreover, the question arises of which coun-
tries would be willing to accept these facilities on their territory. 
Another matter in which there is a risk of unequal treatment concerns 
early release. The fact that, at the ICTY and ICTR, national legislation 
stipulates whether one is eligible for early release allows there to be a 
lack of equality between different prisoners of the international court 
(Schabas, 1997). Even though the national regulations on release are 
not directly applicable to international prisoners, the agreements with 
the executing countries stipulate that the international court will be 
informed when the convicted person is eligible for early release. The 
‘trigger’ for the release is thus found in the national legislation. The 
differences in legislation (in Belgium, for instance, a prisoner is eligi-
ble after one third of his sentence, in the UK after half, and in Sweden 
after two-thirds) do have an influence (Mulgrew, 2009). Differences 
between the different countries in legislation concerning early release 
possibly also cause discrepancies.  
Nevertheless, the courts attempt to remedy the inequalities arising 
from the fact that there are no fixed terms for early release. This 
                                                            
60 Interview with staff of the ICTR Detention Facility, held October 8, 2009. 
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mainly happens through the courts themselves. The fact that the 
president of the court, and not the state itself, eventually makes the 
decision indicates that a balance is sought in decisions regarding re-
lease. Just because this control is kept by the court, the punishment 
and the prisoner are granted an ‘international rank’ (Mulgrew, 2009). 
If the decision on release were to end up in the hands of the state of 
execution, this would undermine the foundations of the international 
execution mechanisms. This would signify a kind of internationaliza-
tion of the sentence.  
The Manual on Developed Practices of the ICTY reasons that the con-
centration in the president of the discretionary competence in the 
decisions on early release means that the relevant factors can be con-
sistently evaluated. Moreover, the president can take account of deci-
sions concerning other prisoners.61
The application of this two-thirds threshold is also seen in the cases in 
which a convicted person is never transferred to a state for the execu-
tion of his sentence, but stays in the detention facility of the tribunal. 
There is no special procedure provided for this. Normally, the state 
 It is stipulated that all prisoners 
receive equal treatment and equal possibilities of obtaining early re-
lease. Even though this was not recorded in the Practice Direction, it 
turns out that, in practice, the limit of two-thirds is applied.  
                                                            
61 The supervision of the detention by the international tribunal was recorded in the 
Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR. The supervision remains with the tribunal, but 
this means that it is not immediately clear who is responsible for the supervision 
when the mandate of the tribunal ends. The appeals chambers ceased their hearings 
at the end of 2010. The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence clearly stipulated that 
‘all sentences of imprisonment shall be served under the supervision of the Tribunal 
or a body designated by it’. In the agreements which the ICTR concluded regarding 
the execution of sentences, this becomes a real concern. The treaties with Benin, Mali, 
Swaziland and Rwanda indeed stipulate that ‘in the event that the tribunal is to be 
wound up, the registrar will inform the Security Council (and the government of 
Rwanda) of any sentences whose enforcement remains to be completed pursuant to 
this Agreement’. For Sierra Leone as well, there is no certainty about the way the 
remaining sentences will be executed after the discontinuation of the tribunal (Mul-
grew, 2009). In the discussions concerning the residual mechanism, the execution of 
sentences was also discussed with the Security Council. The ICTR is convinced that, if 
the president stays, he can realize a certain degree of harmonization in the practices 
of states.  
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concerned must let the tribunal know when the person concerned is 
eligible for release. In the case of detention in the UN facility, this, 
however, is not possible. In this case even a request by the prisoner is 
declared admissible after a certain time. ‘Considering that the condi-
tions for eligibility regarding early release applications should be ap-
plied equally’ the ICTY has decided, inter alia regarding Simić62 and 
Mucić,63
Even though an attempt is made at consistency, equality between 
prisoners remains an important point of interest. In a few cases, the 
prisoner is only eligible for release after three-quarters of his sentence. 
Release is only possible if the person involved complies with the con-
ditions of the national legislation, and in this respect the discrepancy 
with the unofficial two-thirds term remains.  
 to allow a release after two-thirds of the sentence has been 
served, ‘considering that eligibility for early release in some Signatory 
States starts at two-thirds of the sentence served and, in some circum-
stances, even earlier’. This explicitly refers to the principle of ‘equal-
ity’, and indicates that the ICTY generally accepts that prisoners can 
be released after serving two-thirds of their sentence. The president of 
the ICTY has nevertheless already been prepared to intervene before 
the two-thirds limit in the past (inter alia in the cases of Kos and Kol-
undzija) (van Zyl Smit, 2007). The two-thirds limit is therefore not 
always applied consistently.  
The ICC system, under which the ICC records a term itself, will there-
fore be more able to exclude inequality. The ICC sentence will be 
based on a fixed term in which the prisoner is eligible for release after 
two-thirds of his sentence, or, in the case of life imprisonment, after 
25 years (Mulgrew, 2009). This also allows for the implementation of 
the ‘rule of law’ in the execution of sentences and therefore decreases 
the room for discretion. The creation of a framework for awarding 
release only encourages the good administration of justice in the long 
term.64
                                                            
62 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Decision of president on early release of Blagoje 
Simić, Case No. IT-95-5 (15 February 2011). 
 
63 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucic, Order of the President in response to Zdravko Mucic’s 
request for Early Release, Case No. IT-96-21-Abis (July 9, 2003). 
64 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 8, 2009. 
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Besides clarity on the terms, there should be a better framework re-
garding the criteria to be applied in deciding on early release. Without 
this, it is possible that the degree of discretion in decisions concerning 
release is (too) high. For instance, large differences between the poli-
cies of the ICTY and the ICTR can be noticed nowadays. At the ICTR, 
awarding early release is a relatively standard practice. The standard 
practice of the ICTY differs greatly. In twenty or so cases so far, the 
ICTY has opted for the release of the person concerned before the 
termination of the sentence. This has happened at the earliest after 
about two-thirds of the sentence had been served. In most of the cases 
the length of time was much greater: on average, the prisoners had 
served more than three-quarters of their sentences before they were 
released early. Nevertheless, at the ICTR, early release is hardly ever 
awarded,65 even though some judges have been common to both tri-
bunals.66
The criteria taken into account by the ICTY are, inter alia, the pris-
oner’s behaviour during detention (based on a report from the Com-
manding Officer of the Detention Unit), the prisoner’s attitude regard-
ing the facts, psychological reports dealing with whether there is an 
objection to the release
 
67
                                                            
65 Such differences between tribunals have also been noted earlier in history: the 
people given prison sentences by the Tokyo tribunal were released before the end of 
their sentences. Eight years after their convictions, they had already all been released. 
The persons convicted in Nuremberg, on the other hand, normally served their whole 
sentence, with the exception of two persons sentenced to life imprisonment who were 
released after 44 years (Klip, 1997).  
 and with whether the prisoner is ‘prone to 
66 It is possible that the vagueness concerning the relevant criteria for decisions con-
cerning release also plays a role in this, as these criteria can determine the differences 
for the two tribunals in the files prepared with a view to obtaining the release. In 
requests made to the ICTR, there is more often a reference to elements of the case 
(cooperation with the prosecutor, voluntary surrender and guilty plea) than to the fact 
that the prisoner has been rehabilitated (although this sometimes happens, for in-
stance concerning Ruggiu). In the ICTY decisions, it is clear that the tribunal was 
informed about the prisoner’s behaviour during detention (and was also told of his 
employment, relationships with staff etc.), and about whether he showed regret, his 
psychological condition and the chances of him being successfully reintegrated into 
society. 
67 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Order of the President on the Application for Early 
Release of Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1 (July 29, 2004). 
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loss of control’ (but not with whether he is emotionally stable, e.g. 
Simić) (Abels, 2008), whether the prisoner is suffering from disease, 
the prisoner’s bonds with his family, and the prisoner’s prospects of 
work.68 The jurisprudence of the ICTY makes it clear that importance 
is attached to whether the prisoner has complied with the rules and 
has a good relationship with the staff69 and other prisoners. Special 
attention is paid to good relationships with persons of the same na-
tionality, ethnicity or religion as the victims of the person concerned. 
Also regret, participation in prison activities and good behaviour not-
withstanding that the person is imprisoned in a foreign country are 
considered as positive. The Miroslav Tadic decision additionally refers 
to the prisoner’s opinion that he had good relationships with the other 
ethnic groups before the conflict broke out, and assumed that his re-
turn to the community would not cause any commotion.70 Also a con-
fidential memorandum of the registrar and a written opinion of the 
prosecutor are taken into account; the latter explains the cooperation 
with the prosecutor.71
                                                            
68 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucić, Order of the President in response to Zdravko Mucić’s 
request for Early Release, Case No. IT-96-21-Abis (July 9, 2003). 
 If a prisoner has acted as a witness in other 
cases after his conviction, this is seen as a positive factor for the reduc-
tion of his penalty (Manual on Developed Practices, p. 162). In addi-
tion, consistency between cases is also taken into account. The Simic 
decision contains the words ‘considering that Milan Simic’s case is no 
less appropriate for a grant of early release than prisoners previously 
granted early release’. The president is not affected by the judgment 
when he makes this decision, although in some judgments some kind 
of rate is stipulated. As an example: in the Dusko Tadic case the judg-
ment states that ‘unless exceptional circumstances apply, Dusko Tadic 
should serve a term of imprisonment ending no earlier than 14 July 
2007’. This is equivalent to about two-thirds of the sentence. Never-
69 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Order of the President on the Application for Early 
Release of Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1 (July 29, 2004). 
70 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon 
or Commutation of Sentence of Miroslav Tadic, Case No. IT-95-9 (November 3, 
2004). 
71 This opinion should concern cooperation given after the conviction, because coop-
eration given before the conviction would already have been taken into account in the 
determination of the sentence; other authors have already pointed to the risk of dou-
ble counting in this regard.  
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theless, such recommendations do not have to be considered by the 
president (Tolbert & Rydberg, 2000).  
The jurisprudence of the ICTR indicates that the nature of the facts 
plays an important role. The decision concerning Serushago states: 
‘Noting that the crimes for which Serushago was sentenced include 
those of the utmost gravity, including genocide; […] considering that to 
date, no person convicted by this Tribunal has yet applied for commu-
tation or early release and that those persons granted early release by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have 
not been convicted for genocide.’ 72  Similar considerations can be 
found in the decision with regard to Ruggiu.73
But the decisions regarding release are always short and contain little 
reasoning, frequently using the words ‘noting’ and ‘considering’ fol-
lowed by the decision. Genuine argument is lacking. The importance 
attached to each of the parameters and the way they relate to each 
other remains unclear. The criteria for early release are not fixed in a 
verifiable and workable manner. The decisions are only made by the 
president himself, without following a framework supported by a lar-
ger whole. Considering the consequences of these decisions, this is 
unacceptable, and the procedure can be called rather ‘primitive’. The 
‘novelty’ of the tribunals means that many imperfections can still be 
found in the system. The search for compromises often creates diffi-
culties when the aim is to ensure instant and obvious answers. None-
theless, it is extremely important to consider the discretion that is now 
present in the system, so that abuse and unwanted consequences can 
be opposed. For as long as there are no adequate criteria, the tribunal 
is vulnerable to accusations of the arbitrary adjudication of favours 
(Abels, 2008). Transparency, decisions that can be anticipated, and 
clarity are important, not only for the convicted person, but also for 
the judges, the victims and the entire international community 
(Sluiter, 2008).  
 
                                                            
72 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Decision of the President on the Application 
for Early Release of Omar Serushago, ICTR-98-39-S (May 12, 2005). 
73 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Decision of the President on the Application for 
Early Release of Georges Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-S (May 12, 2005). 
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b. Right of complaint and inspection 
The international norms stipulate that regular inspections of prison 
institutions have to be carried out by qualified and experienced inspec-
tors (Article 55, Standard Minimum Rules; Principle 29, Body of Prin-
ciples). During the inspections, it must always be possible for the 
prisoners to talk with the reviewing authority in a free and confiden-
tial way, without the prison staff being present (Principle 29, Body of 
Principles). Each prisoner must, moreover, have the possibility (on a 
weekday) of making a request or complaint to the director of the insti-
tution (or someone who represents him) and of making a request or 
complaint to the general prison administration. The Body of Princi-
ples also stipulates that it has to be possible, if necessary, to contact 
other competent authorities who are ‘vested with reviewing or reme-
dial powers’ about violations of the principles (Principle 7). The first 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR74
All the agreements provide for inspections to be carried out, but 
whether these are to be executed by ‘qualified and experienced inspec-
tors’ could nonetheless be a topic for debate. In many agreements, the 
ICTY and the ICTR agreed that inspections were to be carried out by 
the ICRC. The appointment of the ICRC was not completely obvious. 
The experience of the ICRC in supervising the treatment of prisoners 
in penitentiary institutions was not very broad. The ICRC, on the 
other hand, did have experience in the treatment of prisoners of war 
in armed conflicts, but this treatment is of a totally different order. 
The situation in prisons cannot be related to the competences of the 
ICRC under the Geneva Conventions, and signifies a diversion from 
the core activities of this organization (Klip, 1997). The CPT, which, 
for instance, carries out the inspections in the UK, does have this ex-
perience, but it is a European organization. The agreement between 
the ICTY and Spain, for instance, provides for a joint commission to 
execute the inspections. The way in which this commission is ap-
 allows the Human Rights Commit-
tee ‘to receive and consider communications from individuals subject 
to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of violations by that state of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant’. 
                                                            
74 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, De-
cember 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S., 171. 
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pointed, however, is not clear. A (more) credible solution (at least for 
the ICC) would probably have been to entrust inspections to the Sub-
committee on Prevention Torture (SPT), which – quite comparable to 
the CPT but at UN level then – was set up by the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment.75
Gautier, 1980
 Its establishment had been pleaded 
for since decades, building on the ICRC experience, but with a generic 
mandate to conduct independent international inspections of deten-
tion conditions ( ). 
Moreover, the organization of inspections is far from flawless. The 
ICTR, for instance, is only willing to execute a first inspection in coun-
tries executing a sentence, immediately after the transfer of the pris-
oner. Requests for recurring inspections are met with resistance.76 For 
this reason the ICTR staff sometimes refrain from inspections.77
Concerning complaints made by prisoners, it should be pointed out 
that the tribunals do not necessarily communicate directly with the 
prisoners. The ICTR, for instance, frequently uses the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to communicate with prisoners. 
The UNDP in a sense looks after the institutional bonds between the 
state that is enforcing the sentence and the ICTR. People working at 
the UNDP might not be officers of the court, but the court delegates this 
responsibility to them. Besides this communication line, prisoners 
can also send letters to the president of the tribunal, allowing them to 
communicate their complaints.
 Al-
though the inspections are well-organized on paper, certain problems 
remain in practice. Moreover it is not clear whether experienced in-
spectors are involved at all times.  
78
 
 
                                                            
75 Which entered into force on 22 June 2006. 
76 In the detention facility itself, inspections are executed by the ICRC every six 
months.  
77 Interview with Roland Amoussouga, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief of External Rela-
tions and Strategic Planning Section (ERSPS) and ICTR Spokesperson, held Septem-
ber 23, 2009. 
78 Ibidem. 
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c. Right to contacts with the outside world, in particular family and 
legal counsel 
In this respect, the Standard Minimum Rules (Article 37) and the 
Body of Principles provide that prisoners must be permitted to com-
municate with their family and friends on a regular basis, under the 
necessary supervision, both by the exchange of letters and by receiving 
visits (Principle 19). It is stipulated that special attention should be 
given to the maintenance and amelioration of these relationships with 
persons (inter alia family) and institutions in the outside world that 
are desirable and in the interest (‘best interest’) of both sides. Accord-
ing to the Body of Principles, each prisoner also has the right to com-
municate with his legal counsel. In this respect, adequate time and 
facilities have to be provided (Principle 18). 
Even though detention, by definition, has an influence on both private 
and family life, it is stipulated that the suffering caused by the depriva-
tion of physical freedom may not be augmented by the prison regime, 
unless there is sufficient justification for this. As we have said, the 
core of the punishment is the deprivation of freedom. By itself this 
does not have to lead to a violation of other rights, such as the right to 
a family life, but in an internationalized mechanism for the execution 
of sentences the distance from family and home can literally be very 
great. Simply because in this kind of international transfer of con-
victed persons the bonds of the convicted persons do not necessarily 
play a crucial role in the appointment of a state to execute the sen-
tence, the realization of a right to contact the outside world is not easy. 
The prisoners are rarely transferred to the country in which their fam-
ily lives, and it often requires a huge financial outlay if the family 
wishes to visit the prisoner. Many people convicted by the ICTR, who 
are serving their sentences in Mali and Benin, serve their sentences 
far away from their family, as their families often live in Europe. The 
right to receive visits can become rather meaningless if the family 
does not have the means to travel long distances, and certainly not to 
do so on a regular basis. For this reason, the ICRC has already, regard-
ing one prisoner, intervened financially so that the close relatives 
could visit the prisoner.79
                                                            
79 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
 Even though the possibility to receive visits 
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may well exist on paper, i.e. in the legislation of the state of execution, 
it may often be hard for the right actually to be exercised in practice. 
B. Maximum individual interest: Reintegration 
Earlier we reviewed how well the individual interests of the convicted 
person are protected. Next, we review how and to what extent the in-
terests of the convicted person are given maximum attention. In the 
context of this research, the maximum attention is paid to the inter-
ests of the convicted person when his/her reintegration is promoted at 
the time the choice is made about the execution of his/her sentence. 
At international courts and tribunals the execution of the sentence is 
an ‘additional’ stage, which per se is not of crucial importance to the 
activities of the court or tribunal. The interests of the convicted person 
are therefore definitely not the focus in the vertical framework for the 
execution of sentences, which lacks (theories on) goals for the execu-
tion of sentences. The international courts per se do refer to penal 
goals, mainly to retribution (Sebba, 2009), but these goals were not 
explicitly extended to the execution of the sentences. Moreover, 
whether and to what extent penal goals are or should be relevant at the 
stage of sentence execution is still subject to (increasing) jurispru-
dence in the courts. It is however clear that the reintegration of the 
offender is not the primary objective in the execution of his sentence. 
The international agreements made by these courts concerning the 
execution of sentences are guided by an administrative logic that seeks 
to spread the costs as much as possible around the international 
community. Yet these instruments cannot be completely decoupled 
from reintegration, as they ground the execution of sentences on in-
ternationally accepted standard instruments. This orientation demon-
strates that the agreements are intended to be ‘fair’ and to comply 
with the valid – international – instruments that govern them. Yet 
these governing instruments also refer to the rehabilitation of the 
offender as an important aspect of the execution of a sentence. There-
fore, these standard instruments refer to the reintegration of the of-
fender as an important aim of the execution of the sentence, and the 
individualization of the sentence and the offender’s gradual return to 
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society are proposed as important principles (Articles 60 and 67-69, 
Standard Minimum Rules). 
The way in which rehabilitation has to be considered can nevertheless 
be shaped by the literature. Rehabilitation is not an empty box – the-
ory and practice form a consistent framework in which the meaning 
and content of this term are well worked out. The primary objective of 
rehabilitation is the prevention of criminality. The punishment should 
focus on the remediation of criminal behaviour, by influencing the 
personal skills and possibilities of the individual delinquent (Duff, 
2001). Willingness to change has always played a central role in theories 
concerning rehabilitation, and has developed in stages. Initially, reha-
bilitation was mainly considered as a psychological transformation 
that has to be experienced by the offender during his prison sentence. 
Later on, the growing therapeutic trend was integrated into this con-
cept. People who committed crimes now had to be cured from their 
criminal tendencies. In a third stage, the therapeutic model was sup-
plemented by a social learning model, which no longer characterizes 
criminality as an individual pathology, but argues that it is a result of 
learnt behaviour. Rehabilitation thus has to compensate for the faults 
in socialization. The most recent evolution in the rehabilitation model 
is the attention that is paid to the rights of the offender: rehabilitation 
is now translated into a right to education and aid that will permit or 
facilitate the offender’s reintegration into society and also into an 
avoidance of custody circumstances that are below standard or create a 
physical or mental decline that is incompatible with social reintegra-
tion (Rotman, 1994).  
Another characteristic of the rehabilitation perspective is that in deci-
sions on the nature and duration of the punishment there should be 
room for subjectivation:80
                                                            
80 The term ‘subjectivation’ is preferred to terms like individualization; subjectivation 
refers to the level of attention given to the person concerned and to his or her subjec-
tive needs and motivations, as well as to the role he or she can play in a given proce-
dure (here: transfer procedures). 
 subjective aspects are of crucial importance 
in determining the sentence. The type and duration of the sentence 
must – as far as possible – be adjusted to the individual causes of the 
crime that has been committed, and must assist the offender in end-
ing his or her criminal behaviour (Rotman, 1994). In the punishment, 
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the life course of the offender is taken into account. The aim is to pre-
vent criminality by influencing the personality and the skills of the 
person who committed the crime, or his position and abilities in soci-
ety, so he will no longer commit crimes (de Keijser, 2004). Theories 
concerning rehabilitation are distinct from retribution theories, which 
only take subjective criteria into account if these are necessary to de-
termine whether a crime has been committed or the degree of respon-
sibility (Rotman, 1994).  
From the point of view of rehabilitation, a prison sentence is the ulti-
mate recourse (subsidiarity of the prison sentence). A prison sentence 
is seen as a counter-productive measure (except in exceptional cir-
cumstances), which tends to strengthen criminal predispositions in-
stead of weakening them. If possible, alternative sentences and meas-
ures are preferred (Duff & Garland, 1994).  
Rehabilitation assumes that it is possible to examine the causes of a 
certain offender’s criminal behaviour, and to intervene with regard to 
these causes or to stimulate other positive changes (Raine & Willson, 
1997). Future criminal behaviour is, on the one hand, influenced by 
factors that have to do with the ‘ways of thinking’ of the offender and, 
on the other hand, by factors that have to do with the ‘circumstances’ 
in the life of the offender (Maguire & Raynor, 2006). The chosen in-
terventions in a framework of rehabilitation are thus treatment and 
assistance, like the stimulation of social bonds.  
Rehabilitation in punishment requires that the criminal law system 
also opens doors to help and assistance, considering declining recidi-
vism (Rotman, 1994). Individual treatment and assistance pro-
grammes, possibly also focused on psychological or addiction prob-
lems, try to increase the prisoner’s motivation and willingness to 
change. There is an international consensus on the effectiveness of 
such programmes: Canadian, American, and European authors think 
that some rehabilitation programmes succeed in lowering the degree 
of recidivism, when they are focused on the criminal needs of the per-
sons concerned (i.e. those factors that are very likely to contribute to 
the criminal behaviour of the person concerned) (Bernfeld, Farrington 
& Leschied, 2001). The most effective individual treatment pro-
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grammes are those focused on the factors which are of a very dynamic 
kind, and which are directly related to the committing of criminal 
activities, such as social attitudes, problem-solving skills and abuse of 
means. Moreover, high risk offenders would be especially helped by 
treatment programmes focused on rehabilitation. Concerning the 
context, it seems that interventions in the community produce better 
results than those in prison: generally it is noticed that treatment in 
the context of an alternative sanction produces better results than 
treatment in prison (Easton & Piper, 2005). It is nonetheless impor-
tant to adapt the intensity and length of the treatment to the needs and 
the risk profile of the offender. Treatment in prison therefore also 
assumes that different treatment options are offered, to take into ac-
count the diversity in the profiles of the offenders when assigning 
prisoners to particular treatments (Bourgon & Armstrong, 2005). 
Lastly, the social bonds of offenders have to be developed, maintained 
or repaired, to increase their chances of reintegration. The contribu-
tion of social factors is an important part of rehabilitation. Defeating 
social problems is often insufficient per se for ending the criminal 
behaviour, but it is a necessary condition (Maguire & Raynor, 2006). 
Social problems are in this sense obstacles to a life without criminal-
ity. Hirschi considered, in his theory concerning the social control of 
criminality, that the appearance of social bonds is the paramount force 
preventing criminal behaviour. Later, effect studies confirmed that 
social bonds are connected with criminal behaviour (MacKenzie, 
2002). In particular, having a partner (or, more broadly, good family 
relationships) and having employment cause a reduction in criminal 
behaviour (Hepburn & Griffin, 2004). People who have committed 
crimes find it hard to establish strong social bonds.81
                                                            
81 Studies show that former prisoners experience high levels of social need (Maguire & 
Raynor, 2006). Former prisoners are one of the least privileged groups and are often 
the subject of social exclusion. This has to do with the prison sentence itself and with 
the previous history of the prisoners. By now it is well known that criminal behaviour 
is associated with different kinds of economic and social deprivation, such as low 
income, lack of employment possibilities and bad housing circumstances (Crow, 
2001). A prison sentence often increases this deprivation: a large number of prisoners 
lose their job and their house, etc., while serving their prison sentence. Others face 
financial problems or find that contact with their family is broken (Robinson & 
Raynor, 2006).  
 When they have 
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created those bonds, the chances are that their life is greatly changed 
and that positive changes occur in their life (De Li & Layton 
MacKenzie, 2003). Given the importance of social bonds, especially 
bonds of employment and social relationships, it is necessary that 
attention is given to this at the stage of sentence execution. By apply-
ing alternative sanctions, social bonds can be maintained, but these 
matters also have to be incorporated into the prison sentences (or the 
interventions after release).  
Based on the literature describing the theoretical framework for this 
penal goal, and according to the aspects of this theory for which em-
pirical evidence was found, this penal goal was not only generally in-
vestigated, but was also evaluated by four operational criteria for rein-
tegration: a focus on changing, room for subjectivity, attention to so-
cial bonds, and admission to help and assistance.  
1. Reintegration in general 
Vertical proceedings in a sense also include attention to rehabilitation. 
After all, the norms on the execution of sentence explicitly refer to this 
at certain points. Article 10 of the ICCPR reads: ‘The penitentiary sys-
tem shall comprise treatment of prisoners, the essential aim of which 
shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation […]’, and thus 
stresses the importance of rehabilitation (Schabas, 1997). The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee added that ‘no penitentiary system 
should be only retributory; it should essentially seek the reformation 
and social rehabilitation of the prisoner’.82
                                                            
82 General Comment, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/21/Rev.1/Add.3 
(1992). 
 The Basic Principles point 
out that: ‘With the participation and help of the community and social 
institutions, and with due regard to the interests of victims, favourable 
conditions shall be created for the reintegration of the ex-prisoner into 
society under the best possible conditions.’ (Principle No 10).The final 
justification for a prison sentence is, according to the Standard Mini-
mum Rules, the protection of society against criminality (Article 58). 
For that very reason, the period of imprisonment has to be utilized so 
that the convicted person wants and is able to live a life without crimi-
nality when he returns to society. A prison institution should therefore 
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provide all forms of support and assistance which are suitable and 
available, and supply these according to the individual treatment 
needs of the prisoners (Articles 59-61). Rehabilitation thus is the ideal 
penal goal proposed by the standard instruments that play such a cen-
tral role in the sentence execution system of the international courts 
and tribunals (Schabas, 1997). Besides that, it is also explicitly men-
tioned in the basic norms that a sentence should be based on the indi-
vidualization of treatment, and that a gradual return to society should 
be accomplished (Articles 60 and 67-69, Standard Minimum Rules). 
In the context of international courts and tribunals, this penal goal is 
hard work in every way. These courts formulated totally different goals 
of their own. Retribution and deterrence are the main objectives in the 
passing of the sentence, and they are therefore often cited by the ICTR 
and the ICTY. In the Dusko Tadic case, the ICTY stated that ‘retribu-
tion and deterrence serve as a primary purposes of sentence’.83 The 
ICTR said that sentences are intended to achieve retribution with re-
gard to the offenders and deterrence with regard to others who could 
possibly want to commit these crimes in the future, by demonstrating 
that the international community will not tolerate this.84 The tribunals 
are focused both on specific deterrence, so that those who are con-
victed do not commit any further crimes, and on general deterrence, 
so that other persons who might commit crimes are discouraged.85 
The ICC also refers to the end of the impunity for perpetrators of such 
crimes and, in this way, to the contribution to the prevention of these 
crimes. A judgment of the ICTY86
                                                            
83 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-S (July 14, 1997). 
 referred to the fact that the certainty 
of the sentence, rather than its severity, has a greater influence on 
making it an important instrument of retribution, stigmatization and 
deterrence. It further stated that the international character of the 
84 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-3 (De-
cember 6, 1999). 
85 General deterrence can nevertheless not have the greatest influence in individual 
sentences, which are only based on the crimes committed by the person concerned 
and not on paramount objectives. No-one can therefore be punished more heavily 
than is considered necessary because of a belief that this will discourage others 
(Meernik, 2003). 
86 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 
1998). 
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court contributes to this, as its moral authority and impact ensure a 
much stronger punitive effect, which should also be taken into ac-
count when deciding on the right punishment. The context in the 
international tribunals is mostly retributive and deterrent (Henham, 
2003).87
The tribunals (and their founders) also speak of reparation and the 
maintenance of the peace as their goal (Meernik, 2005). The UN 
Resolution which created the ICTR
 The very point is the punishment (of international crimes), 
whether or not there is an effect in the future. The main purpose is 
retribution (Kury & Ferdinand, 2008).  
88 stipulates that the prosecutions 
will contribute to ‘the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace’. The ICTY stated in the Delalic 
case that, if retribution were to be taken as the only reason for pun-
ishment, this could be counter-productive and difficult as regards the 
paramount objective of the Security Council, namely the restoration 
and maintenance of peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.89
                                                            
87 The individual’s responsibility, which is a very important paradigm in the interna-
tional courts and tribunals, is often based on the belief that penal sentences really do 
have a deterrent effect. Criminological research has nevertheless questioned the effec-
tiveness of deterrence as a penal strategy: deterrence starts from models of human 
rationality that are too simplistic (Roberts & McMillan, 2003). Note that the faith in 
this penal goal remains fully intact at the international level. The footnotes which 
were added by the investigation about the deterrent effect do not find a willing ear. 
Henham nevertheless argued that the effect of deterrence as a goal of punishment 
should be put into perspective, and that the type of crime should also be considered. 
He gave the example of suicide terrorism to state that deterrence can be completely 
irrelevant for certain crimes (Henham, 2003). Whether international courts can con-
tribute to prevention is not clear, and is a matter of ‘possibility’ and ‘faith’ rather than 
of empirical evidence or clear analysis (Tallgren, 2002). Moreover, the relatively small 
number of convicts is mentioned, and this also should temper the optimism concern-
ing deterrence (Findlay & McLean, 2007).  
 
The reaction with regard to these crimes would in this sense not be 
limited to the criminal field (Haveman, 2004). This aim is, neverthe-
88 Resolution S/PV.3453 of the Security Council of the United Nations (November 8, 
1994), U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994). 
89 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 
1998). 
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less, (too) ambitious,90 and causes the creation of different roles for 
tribunals. After all, the objectives of the courts are, in fact, fundamen-
tally prosecution and judgment, not peace-keeping and peacemaking 
(Beigbeder, 2005). Whether these courts can contribute to the restora-
tion of peace in the conflict region also depends on the attitude 
adopted by the local population with regard to the court. The legiti-
macy of the courts is questioned anyway, judging from the local popu-
lation’s perception of and trust in these institutions (Arzt, 2006). 
There is also scepticism about whether tribunals would really contrib-
ute to peace in the country concerned. Meernik thought that there was 
only an effect in Bosnia (and not in the entire territory of the former 
Yugoslavia), or that sometimes even the opposite occurred: increased 
hostility after an arrest or a conviction (Meernik, 2005). In the case of 
the ICTR, it is generally pointed out that most of the Rwandan popula-
tion considers the ICTR as an expensive irrelevance and that the in-
ternational community has contributed little to the development of the 
national judiciary. Ambitions that are too high threaten to de-
legitimatize an international court in the eyes of the population con-
cerned (Zaum, 2009). However, one ought not to forget that the ref-
erence to the peace proceedings was a legal necessity in the creation of 
the tribunals. In the interpretation of the official purposes of the 
courts and tribunals, a sense of reality is needed.91
                                                            
90 Enquiries of the local population or the ICTR, for instance, show that it is assumed 
that the tribunal can only make a limited contribution to reconciliation in Rwanda.  
 The ad hoc tribunal 
91 The abolition of impunity is only possible for a limited group of offenders. Large 
numbers exceed the capacity of the international courts. The courts may contribute to 
an awareness that atrocities cannot be accepted and that, by definition, they do not 
remain unpunished. This in itself, when linked to the concrete possibilities provided 
by the courts to the victims, possibly has a good influence on the reparation in and of 
society. However, it seems very difficult to perform this work. A contribution to rec-
onciliation from the offender risking a sentence seems to be an illusion. The threat of 
being convicted will not promote truth-telling behaviour by the offender at the trial. In 
a truth and reconciliation commission this may be more likely to happen. These 
commissions are seen as a non-judicial and non-penal way to ‘set an example’, and 
involve giving an example of the way in which people treat each other in a democratic 
society, even if there is no solution to the underlying disputes. The South African 
TRC, for example, was part of a package of measures focused on the establishment of 
a democratic rule of law. Moreover, reconciliation is something coming from the 
inside, and cannot be imposed by external people like international judges (Haveman, 
2005). But truth and reconciliation commissions also have their shortcomings. At the 
South African TRC, many victims did not have the opportunity to give testimony. 
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fundamentally remains focused on the prosecution and judgment of 
criminals, and this judicial process is the purpose of an international 
tribunal.92
Nevertheless, the reasons for imposing a sentence and the purposes 
which have to be achieved during the execution of that sentence have 
to be distinguished (Henham, 2003). In the context of the tribunals, it 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Those who did thought that their testimony was often limited to the gathering of 
empirical data of which the TRC was in need. Here also, the victim is treated as an 
instrument, even if the goal is not even to achieve a conviction (Findlay, 2008). 
Criminal law does not stand alone in the national context, but operates in the totality 
of social intervention mechanisms. Not all of these mechanisms have a counterpart at 
the international level. This means that the ICC functions in almost total isolation. 
Nevertheless, this cannot interfere with the fact that the ICC realizes that the criminal 
approach is only one of many approaches. Besides this, there are also other necessary 
mechanisms, which can be classified under the heading of transitional justice. In par-
ticular, one can think of both corrective and educational measures. Besides that, insti-
tutional reform is often also a crucial component. Also the aforementioned reconcilia-
tion commissions may prove relevant and may help to contribute to the expected 
transition. Additions are thus necessary to overcome the inherent limitations of the 
criminal law (Haveman, 2005).  
92 The way in which an answer based on the criminal law can be combined with repa-
ration remains a difficult issue. Studies also give different results. A survey of the war 
victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, for instance, makes it clear that 
the victims wish the offenders concerned to be brought to judgment (about 80% of 
the people surveyed said that they thought that this was needed). This however does 
not mean that it is assumed that the offenders have to go to prison (only 38% think 
that imprisonment is necessary, slightly less than the percentage who think that the 
victims should be compensated (40%)). Nonetheless, rarely or never is it said that the 
offenders should be executed (1.5%). The most startling result of the questionnaire 
nevertheless lies in the answers to the question of why there should be punishment. 
Around 88% think that the first place should be given to the purpose of finding the 
truth about what happened. This corresponds to the results of other studies of victims 
and witnesses at the ICTY. Obtaining revenge is a purpose of the punishment accord-
ing to only 10.5% of the persons surveyed. It should be noted that there are large 
differences in this between Kosovars and the two other populations in the survey. The 
Kosovars taking part in the survey do not think that finding the truth is as important 
as do the two other populations (71.6% of Kosovars put finding the truth first), but 
that taking revenge is more important (21%). Moreover, they also indicate that the 
creation of the possibility of living together is an important goal (27%), while neither 
of the other populations think this. These differences possibly have to do with the fact 
that the conflict in Kosovo arose later than the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, so the victimization is still fresh in the memory (Kiza, 2008).  
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is clear that a separate aim regarding the execution of sentences has 
not been explicitly set. Schabas states that in international courts the 
judgment is normally the most important element; what happens to 
the offenders after conviction is less important (Schabas, 1997). Noth-
ing is said in the Rome Statute about the purposes of the execution of 
sentences, as if the matter is clear and does not require further expla-
nation or guidance. Mulgrew has already argued, concerning the 
mixed SCSL tribunal, that the jurisprudence of the SCSL ‘discusses 
sentences of imprisonment as though they are an end in themselves’, 
while in human rights instruments it is admitted that a prison sen-
tence should not only be retributive, but also has to assist in the social 
rehabilitation of the offender. Other international courts have ac-
knowledged in their judgments that rehabilitation is a valid purpose of 
the execution of sentences in international systems. The ICTY trial 
chamber, for instance, admitted in the Dusko Tadic case that both 
punishing the most dangerous offenders and rehabilitation can be 
desirable objectives, stipulating that ‘the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime’. In the Erdemovic case it is made 
clear that rehabilitation has to be subordinated to retribution, deter-
rence and stigmatization (Henham, 2003). The trial chamber said that 
the possibility of rehabilitation ‘must be subordinate to that of an at-
tempt to stigmatize the most serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law, and in particular an attempt to preclude their recur-
rence’. According to the Chamber, the vital function is located else-
where: ‘One of the purposes of punishment for a crime against hu-
manity lies precisely in stigmatizing criminal conduct which has in-
fringed a value fundamental not merely to a given society, but to hu-
manity as a whole. […] On the basis of the above, the International 
Tribunal sees public reprobation and stigmatization by the interna-
tional community, which would thereby express its indignation over 
heinous crimes and denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential 
functions of a prison sentence for a crime against humanity.’ Never-
theless, irrespective of this argument, the trial chamber appeared to be 
sensitive to the possibility of rehabilitation in passing a ten year prison 
sentence, when it mentioned ‘a series of traits characterizing a corri-
gible personality’ (Schabas, 1997). In the context of the most serious 
crimes, the consideration of rehabilitation nevertheless remains diffi-
cult.  
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This means that there is no paramount official rationale for the execu-
tion of sentences, and even that the purpose acknowledged and rec-
ommended by the international human rights and sentence execution 
norms has no priority. The role of punishment seems to suffer under 
the lack of theorizing or, better, the lack of explanation. Henham 
states that this partly has to do with the compromises that have to be 
sought at the international level. Paradoxes and disharmony are often 
hidden and ignored, so they can be hidden in the rhetoric of retribu-
tion. The absence of principles, however, weakens the claim that an 
international court has a rational basis for the execution of democratic 
principles of punishment (Henham, 2003).  
The fact that there are no explicit purposes linked to the stage of the 
execution of the sentence does not imply that this stage is without 
purpose. In what follows, an inventory has been drawn up of aspects 
of thinking about reintegration that can be found in or derived from 
sentence execution instruments and proceedings of the international 
courts.  
2. Change-orientation 
It is hard to defend the statement that willingness to change shapes 
the instruments and proceedings for the execution of sentences at the 
international courts and tribunals. Sentence execution agreements are 
concluded with states which declare themselves willing to conclude 
them. The connection between the countries responsible for the exe-
cution of sentences and the convicted persons in this respect is not 
always clear. At the ICTY, the countries executing sentences may all 
be European countries, and at the ICTR sentences appear to be exe-
cuted in both European and African countries. A connection between 
the convicted person and the country of execution is not assumed or 
considered to be necessary. This means that the regulation of the exe-
cution of sentences is not explicitly controlled by a concern for the 
convicted person himself. Moreover, it is very difficult to discover the 
policy behind the practice of the international transfer of convicted 
persons by the ad hoc tribunals. The written decisions under which a 
state is appointed are often very short, and the reasons why a person 
will serve his/her sentence in a certain country are barely given. It can 
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only be assumed that these reasons are mentioned in the confidential 
memoranda that are delivered to the registrar and to the president. In 
the decisions made by the president of the ICTY, on the other hand, 
the substantive argument is very brief. In a few cases (for instance in 
the Plavsic case) there are no references to specific factors.93
In addition to the insubstantial and very brief character of the deci-
sions concerning the appointment of the state in which a sentence will 
be executed, it appears that the system for the appointment of states to 
execute the sentences does not operate on a continuous and regular 
basis. The first decisions of the ICTR were made in 2001. Subse-
quently, nothing happened for seven years in the area of the execution 
of sentences. It took until 2008 before another decision was made.
 At the 
ICTR it is also often hard to discover a policy line in the decisions 
concerning the execution of sentences. Most of the decisions concern-
ing the appointment of a state are even shorter than those of the 
ICTY.  
94
The huge delays in the appointment of states to execute sentences 
were to some extent influenced by the wait for the availability of the 
necessary detention facilities. An important factor, however, is the 
pressure experienced by the ICTR from Rwanda for the sentences to 
be executed in Rwanda itself. When a decision is made not to send a 
convicted person to Rwanda, this is therefore very sensitive, and is 
followed by an indignant reaction from Rwanda. This also explains the 
reluctance to make decisions, and the fact that decisions are often 
 
Only the decision, mentioned earlier, concerning the execution of the 
sentence passed on Ruggiu, in February 2008, has been made public. 
After this, these decisions became confidential again, and were not 
published until their implementation.  
                                                            
93 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Order designating the state in which Biljana Plavsic is to 
serve his prison sentence, IT-00-39&40/1 (April 24, 2003). Specific elements were 
also not apparent in the decisions concerning Banovic, Cesic, Mradja, Krnojelac, Delic 
and Nikolic. 
94 This specifically means that Judge Erik Møse did not make a decision on the execu-
tion of a sentence. President Pillay made the first decisions in 2001, but it took until 
the moment when President Byron took over from Møse before the next decisions 
were made.  
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made ‘on a group-by-group basis’.95 Moreover, it is more than likely to 
be a decisive element in the decision that the sentences should be 
executed in African states: ‘In my view the idea was to, what we call in 
French, ‘trancher la poire en deux’: they want to go to Europe, the vic-
tims want them in Rwanda, so leaving them in Africa will be just 
halfway between Rwanda and Europe.’96
The stage of sentence execution is given an intrinsically administrative 
character. This stage is the logical consequence of the conviction, but 
there is neither a specific purpose connected to it, nor a substantial 
interpretation given to it. 
 
3. Individualization of treatment 
The ‘subjectivation’ of the sentence is not only one of the main aspects 
of reintegration, but it is also supported by the basic norms for the 
execution of sentences. The Standard Minimum Rules stipulate that, 
with a view to the rehabilitation of the offender, the treatment has to 
be made individual, keeping in mind the social and criminal history of 
the person concerned, his capabilities and his perspectives after re-
lease. In order to do this, a flexible system of classification has to be 
applied, so that appropriate treatment is facilitated (Articles 67-69). 
Subjectivation is only translated to a limited extent into the execution 
of sentences after conviction by the international courts. The decisions 
are not based on the preferences of the person concerned, with one 
exception. In the decision with regard to Landzo,97
                                                            
95 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 8, 2009. 
 the court focused 
on the preferences of the person concerned, which is totally excep-
tional. Landzo asked whether he could serve his sentence in an Eng-
lish-speaking country, as he had learned English during his detention 
in The Hague and had also learned computer skills which he wanted 
to develop further, with a view to rounding off his higher education. 
The decision however mentions that, at that time, there was no 
agreement with an English-speaking country. The offender therefore 
had to serve his sentence in Finland. Nevertheless, the decision men-
96 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
97 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Landzo, Order designating the state in which Esad Landzo is to 
serve his prison sentence, IT-96-21-ES (April 29, 2003). 
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tions, in addition, that English is widely spoken in Finland and that, 
when the tribunal did conclude an agreement with an English-
speaking country, Landzo could submit an application in order to 
serve his sentence in this state.  
Objections of convicted persons themselves also have little or no in-
fluence on the decisions. The limited extent to which the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person play a role is shown, for in-
stance, in the reconsideration of the decision concerning Martic. 98
It also appears that the convicted person cannot influence the decision 
at the ICTR, as the tribunal has declared that decisions on the execu-
tion of sentences are made independently of the ‘submissions’ of the 
offenders.
 
Martic demanded that the decision that he serve his sentence in Esto-
nia be reconsidered. In the decision on the reconsideration, the presi-
dent stated firmly: ‘The Practice Direction allows me, if I so wish, to 
request the opinion of the convicted person and of the office of the 
prosecutor. However, as the Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
and Practice Direction make clear, there is no right conferred on a 
convicted person to be heard on this issue. Accordingly, Martic has no 
right to directly petition me with respect to the location in which he 
will serve his imprisonment, and the Request is incompetent on this 
basis alone.’ Still, the president briefly considered the request. Martic 
argued that his family did not have the financial means to visit him in 
Estonia. Moreover, he said that he did not speak the language and 
could not practice his religion in Estonia. The president did not an-
swer these objections, but argued: ‘Paragraphs 3(a), (c) and (g) of the 
Practice Direction require the registrar to take these considerations – 
and “any other considerations related to the case” – into account. […] 
In light of the above, there is no basis for ordering the registrar to 
conduct an investigation into Martic’s family’s financial resources and 
to stay the procedure of enforcement of his sentence’. The request was 
rejected.  
99
                                                            
98 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martic, Decision on Milan Martic’s request for reconsideration 
of order designating state in which he is to serve his sentence, IT-95-11-ES (July 26, 
2002). 
 As an example, there was a case at the ICTR in which the 
convicted person himself wrote to the country in which he wanted to 
99 Inter alia in jurisprudence relating to Rule 11bis. 
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serve his sentence. That country wrote to the ICTR and declared its 
willingness to execute the sentence. The ICTR refused this. Notifica-
tions to the registrar and the president have also been stopped: to 
combat the flow of letters, the president released a direction in Sep-
tember 2008 to the Commanding Officer of the detention facility to 
let him know that communications of prisoners about where they 
might execute their sentences no longer have to be brought to the 
president. The prisoners are only heard when the president decides to 
hear them. Since that date, only one set of decisions has been made, 
but the opinions of the prisoners were not requested before these. 
Moreover, the convicted persons are only informed at the end of the 
proceedings of the fact that they will be transferred to a particular 
country to execute their sentence, without any specific information 
being given.100
The formal procedure that has to be followed in this matter is not 
clear. At the ICTR, the convicted person expresses his/her opinion by 
writing a letter addressed to the president of the court, in which 
he/she stipulates his/her preference for or rejection of a certain coun-
try for the execution of the sentence.
 
101
For these reasons, there is no foundation on which convicted persons 
can force their individual circumstances to play a specific role in the 
appointment of a state. There is no right to be heard at the tribunal 
and also no way to question the decision.
 Convicted persons often stipu-
late, on the one hand, that they want to serve their sentence in a Euro-
pean country, or, on the other hand, that they do not want to serve 
their sentence in the country where the conflict took place. Neverthe-
less, because of the limited choices available to the ICTR (see earlier), 
the president does not have much opportunity to take this opinion 
into account in his decision. In any case, the number of countries 
involved in the execution of sentences is already rather limited; more-
over the eventual decision on whether or not the convicted person is 
accepted is in the hands of the countries concerned.  
102
                                                            
100 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
 An obligation to hear the 
person concerned about this before the appointment of the state 
101 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 4, 2009. 
102 Interview with staff of the ICTR Registry, held September 29, 2009. 
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would however be appropriate, given the impact of the decision. John-
son has already expressed his concerns about the rights of the of-
fender at the ICTY: ‘While there is much to praise, there is also much 
with which to be concerned’. He says that the pressure on the ICTY to 
succeed is so great that it is no wonder that the rights of the defendant 
are insufficiently protected (Johnson, 1998). The ‘objectivation’ of the 
convicted person also causes concerns in the area of the rights of the 
convicted person, and thus at the stage of the execution of the sen-
tence. The rights granted to the convicted person are rather limited. It 
was stipulated that convicted persons have the right to state their opin-
ion, but the consequences of their doing this remain unclear.  
4. Ties with society 
At the ICTY, it is demonstrated that connections with society play a 
role in the making of decisions on the execution of sentences. Most of 
the decisions state that all factors mentioned in the Practice Direction 
have been taken into account, especially the place of residence of the 
family of the person concerned (for instance in the decision concern-
ing Aleksovski103) or, in another instance, the family situation of the 
person concerned (for instance in the decision concerning 
nik104). In the decision with regard to Kunarac, the place of residence 
of his family is the reason why the sentence was executed not in one 
of the countries that had concluded an agreement with the ICTY,105 
but in Germany.106
                                                            
103  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Order designating the state in which Zlatko 
Aleksovski is to serve his prison sentence, IT-95-14/1 (July 7, 2000). 
 For the same reason, Italy was first appointed as 
the state where Jelisic should serve his sentence. Later, this decision 
was reversed (as the transfer could not take place within a reasonable 
time, ‘contrary to the spirit of the Statute and the Rules’), and the sen-
tence still had to be served in Norway. The reference to the family was 
removed in the order appointing the latter as the new country of en-
104 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Order designating the state in which Momcilo Krajis-
nik is to serve his prison sentence, IT-00-39-ES (April 24, 2009). 
105 Germany has not concluded an agreement with the ICTY, because this is not pos-
sible because of the federal structure of the country. Nevertheless, the German au-
thorities declared that they were willing to conclude agreements concerning specific 
convicts based on an ‘exchange of notes’. 
106 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Order designating the state in which Dragoljub Kuna-
rac is to serve his prison sentence, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (July 26, 2002). 
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forcement.107 Based on the decisions of the ICTY, it can even be con-
cluded that family reasons are almost the only factors considered in 
the decisions. Reasons other than family reasons are only exception-
ally considered. In the decision concerning Deronjic108 there was con-
cern about the safety and protection of the person concerned and his 
family. In the Nikolic decision, additional reasons were censored (‘re-
dacted’).109
In the decisions of the ICTR there is no reference to the place of resi-
dence of the family or to the family situation, let alone the personal 
preferences of the person concerned. In only one decision are many 
‘deliberations’ explained.
 
110 After an outline of the legal framework, 
the decision states that ‘in accordance with those guiding principles, 
the President shall take into account the individual circumstances of 
the convicted person in his/her decision-making process. It is logical 
for the President to consider such circumstances, because these cir-
cumstances will also influence the determination of the President as 
to which State will enforce the sentence.’ The nationality and birth-
place of the person concerned are discussed, as are some individual 
circumstances (medical condition and religion), and the court decided 
that the sentence should be executed in one of the states in which the 
person concerned held nationality.111
The social bonds of a person with a certain country do not constitute 
an element which the president must consider in his decisions. None 
of the elements mentioned is legally binding. This means that the 
president can consider these elements, but can also decide that they 
 
                                                            
107 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Order setting aside the order of 21 August 2001 and 
designating Norway as the state in which Goran Jelisic is to serve his sentence, IT-95-
10-A (November 6, 2001). 
108 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Order designating the state in which Miroslav Deron-
jic is to serve his prison sentence, IT-02-61-ES (August 15, 2005). 
109 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Order designating the state in which Momir Nikolic is 
to serve his prison sentence, IT-02-60/2-ES (December 14, 2007). 
110 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Decision on the enforcement of sentence, ICTR-97-32-
A26 (February 13, 2008). 
111 The sentence is being executed in Italy. Ruggiu has both Belgian and Italian na-
tionality. 
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are not relevant in proportion to other considerations.112
5. Help and assistance 
 The convicted 
persons are considered as ‘objects’ rather than as ‘subjects’ in these 
proceedings: a convicted person can be moved to any country which 
declares its willingness to accept him/her, without individual circum-
stances necessarily playing a role. If these prisoners are isolated from 
family and other support mechanisms, they are more than likely to be 
in a situation of relative isolation and in a culturally unknown envi-
ronment, and they are not able to communicate with other prisoners 
or staff. Also treatment may not be possible, in any event not in the 
prisoner’s own language. The question arises whether this is in line 
with the stipulation of the Basic Principles that ‘the responsibility of 
prisons for the custody of prisoners and for the protection of society 
against crime shall be discharged in keeping with a State’s other social 
objectives and its fundamental responsibilities for promoting the well-
being and development of all members of society’ (Principle No 4). 
Help and assistance were, in an exceptional case and to a limited ex-
tent, discussed at the ICTY. The Jelisic case is exceptional because 
there is explicit reference to the fact that the person concerned has to 
receive treatment. The trial chamber recommended that the person 
concerned should be given psychological and psychiatric treatment, 
and requested ‘the registry to take all the appropriate measures in this 
respect together with the state in which he will serve his sentence’. In 
the decision indicating the state of execution, this was translated as 
follows: ‘Noting the disposition of the above trial judgment which 
provides that the convicted person must receive psychological or psy-
chiatric follow-up treatment’. However, this cannot be considered as 
more than a recommendation, as the sentence is executed in accor-
dance with the legislation of the executing state (Tolbert & Rydberg, 
2000).  
Nevertheless, the norms for the execution of sentences pay great at-
tention to the prisoner’s return to society: they require that circum-
stances are created that are favourable to the reintegration of the for-
mer prisoner into society under the best possible conditions (Basic 
Principle No 10). The Standard Minimum Rules stipulate that a grad-
                                                            
112 Interview with former staff of the ICTR Presidency, held October 4, 2009. 
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ual return to society has to be accomplished, because, according to 
those rules, the duty of society does not end with the release of the 
prisoner. Therefore it is proposed that a pre-release regime is organized 
in the prison or that a convicted person is released under supervision 
combined with social assistance. Efficient after-care has to be provided 
(Articles 60 and 64). 
The question of after-care and preparation for the release is also a very 
relevant matter for the international tribunals and courts. The fact is 
that, notwithstanding the gravity of the crimes that are tried there, 
prison sentences of very different lengths are pronounced. The ICTY, 
for instance, has passed sentences varying between two years and life; 
the average duration of a sentence is about fifteen years. It is therefore 
unrealistic to assume that the convicted persons do not return to soci-
ety. Nevertheless, there is no provision for a gradual return to society. 
The ‘early release’ mechanism foreseen in the context of the tribunals 
concerns early release, and not conditional release or ‘parole’ as in 
many national systems, because an early release decision is in any 
case definite and irreversible (Cassese, 2003). Nevertheless, good rea-
sons would exist to provide for a gradual return to society, with a view 
to both rehabilitation and security. Given the seriousness of the 
crimes committed, the fact that it is not guaranteed that the persons 
concerned will receive treatment during their detention and the fact 
that a return to the home country may be excluded, the observation, 
supervision and assistance of released offenders could have many 
advantages.  
The execution of sentences in a decentralized system in any event 
reduces the possibility of a gradual return. In many systems ‘early 
release’ is at least conditional, in the sense that an offender can be re-
imprisoned if he commits new crimes. Until now, however, there has 
been no authority that could ensure the supervision of the convicted 
person. Until now, there also are no cases in which parole was granted 
to convicts, as happens in national systems with a view to preparing 
the prisoner for release.  
Moreover, there are additional problems in these international pro-
ceedings. Given the nature of the crimes committed, it is not always 
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possible for former prisoners to return to their home country. When 
they request a right of residence in other states, this is often refused. 
Not only does this apply to people who are convicted, but it even ap-
plies to people acquitted by the court. These people often cannot or do 
not want to return to their home country, but even for them it is hard 
to obtain residence in other states.113
C. Conclusion 
 
Instruments for the vertical execution of sentences seem to opt explic-
itly for minimal consideration of the role of the offender; in particular, 
a ‘fair’ system is pursued which does not harm the interests of the 
offender. It is not the purpose to pay the maximum attention to the 
interests of the convicted person through the international execution 
of sentences. At the stage of sentence execution, the international 
courts and tribunals have to perform a difficult task. The international 
courts set themselves the aim of ensuring that sentences were exe-
cuted (this is only since the creation of the ad hoc tribunals in the 
1990s). The aim was thus the creation of a good system that respects 
the interests of all parties involved. After all, punishments after con-
viction are very sensitive matters, especially bearing in mind the seri-
ousness of the crimes committed.  
The system of the international transfer of convicted persons, as it 
exists today, is not entirely up-to-date and still faces a few problems 
that fundamentally influence its activities. An evaluation based on a 
few of the main – universal – instruments in the areas of human 
rights and the execution of sentences made this clear. Moreover, the 
question arises whether, for instance, the EU member states that have 
concluded sentence execution agreements with international courts 
and tribunals, should be required or expected to comply with supple-
mentary, and often wider and more precise, binding and non-binding 
norms of the Council of Europe and the EU. An additional assessment 
by the international courts and tribunals may therefore be desirable 
when a sentence is being executed in an EU country or when this is 
                                                            
113 Interview with Roland Amoussouga, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief of External Rela-
tions and Strategic Planning Section (ERSPS) and ICTR Spokesperson, held Septem-
ber 23, 2009. 
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planned. If there is a choice between an EU and a non-EU country, a 
fair comparison possibly even requires the court to take account of the 
reality that EU countries have to comply with additional norms (and 
thus that the prospects for the execution of sentences may be better 
there). In order to allow for such a comparison, detailed information 
on the compliance of EU member states with both international stan-
dards and additional Council of Europe and EU standards has been 
inserted in the annex to this book. 
Even though in the present system for the international transfer of 
convicted persons there are many references to human rights and 
sentence execution norms, there are clear shortcomings in a number 
of areas. The reference to these norms mainly seems to focus on the 
material detention conditions, while some of the substantial consid-
erations are given a less important place. Some problems are in any 
case inherent to a decentralized system. Solving the potential conflicts 
between the national legislation and the international court is of per-
manent interest in such a system. These conflicts are solved by, inter 
alia, ensuring that the authority of the court over the sentence that it 
has pronounced remains. In this system of the international transfer 
of convicted persons, the international court is responsible for the 
supervision of the circumstances of the detention, and therefore 
maintains international control over the fundamental aspects of the 
sentence. Even so, the system is characterized by many inequalities, 
especially concerning detention conditions and release. Consequently, 
it seems to be crucial for international tribunals and courts to have a 
proper insight into the variations that exist. At least for the EU mem-
ber states, this book offers such an insight (see the annex). In the area 
of the terms for release, there is already some noticeable progress at 
the ICC, as the term has been set in advance at two-thirds of the sen-
tence, and this is not dependent on the legislation of the country con-
cerned. Such prior stipulations can increase transparency and predict-
ability.  
A few of the premises that occupy a central role in the internationally 
recognized norms for the execution of sentences cannot be recognized 
in the international system for the execution of sentences. Serving 
one’s sentence as close as possible to one’s home environment, for 
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instance, is not an underlying motive in this system. The combination 
of a lack of commitment to make arrangements in the system for sen-
tence execution and a limited willingness of states means that only a 
small number of states is involved. The choices available for the place 
where a sentence will be executed are therefore necessarily limited. 
Individual circumstances are not or are only briefly considered when a 
state is appointed, so that the country in which a convicted person 
ends up is almost the result of pure arbitrariness. The person con-
cerned is treated here as an object instead of as a subject. There is no 
judicial explanation of the goals for the execution of sentences, or any 
criteria at all. The execution of sentences is treated in a pragmatic way. 
A hyper-individual decision forms the basis, which means that the 
proceedings relating to the execution of the sentence are not at all 
transparent or rational. For these reasons it is hard to consider this 
kind of international transfer of convicted persons as a coherent and 
credible system or to refer to ‘international justice’. There is little cer-
tainty for the person concerned and there is no policy (Henham, 
2003).  
However, alternatives are conceivable. As an example, the courts could 
consider only concluding agreements with countries in which the 
detention conditions, based on the regulations in that country and 
according to evaluation reports (for instance of the CPT), are optimal, 
in order to create equality between different convicted persons. The 
study by Vermeulen et al. (2011), the high-level results of which have 
been reproduced in the annex, may be instrumental from this per-
spective. The courts could also think of a system in which differences 
in detention conditions are allowed, but in which these different types 
of conditions are allocated, based on fixed criteria, to different catego-
ries of prisoner. Therefore people who are punished for a long time 
could be given better facilities in the detention regime than those who 
are punished for a short time. The courts could also, by analogy with 
the interstate transfer of prisoners, decide that the sentence should be 
served in the home country (unless this is not desirable) as a standard 
mechanism, or could consider the place of residence of the closest 
relatives as the decisive element. This also has the advantage that the 
sentence can be executed close to the victims. Moreover, the transfer 
of cases to national jurisdictions is considered as time goes on, so the 
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question arises of why the execution of sentences in the conflict re-
gion cannot be considered as time goes on. For now, however, there is 
no ‘policy’, only a list of possibilities.  
As we have seen, it is clear that there are some malfunctions of this 
system. No specific rights were provided which combat the aggravat-
ing consequences of imprisonment in a decentralized system (Mul-
grew, 2009). There is barely room for the opinions of the convicted 
persons. Nevertheless, it would be better, considering the deficiencies 
of the system, not just to put this to one side. This would eventually 
not have to be a problem for the international transfer of convicted 
persons, if the right to be heard is actually used to discover the prefer-
ences of the convicted person or if it was explicitly made possible to 
ask for a transfer for justifiable reasons. The main thing is that the 
sentence is served. Giving space to the individual in the international 
transfer of a convicted person does not constrain the enforcement of 
the sentence in any way, and thus does not endanger the legal order.
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V. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The history of vertical proceedings shows that the execution of sen-
tences at the international courts and tribunals has followed a troubled 
path. The execution of sentences was not initially part of this interna-
tional system. The death sentence was still applied, and imprisonment 
took place in the relevant states themselves. It was not until the 
1990s, as the ad hoc tribunals were created, that the execution of sen-
tences was also considered to be a task for the international tribunals. 
Starting from the idea that the activities of the international courts and 
tribunals are supported by the entire international community, the 
execution of sentences was also incorporated into this system. Even 
though states were not obliged to do anything (a commitment to exe-
cute sentences is voluntary), it is clear that the courts aspired to make 
different states carry the costs of executing sentences. Moreover, it is 
clear, especially in the regulations of the ICC, that the idea was to 
spread the costs as equally as possible. Consequently, it appears that 
there was also a system logic in place here, in which the prisons ap-
pear as nothing more than a part of a larger international whole. The 
vertical function of the international transfer of convicted persons is 
therefore based instead on administrative motives: finding a compro-
mise between countries and developing an acceptable distribution.  
In vertical proceedings, the role of the convict is intrinsically limited, 
even though there is a certain flexibility and sense of compromise. 
The basic principle in vertical proceedings, in any case, is not that the 
sentence is best served in the home country of the person concerned. 
In fact, there is no basic principle about ‘where’ sentence execution 
happens best. It all comes down to executing the sentence in one of 
the countries that are connected to the system for executing sentences. 
States are not obliged to accept convicted persons; even after an 
agreement is concluded with the court or the tribunal, the country 
chooses entirely freely whether or not to accept a (certain) convicted 
person. The framework in which the vertical proceedings operate is 
thus a very pragmatic framework (countries have to declare their will-
ingness, and ‘where’ someone ends up is a secondary consideration). 
Moreover, it is a system logic (prisons as part of a larger whole), which 
is still characterized by a broad margin of discretion regarding the
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states concerned. Also the court itself enjoys considerable discretion 
in the appointment of a state to execute the sentence. A few factors 
should be considered, according to the relevant stipulations that apply 
to the courts and tribunals, but in what way they have to be considered 
in the decision has not been stipulated. In these vertical proceedings, 
the individual is always subsidiary to the system. Consequently, the 
individual again does not play the main role, but at most a supporting 
role – although again this depends on the way in which the right to be 
heard is utilized.  
Finally, the proceedings for the international transfer of convicted 
persons are evaluated in the light of the attitude towards the convicted 
person. The question here is the determination, by means of conduct-
ing an assessment, of the extent to which the international transfer of 
a convicted person is in that person’s interests. 
In vertical proceedings the interests of the convict in the area of rein-
tegration is far from the primary purpose. It is hard to make the rein-
tegration of the offender the paramount objective with regard to the 
execution of the sentence. Indirectly, this kind of international trans-
fer of convicted persons is influenced by reintegration, because of the 
sentence execution norms that declare these instruments to be appli-
cable, but in the retributive context in which tribunals and courts, 
after all, evolve, reintegration is only obliquely aimed at or striven for. 
This becomes clear when the proceedings are compared with the most 
important substantial criteria from the reintegration perspective. Of 
the different elements underpinning reintegration, few are seen in the 
mechanisms for the execution of sentences of the international courts: 
the vertical instruments do not reflect actual policy, but rather mere 
pragmatism, so no specific attention is paid to the willingness to 
change. The bonds of the convicted person with a certain society do 
play some role in the indication of the state to which the prisoner will 
be sent, especially at the ICTY, but the proximity of the family for po-
tential visits is considered rather than real bonds with a society itself. 
The potential need for help and assistance is almost never present in 
the considerations.  
As furthering the interests of the convicted person is also not the aim 
of the vertical proceedings, a better framework can be found in the 
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human rights and sentence execution norms. Vertical proceedings are 
definitely characterized by their inherent striving for fairness vis-à-vis 
the convicted person and by their attempts to avoid damaging his in-
terests. The interests of the convicted person are definitely not harmed 
by the material detention conditions, as great efforts are made to make 
sure that there are no material problems and, in order to do this, in-
spections are also organized. Nevertheless, there are certain problems 
of ‘fairness’ in some respects. One of the main problems is typical of 
the system that is chosen, because the convicts are spread over the 
different countries that have indicated their willingness to execute 
sentences, and it concerns the requirement for equality. Differences 
are remedied as much as possible, inter alia by supervising the condi-
tional release of prisoners, but inherent differences always remain. 
The most important problem, nevertheless, is the fact that these ine-
qualities have not until now been based on anything and they could 
thus be considered as arbitrary. The system of the international courts 
for the execution of sentences still operates in a pragmatic framework 
in which no paramount objective is provided for the execution of sen-
tences.  
Nevertheless, alternatives are conceivable. For example, the courts 
could consider only concluding agreements with countries in which 
the detention conditions, based on the legislation in those countries 
and according to evaluation reports (for instance of the CPT), are op-
timal for creating equality between different convicts. The courts 
could also think of a system in which differences in detention condi-
tions are allowed, but in which these different conditions are assigned, 
based on fixed criteria, to different categories of prisoners. Therefore 
people who are punished for a long time could be granted better facili-
ties under the detention regime than people who are punished for a 
short time. The courts could also treat detention in the home country 
(unless this is not desirable) as the standard mechanism, by analogy 
with the interstate transfer of prisoners, or apply the place of resi-
dence of the closest relatives as the decisive criterion. The vertical sys-
tem obviously needs a regulating or at least an explicit normative 
framework with regard to the execution of sentences, based on 
autonomous criteria such as reintegration and rehabilitation.  
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In addition, and notwithstanding the fact that, legally speaking, only 
compliance with universal minimum standards (such as the Universal 
Declaration) is required in the practice of sentence execution at the 
level of international tribunals and courts, the question arises of 
whether practice should not evolve towards reflecting the obligatory 
compliance of EU member states with additional (sometimes broader, 
more precise and higher) binding and non-binding Council of Europe 
and EU standards. This would be reflected in the policies of the tribu-
nals and courts (especially the ICC) relating to the conclusion of sen-
tence execution agreements with states, as well as in the actual case-
based decisions in which particular sentence execution states are cho-
sen. 
When it comes to the conclusion of sentence execution agreements, a 
bilateral EU-ICC agreement on the execution of sentences should be 
seriously considered. Given that currently the laws and practices of the 
states that have entered into agreements in this area with the ICC 
sometimes differ widely when it comes to issues relating to the execu-
tion of sentences, it would clearly be beneficial to have a single or 
agreed (approximated) position for the EU member states in this re-
spect. The study by Vermeulen et al. (2011) may bring indispensable 
knowledge to the ICC-EU negotiation table in this respect (see the 
annex). Also, an EU-wide commitment to accept requests from the 
ICC for the execution of sentences would constitute an important con-
tribution to international justice, and one that is likely to make the 
reintegration and rehabilitation of offenders (a greater) part of it.
 
 
  
  
99 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abels, D. (2008). Commentary, ICTY, Order of the President on the 
Application for the Early Release of Milan Simić, Prosecutor v. Simić, 
Case No. IT-95-9/2, T. Ch., 27 October 2003. In A. Klip & G. K. 
Sluiter (Eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribu-
nals - Volume XV: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 2003 (pp. 796-800). Antwerp: Intersentia. 
Akhavan, P. (1996). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: 
The politics and pragmatics of punishment. The American Journal of 
International Law, 90(3), 501-510. 
Arzt, D. (2006). Views on the ground: The local perception of interna-
tional criminal tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone. 
The Annals of the American Academy, 1, 226-239. 
Balint, J. (1996). The place of law in addressing internal regime con-
flicts. Law and Contemporary Problems, 59(4), 103-126. 
Bassiouni, M. C. (1996). Searching for peace and achieving justice: 
The need for accountability. Law and Contemporary Problems, 59(4), 9-
28. 
Bassiouni, M. C. (2000). Explanatory note on the ICC Statute. Revue 
internationale de droit penal, 71, 1-37. 
Beigbeder, Y. (2005). International justice against impunity. Progress and 
new challenges. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Bernfeld, G., Farrington, D., & Leschied, A. (2001). Offender rehabilita-
tion in practice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bourgon, G., & Armstrong, B. (2005). Transferring the principles of 
effective treatment into a “real world” prison setting. Criminal Justice 
and Behavior, 32(1), 3-25. 
Broomhall, B. (2003). International justice and the International Crimi-
nal Court. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
100 
 
Cassese, A. (2003). International criminal law. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Crow, I. (2001). The treatment and rehabilitation of offenders. London: 
Sage. 
de Keijser, J. (2004). Doelen van straf. Morele theorieën als grondslag 
voor een legitieme strafrechtspleging [free English translation: The 
purposes of punishment. Moral theories as the basis for legitimate 
criminal justice]. In B. Van Stokkom (Ed.), Straf en herstel: ethische 
reflecties over sanctiedoeleinden [free English translation: Punish-
ment and restorative justice: ethical reflections on the purposes of 
sanctioning] (pp. 43-68). The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. 
De Li, S., & Layton MacKenzie, D. (2003). The gendered effects of 
adult social bonds on the criminal activities of probationers. Criminal 
Justice Review, 278-298. 
De Wree, E. (2011). Internationale overbrenging van veroordeelden. De 
veroordeelde als subject [free English translation: International transfer of 
prisoners. The sentenced person as a subject]. Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu. 
Duff, A. (2001). Punishment, communication and community. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Duff, A., & Garland, D. (1994). Introduction: Thinking about pun-
ishment. In A. Duff & D. Garland (Eds.), A reader on punishment (pp. 
1-44). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Easton, S., & Piper, C. (2005). Sentencing and punishment. The quest for 
justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Findlay, M. (2008). Governing through globalised crime. Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing. 
Findlay, M., & McLean, C. (2007). Emerging international criminal 
justice. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 18(3), 458-480. 
Gardocki, L. (1992). Transfer of proceedings and transfer of prisoners 
as new forms of international co-operation. In A. Eser & O. Lagodny 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
101 
 
(Eds.), Principles and procedures for a new transnational criminal law (pp. 
317-324). Freiburg im Breisgau. 
Gautier, Jean-Jacques. (1980). The Case for an Effective and Realistic 
Procedure. In I. C. o. Jurists & S. C. A. Torture (Eds.), Torture: How to 
Make the International Convention Effective. A Draft Optional Proto-
col) (pp. 31-38). Geneva: International Commission of Jurists. 
Haveman, R. (2004). De rationaliteit van het supranationale straffen 
[free English translation: The rationality of supranational sanctioning]. 
Justitiële Verkenningen, 30(5), 67-78. 
Haveman, R. (2005). De supranationale grens van de overspannen 
verwachting [free English translation: The supranational limits of too 
high expectations]. In R. Haveman & H. Wiersinga (Eds.), Langs de 
randen van het strafrecht [free English translation: Along the boundaries of 
criminal law] (pp. 93-109). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. 
Henham, R. (2003). Some issues for sentencing in the International 
Criminal Court. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52(1), 81-
114. 
Hepburn, J., & Griffin, M. (2004). The effect of social bonds on suc-
cessful adjustment to probation: An event history analysis. Criminal 
Justice Review, 46-75. 
Johnson, S. (1998). On the road to disaster: The rights of the accused 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
International Legal Perspectives, 10(1), 111-192. 
Kiza, E. (2008). Post-war societies and punitivity: the inquiry into an 
underexplored field of research. In H. Kury & T. Ferdinand (Eds.), 
International perspectives on punitivity (Vol. 4, pp. 139-160). Bochum: 
Universitätverlag Brockmeyer. 
Klip, A. (1997). Enforcement of sanctions imposed by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 5(2), 
144-164. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
102 
 
Knoops, G. (2003). An introduction to the law of international criminal 
tribunals. A comparative study. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, In-
corporated. 
Kury, H., & Ferdinand, T. (Eds.). (2008). International perspectives on 
punitivity (Vol. 4). Bochum: Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer. 
MacKenzie, D. (2002). The impact of formal and informal social con-
trols on the criminal activities of probationers. Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency, 243-276. 
Magnarella, P. (2000). Justice in Africa. Rwanda’s genocide, its courts, 
and the UN Criminal Tribunal. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Maguire, M., & Raynor, P. (2006). How the resettlement of prisoners 
promotes desistance from crime: Or does it? Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, 6(1), 19-38. 
Meernik, J. (2003). Victor’s justice or the law: Judging and punishing 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(2), 140-162. 
Meernik, J. (2005). Justice and peace? How the International Criminal 
Tribunal affects societal peace in Bosnia. Journal of Peace Research, 
42(3), 271-289. 
Mettraux, G. (2005). International crimes and the ad hoc tribunals. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Mugwanya, G. W. (2003). Human rights in Africa. Enhancing human 
rights through the African regional human rights system. Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc. 
Mulgrew, R. (2009). On the enforcement of sentences imposed by 
international courts. Challenges faced by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 7(2), 373-396. 
Raine, J. W., & Willson, M. J. (1997). Beyond managerialism in crimi-
nal justice. The Howard Journal, 36(1), 80-95. 
Rehman, J. (2002). The influence of international human rights law 
upon criminal justice systems. Journal of Criminal Law, 66, 510-527. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
103 
 
Roberts, P., & McMillan, N. (2003). For criminology in international 
criminal justice. Journal of International Criminal Justice (1), 315-338. 
Robinson, G., & Raynor, P. (2006). The future of rehabilitation: What 
role for the probation service? Probation Journal, 53(4), 334-346. 
Rotman, E. (1994). Beyond punishment. In A. Duff & D. Garland 
(Eds.), A reader on punishment (pp. 281-305). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schabas, W. (1997). Sentencing by international tribunals: A human 
rights approach. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 7, 
461-517. 
Schabas, W. (2004). An introduction to the International Criminal 
Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sebba, L. (2009). Punitiveness in international criminal justice. In J. 
Winterdyk, P. Reichel & H. Dammer (Eds.), A guided reader to research 
in comparative criminology (Vol. 5, pp. 103-131). Bochum: Brockmeyer 
Universitätsverslag. 
Sluiter, G. (2008). Commentary, ICTY, Order of the President in Re-
sponse to Miroslav Kvočka’s Request for Pardon, Prosecutor v. Kvočka, 
Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Pres., 7 August 2003. In A. Klip & G. K. 
Sluiter (Eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribu-
nals - Volume XIV: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 2003 (pp. 899-904). Antwerp: Intersentia.  
Tallgren, I. (2002). The sensibility and sense of international criminal 
law. European Journal of International Law, 13(3), 561-595. 
Tolbert, D., & Rydberg, A. (2000). Enforcement of sentences. In D. 
May, D. Tolbert, J. Hocking, K. Roberts, B. Bing Jia, D. Mundis & G. 
Oosthuizen (Eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and evidence. In honour of 
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. 
van Zyl Smit, D. (2007). Commentary, Order of the President on the 
Appeal of Zejnil Delalić against the Decision of the Registry, Case No. 
IT-96-21-A, Pres., 10 March 2003. In A. Klip & G. K. Sluiter (Eds.), 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
104 
 
Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals - Volume 
XI: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2002-
2003 (pp. 991-1000). Antwerp: Intersentia.  
Vermeulen, G., van Kalmthout, A., Paterson, N., Knapen, M., Verbe-
ke, P., & De Bondt, W. (2011). Cross-border execution of judgements in-
volving deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical 
problems through flanking measures. Antwerp: Maklu. 
Wise, E. (1999). Aut dedere aut judicare: The duty to prosecute or 
extradite. In M. C. Bassiouni (Ed.), International criminal law (2nd ed.) 
(pp. 15-29). New York, NY: Transnational Publishers. 
Zaum, D. (2009). Balancing justice and order: State-building and the 
prosecution of war crimes in Rwanda and Kosovo. In P. Clark & Z. D. 
Kaufman (Eds.), After Genocide. Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Re-
construction & Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (p. 428) New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
  
  
105 
 
ANNEX: INTERNATIONAL & EUROPEAN DETENTION-RELATED 
STANDARDS 
The below analysis provides details on the relevant international legal 
framework as regards material detention conditions and the execution 
of custodial sentences. 
First, information is given on the United Nations (UN) Conventions 
(and [optional] Protocols), the Council of Europe (CoE) Conventions 
(and [optional] Protocols), the relevant European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, and the Framework Decisions and 
Conventions of the European Union. Given that people convicted by 
international tribunals and courts have almost always been adult 
males, specific standards relating to juveniles and women have been 
left out, although they were included in the original analysis (Ver-
meulen et al., 2011). Based partly on this analysis, the national legal 
framework questionnaire was drafted. 
The instruments and documents listed are preceded by the abbrevia-
tion (bold) that is used in the overview of standards under B.1. 
A. Index of legal instruments and documents 
1. Legally binding international instruments and documents 
a. United Nations (UN) 
- CERD Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (entered into force January 4, 1969)  
- ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (en-
tered into force March 23, 1976)  
- ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (entered into force January 3, 1976)  
- OPCAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(entered into force June 22, 2006) 
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- UNCAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (entered into force June 26, 
1987) 
b. Council of Europe (CoE) 
- ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (Rome, 
4.XI.1950)  
- ECHRP1 Additional Protocol No. 1 (Right to Protection of Property 
and Education) to the ECHR, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (Paris, 
20.III.1952) 
- ECHRP12 Additional Protocol No. 12 (General Prohibition on Dis-
crimination) to the ECHR, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (Stras-
bourg, 4.X.2000) 
- CPT European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as amended by 
Protocol No. 1 (Strasbourg, 26. XI. 1987) 
c. European Union (EU) 
- CFREU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2007, entered into force 2009) 
2. Non-binding international instruments and documents 
a. United Nations (UN) 
- BOP Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment (1988)  
- BPTP Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990)  
- PME Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health 
Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners 
and Detainees against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (1982)  
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- PPPMI Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (1991) 
- RTFP Recommendation on the Treatment of Foreign Prisoners 
(1980)  
- SMR Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(1957), amended (1977)  
b. Council of Europe (CoE) 
- EPR Recommendation No. R(2006)2 on the European Prison 
Rules  
- R(82)16 on Prison Leave 
- R(82)17 concerning Custody and Treatment of Dangerous Prison-
ers  
- R(84)12 concerning Foreign Prisoners 
- R(89)12 on Education in Prison 
- R(93)6 concerning Prison and Criminological Aspects of the Con-
trol of Transmissible Diseases including Aids and related Health 
Problems in Prison 
- R(98)7 concerning the Ethical and Organisational Aspects of 
Health Care in Prison 
- R(99)22 concerning Prison Overcrowding and Prison Population 
Inflation 
- R(2003)23 on the Management by Prison Administrators of Life 
Sentence and other Long-term Prisoners 
- R(2004)10 concerning the Protection of the Human Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Mental Disorders  
- R(2003)22 concerning Conditional Release 
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- Resolution (70)1 on the Practical Organisation of Measures for the 
Supervision and After-care of Conditionally Sentenced or Condi-
tionally Released Offenders 
- Resolution (62)2 on Electoral, Civil and Social Rights of Prisoners 
B. EU & EU member state compliance overview 
1. Thematic overview of detention-related standards114
Questions highlighted in light grey relate to commitments arising 
from binding legal instruments and documents and/or jurisprudence 
emanating from the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
 
Overarching principles 
2.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies specifically requir-
ing that prisoners must be treated with respect for their hu-
man rights? 
ICCPR 10(1), UDHR 1, BOP 1, BPTP 1, EPR 1 & 72.1  
2.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies obliging prison 
management to ensure, as far as is practicable, that the 
prison is operated having regard to international, regional 
and domestic human rights standards? 
EPR 72.1 
2.1.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies explicitly prohibit-
ing practices that could constitute torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment of prisoners? 
ICCPR 7, BOP 6, ECHR 3, Kalashnikov v Russia (ECtHR 
2003) 
2.1.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners have access to a wide range of constructive activi-
ties, including, inter alia, educational, recreational, 
work/training and welfare programmes? 
SMR 77 & 78, BOP 28, BPTP 6 & 8, EPR 25 
 
Conditions of imprisonment 
3.1.1 Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring prison 
                                                            
114 The numbering of the standards from the original analysis is maintained. 
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Conditions of imprisonment 
management and staff to be aware of the special difficulties 
experienced by prisoners in their first days in custody and 
the need to respond as appropriate? 
SMR 7(1), EPR 15.1, 31.1, 31.2 & 31.3 
3.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
upon admission, each prisoner is given a booklet outlining 
his/her rights, duties, obligations and privileges and the 
rules and regulations governing the prison which apply to 
the individual prisoner? The booklet shall be written in a 
language that the prisoner understands. 
CERD 7, SMR 35, BOP 13, EPR 30 
3.1.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that all 
prisoner details are recorded at the time of committal in-
cluding, inter alia, details of any visible injuries, scars, tat-
toos or distinctive marks on the prisoner and their personal 
belongings? 
SMR 24, BOP 24, R(98)7: 1, EPR 42.1 
3.1.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
upon admission, every prisoner shall undergo a medical 
examination either by a nurse reporting to a doctor or by a 
doctor? 
SMR 24, R(98)7: 1, EPR 42.3 
3.1.5 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring the 
doctor/nurse to pay particular attention to the detection of 
injuries, mental illnesses, of withdrawal symptoms result-
ing from the use of drugs, medication or alcohol, of conta-
gious and chronic conditions, and to assess the prisoner’s 
suicide/self-harm risk? 
EPR 15.1.e & 42.3.c  
3.1.6 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring upon 
admission that each prisoner be assessed to determine 
whether he/she poses a safety risk to other prisoners or 
staff, or whether they pose a threat to themselves? 
ICCPR 6, UDHR 3, ECHR 2, R(2003)23: 12, EPR 52.1, Kee-
nan v UK (ECtHR 2001) 
3.1.7 Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
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Conditions of imprisonment 
such risks be managed for the duration of the prisoner’s 
sentence? 
ICCPR 6, UDHR 3, ECHR 2, EPR 52.2, Osman v UK 
(ECtHR 2000) 
3.2.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring pris-
oners to be assigned to a prison as near to their home area 
as possible in order to maintain relationships with families 
and friends, subject to the maintenance of good order and 
security? 
BOP 20, EPR 17.1 
3.3.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
where possible prisoners should have individual cells to 
sleep in? 
SMR 9(1), EPR 18.5 
3.3.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that 
prisoners who are required to share cells be carefully se-
lected and assessed as suitable for sharing accommodation? 
ICCPR 6(1), UDHR 3, SMR 9(2), ECHR 2, EPR 18.6 & 
18.7, Edwards v The United Kingdom (ECtHR 2002) 
3.3.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
the size of a cell must be suitable for its purpose? The suit-
ability of the cell size should be dependent on the number 
of hours spent in the cell, the number of prisoners accom-
modated in the cell and the availability of in-cell sanitation 
facilities that ensure privacy. 
SMR 9, 10, 11 & 12, EPR 18 & 19.3 
3.3.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
cells should not be used to accommodate more prisoners 
than the intended design capacity, unless justified in excep-
tional circumstances? 
SMR 9(1) & 10, EPR 18.1, 18.3, 18.4 & 18.6 
3.3.5 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
cells be suitable for accommodating prisoners in respect of 
size, lighting, heating, ventilation and fittings? 
SMR 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13, EPR 18 
3.3.6 Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that all 
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prisoners have in-cell access to a working alarm bell that 
attracts the attention of staff at all times? 
ICCPR 6(1), UDHR 3, ECHR 2, EPR 18.2.c & 52.4, IPR 
18(4), Edwards v The United Kingdom (ECtHR 2002)  
3.4.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that all 
prisoners have access to adequate and appropriate sanitary 
and washing facilities that respect their privacy? 
SMR 12 & 13, EPR 19.3, 19.4 & 19.7 
3.4.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that all 
in-cell sanitation facilities must be adequately screened? 
ICCPR 10(1), SMR 12, BOP 1, BPTP 1, ECHR 3, EPR 19.3, 
Peers v Greece (ECtHR 2001) 
3.5.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners are provided with clothing that is suitable for the 
climate, is not degrading or humiliating and is age appro-
priate? 
SMR 17(1), EPR 20.1 & 20.2 
3.5.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring each 
prisoner to be provided with a bed and appropriate bedding 
and to ensure that all bedding is in good condition, is 
changed regularly and laundered? 
SMR 19, EPR 21 
3.6.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners are provided with a sufficient quantity of nutri-
tious food taking into account their health, physical condi-
tion, special dietary requirements, religion and culture? 
SMR 20(1), EPR 22.1 & 22.6 
3.6.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners have access to clean drinking water? 
SMR 20(2), EPR 22.5 
3.7.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
adequate time and facilities be provided to prisoners to re-
ceive professional visits from their legal advisers? 
BOP 18(2), EPR 23.1 
3.7.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies establishing the 
right of prisoners to communicate with their legal advisers 
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by telephone and by letter? 
BOP 18(1), EPR 23.1 
3.7.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
communications between a prisoner and his/her legal ad-
viser remain confidential and can only be restricted by law 
or a judicial authority? 
ICCPR 17, BOP 18(3) & (4), ECHR 8, EPR 23.4 & 23.5, 
Campbell v The United Kingdom (ECtHR 1992) 
3.8.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies establishing the 
right of prisoners to communicate with their family and 
friends by correspondence and by receiving visits, subject to 
reasonable conditions/restrictions imposed by law or an-
other authority? 
ICCPR 23(1), UDHR 16(3), SMR 37, BOP 15 & 19, EPR 24.1 
& 24.2 
3.8.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
visits take place in an environment that enables prisoners 
to maintain and develop family and other relationships in 
as normal a manner as is possible subject to the mainte-
nance of good order and security in the prison? 
SMR 79, EPR 24.4  
3.8.2. 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
searching procedures for visitors be undertaken in a man-
ner that respects a person’s dignity? 
SMR 27, BOP 19, EPR 54.1.c, 54.3, 54.4 & 54.9 
3.8.2.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prison officers only be permitted to search visitors of the 
same gender? 
EPR 54.5 
3.8.3.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring the 
authorities to explain the circumstances leading to the im-
position of closed visits to the appropriate party(ies) and to 
review these circumstances on a regular basis? 
SMR 27, 79 & 80, EPR 60.4 
3.8.4.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisoners be informed of the death/serious illness of a close 
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relative/ friend without delay? 
SMR 44(2), EPR 24.6 
3.8.4.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies allowing a pris-
oner to leave the prison to visit a sick relative/friend, attend 
a funeral or for other humanitarian reasons, either under 
escort or alone where practicable and consistent with the 
promotion of safe and secure custody? 
SMR 44(2), EPR 24.7 
3.8.4.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies ensuring that 
prisoners are allowed to inform their families or other 
nominated persons without delay of their imprisonment, 
transfer to another institution or of any serious illness that 
they may suffer from? 
SMR 44(1) & (3), BOP 16(1), EPR 24.8  
3.8.4.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring the 
prison authorities to immediately inform the spouse or the 
nearest relative to the prisoner (or any other person previ-
ously nominated), if the prisoner dies in custody, is re-
moved to a hospital or suffers a serious injury/illness? 
SMR 44(1), EPR 24.9  
3.8.5.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies preventing the 
monitoring or censoring of telephone calls unless the pris-
oner or the recipient of the call is informed of the possibil-
ity of such monitoring or such monitoring has been agreed 
by any lawful authority? 
ICCPR 17, UDHR 12, SMR 37, BOP 19, ECHR 8, EPR 24.2 
3.8.5.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies permitting pris-
oners to send a minimum of 7 letters a week free of charge 
and more if he/she can afford it, and to receive as many 
letters as are sent to him/her? 
SMR 37, BOP 19, EPR 24.1 
3.8.5.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies preventing the 
prison authorities from opening prisoners’ private corre-
spondence subject to the maintenance of good order and 
safe and secure custody in the prison? 
ICCPR 17, UDHR 12, ECHR 8, EPR 24.2 
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3.8.6.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies entitling prison-
ers to be kept informed of current affairs and other devel-
opments outside the prison by reading newspapers and 
periodicals and by listening to radio or television broadcasts 
(subject to the maintenance of good order and safe and 
secure custody)? 
SMR 39, BOP 28, EPR 24.10 
3.9.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring work to 
be incorporated as a positive aspect of prison regimes and 
prohibiting its use as a form of punishment? 
SMR 71(1), EPR 26.1 
3.9.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring the 
work provided to, insofar as is possible, prepare prisoners 
for worthwhile work on their release and facilitate their 
reintegration into the workforce? 
SMR 71(3) & (4), BPTP 8, EPR 26.3 & 26.7 
3.9.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies entitling prison-
ers to be remunerated in respect of prison work carried 
out? 
ICESCR 7(a), UDHR 23, SMR 76(1), BPTP 8, EPR 26.1 
3.10.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies ensuring that, 
subject to the constraints of the particular prison and the 
maintenance of good order and security, prisoners shall be 
entitled to spend as much time out of their cells as is possi-
ble? 
EPR 25(2) 
3.10.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies ensuring that 
prisoners receive at least one hour’s exercise each day in the 
open air, weather permitting? 
SMR 21, EPR 27.1 
3.10.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies ensuring that 
prisoners shall have access to a well-stocked library at least 
once a week (subject to the maintenance of good order and 
safe and secure custody)? 
R(89)12: 10, EPR 28.5  
3.11.1 Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring, as far 
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as practicable, that prisoners have access to educational 
programmes that can meet their individual needs? 
ICESCR 13, UDHR 26, SMR 77(1), BPTP 6, R(89)12: 1, 
EPR 28.1 
3.11.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
education provided in prisons shall be integrated, insofar as 
is practicable, with national educational sys-
tems/programmes enabling prisoners to continue their 
education following their release? 
SMR 77(2), R(89)12: 16, EPR 28.7.a 
3.11.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
vocational training be available for those prisoners who are 
able to benefit from it, particularly young prisoners? 
SMR 71(5), BPTP 8, R(89)12: 9, EPR 26.5 
3.12.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies ensuring that 
prisoners have the opportunity to practise their religion and 
to follow their beliefs whilst in custody? 
ICCPR 18(1), CERD 5 (d) (vii), UDHR 18, SMR 42, BPTP 3, 
EPR 29.1 & 29.2 
 
Health 
4.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
primary healthcare services to meet the needs of all prisoners 
be provided in each prison to a standard equivalent to that 
available to the community in general? 
ICESCR 12(1), SMR 22(1), PME 1, R(98)7: 10, 11, 12 & 19, 
EPR 40 
4.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
where a sick prisoner requires treatment that cannot be pro-
vided by the medical staff in the prison he/she shall be trans-
ferred to an appropriate hospital without undue delay? 
SMR 22(2), BPTP 9, R(98)7:3, EPR 46.1 
4.1.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
medical records be created and accurately maintained on all 
prisoners and that such records are treated as confidential? 
BOP 26, R(98)7: 13, EPR 42.3.a 
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Health 
4.3.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisoners with mental health difficulties be entitled to care 
appropriate to their circumstances, commensurate to the type 
of care available for people with similar mental health diffi-
culties in the community? 
SMR 22(1), PPPMI 1 & 20, R(98)7: 10, 11 & 52, R(2004)10: 
35(1) & (2), EPR 40 
4.3.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners who require psychiatric in-patient care are trans-
ferred to a suitable hospital facility of an appropriate security 
level without undue delay? 
SMR 22(2), PPPMI 9(1) & 20, R(98)7: 3 & 55, R(2004)10:8, 
9(1) & 35(1), EPR 12(1) & 46(1) 
4.4.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisoners assessed as vulnerable be accommodated in such 
area(s) of the prison as is most convenient and appropriate 
for the monitoring and treatment of such prisoners by the 
medical personnel and other relevant agencies? 
SMR 22(2) & 62, EPR 12.2, 39, 43.1, 46.2, 47.1 & 47.2 
4.4.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisoners assessed as being at risk of suicide/self-harm be 
continuously monitored by both medical and prison staff 
throughout the prisoner’s time in custody and that records 
are kept of such monitoring? 
R(98)7: 58, EPR 47(2) 
4.4.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisoners detained in a special cell be visited daily and as 
frequently as is necessary by a doctor who shall, inter alia, 
monitor his/ her physical and mental health? 
SMR 25(1) & 32(3), R(98)7: 66, EPR 43.2 
4.5.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
every prisoner has access to appropriately qualified medical 
personnel in the prison at all times? 
SMR 24, BOP 24, R(98)7:1, 2 & 4, EPR 41.2 & 41.4 
4.6.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners with addiction problems have access to appropriate 
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Health 
treatment and support services, including those from external 
agencies, subject to the maintenance of good order and safe 
and secure custody? 
SMR 62, R(98)7: 7, 43, 44, 45, 46 & 47, EPR 42.3.d 
4.7.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies forbidding the 
practice of forced feeding of hunger strikers? 
DOMHS, R(98)7 
 
Good Order 
5.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
regular reviews be undertaken by prison management re-
garding the level of security required for each prisoner 
throughout that prisoner’s time in custody? 
R(82)17: 8, EPR 51.5 
5.2.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
regular reviews of the placement of prisoners on protection 
take place and ensuring that prisoners are only subject to 
protection status for as long as they pose a threat to another 
prisoner or whilst their life or safety is under threat? 
EPR 51.5, 53.1 & 53.2  
5.3.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
searches conducted on prisoners be carried out with due re-
gard to the prisoner’s dignity? 
ICCPR 10(1), BPTP 1, EPR 54.3 & 54.4 
5.3.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that 
prisoners may only be searched by a staff member of the 
same gender? 
ICCPR 10(1), BPTP 1, EPR 54.5 
5.3.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that 
prisoners may only be subjected to a strip search in excep-
tional circumstances and for good reason, and then only in 
the presence of two officers in an appropriate place which 
ensures privacy? 
ICCPR 10(1), BPTP 1, EPR 54.3, 54.4 & 54.6, Van der Van v 
The Netherlands (ECtHR 2004) 
5.4.1 Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that all 
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Good Order 
inquiries into breach of prison discipline or rules shall be 
conducted in an independent and impartial manner? 
ICCPR 14(1), UDHR 10, ECHR 6(1), Ezeh & Connors v. UK 
(ECtHR 2004) 
5.4.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that all 
incidents of bullying/violence/threatening behaviour be-
tween prisoners and any breach of discipline be reported to 
an officer of a higher rank, duly recorded and properly inves-
tigated? 
EPR 52.2 & 58 
5.4.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that 
when a prisoner has been charged with a disciplinary offence 
he/she shall be promptly informed of the allegation made 
against him/her in a language that he/she understands? 
ICCPR 14(3)(a), CERD 5(a), SMR 30(2), ECHR 6(3)(a), EPR 
59.a 
5.4.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that if 
an inquiry is being conducted into a breach of prison disci-
pline or rules the prisoner shall have adequate time to pre-
pare his/her defence and/or to receive legal assistance? 
ICCPR 14(3)(b) & (d), SMR 30(2), ECHR 6(3)(b) & (c), EPR 
59.b & 59.c, Ezeh & Connors v. UK (ECtHR 2004) 
5.4.5 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that in 
any disciplinary proceedings prisoners must understand the 
proceedings and, if necessary, appropriate interpretation fa-
cilities must be provided? 
ICCPR 14(3)(f), SMR 30(3), ECHR 6(3)(e), EPR 59.e 
5.4.6 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that no 
prison officer shall impose a punish-
ment/penalty/deprivation on a prisoner without due process 
and in accordance with the law and/or relevant rules or in-
struments? 
EPR 57.2.d 
5.4.7 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that if a 
prisoner is found guilty of a disciplinary offence, he/she shall 
be entitled to exercise his/her right of appeal to an independ-
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Good Order 
ent and impartial tribunal established by law? 
ICCPR 14(5), BOP 30(2), EPR 61 
5.4.8 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
when a prisoner is detained in any type of special cell (special 
observation/cladded/strip) he/she shall be regularly moni-
tored by a prison officer? 
ICCPR 6(1), ECHR 2 
5.4.9 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that a 
detailed record be maintained of, inter alia, the monitoring of 
such prisoners, their expressed requirements, actions taken 
in response to such requests and details of visits by officers 
or others to such prisoners? 
ICCPR 6(1), ECHR 2 
5.4.10 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners in a special cell are able to contact a member of 
staff at all times, including during the night, and that a staff 
member shall respond without delay? 
ICCPR 6(1), EPR 18.2.c & 52.4, Edwards v The United King-
dom (ECtHR 2002)  
5.5.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies stipulating that 
members of staff will use force only when absolutely neces-
sary and that any force used shall be proportionate to the 
situation? 
SMR 54(1), CCLEO 3, BPUF 4, EPR 64 & 65  
5.6.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners have sufficient opportunity to make requests or 
complaints to the Governor of the prison or to any other 
competent authority? 
SMR 36(1) & (3), BOP 33(1), EPR 70.1 
5.6.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies establishing the 
right of a prisoner’s legal adviser or to make a request or a 
complaint regarding that prisoner’s treatment to the prison 
authorities, or other relevant authorities? 
BOP 33 (1) & (2), EPR 70.5 
5.6.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that all 
complaints be promptly investigated in accordance with the 
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Good Order 
law? 
SMR 36(4), BOP 33(4) 
5.6.4 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
where a request is denied or a complaint is rejected, the pris-
oner is informed promptly as to the reason(s) for such denial 
or rejection? 
SMR 36(4), BOP 33(4), EPR 70.3 
5.6.5 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
prisoners are not disadvantaged for exercising their rights to 
make requests or complaints? 
BOP 33(4), EPR 70.4 
5.6.6 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
complaints made by members of staff against other members 
of staff be properly recorded and investigated in accordance 
with the law? 
EPR 88 & 87.1 
 
Management & Staff 
6.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that all 
prison staff receive appropriate training at regular intervals 
throughout their career? 
SMR 47(3), EPR 8, 76 & 81.2 
6.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies to ensure that 
members of staff who work with particular groups of prison-
ers, such as foreign nationals, women, juveniles or mentally 
ill prisoners, receive training particular to their individual 
work? 
R(82)17:10, R(2004)10: 12(1), EPR 81.3, ERJO 129 
 
Inspection and monitoring 
7.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that 
prisons be inspected regularly by a governmental agency in 
order to assess whether they are administered in accordance 
with the requirements of national and international law? 
SMR 55, EPR 92, R(2004)10 36.1, ERJO 125, PPPMI 22 
7.2.1 Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that the 
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Inspection and monitoring 
conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners shall 
be also monitored by an independent body or bodies, com-
prised of qualified experienced personnel, and whose find-
ings shall be made public? 
OPCAT 3, 17, 18, 19, BOP 29.1, EPR 93.1, R(2004)10:36.2, 
ERJO 126.1 
7.2.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies granting such an 
independent body open access to places of detention, to pris-
oners and others whom it wishes to interview? 
OPCAT 19, 20, CPT 8,9 BOP 29.2, ERJO 126.1 
7.2.3 
Has your country adopted laws or policies encouraging such 
independent bodies to co-operate with those international 
agencies that are legally entitled to visit prisons? 
CPT 2,7 EPR 93.2, ERJO 126.2 
 
 
Sentenced prisoners 
8.1.1 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that a 
prisoner’s release and re-integration back into society should 
constitute a central part of the sentence management plan? 
ICCPR 10(3), SMR 80, EPR 6, 103.2 & 103.4 
8.1.2 
Has your country adopted laws or policies requiring that a 
sentence management plan be prepared for each prisoner 
serving a sentence of 12 months or over as soon as practicable 
after their admission? It should provide for, inter alia, the 
welfare and health needs of the prisoner, training, employ-
ment or education needs he/she may have, and include a 
release plan for the prisoner. This plan shall be reviewed at 
regular intervals to take into account the changing circum-
stances of the prisoner. 
SMR 65, 66 & 69, R(2003)23:3 & 9, EPR 6, 103 & 104 
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2. EU level – compliance overview table (adoption rate) 
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Overarching principles                     
2.1.1 Respect for prisoners’ human rights 22 92 19 79 7 29 1 4 2 8 
2.1.2 
Human rights standards and prison 
management 
21 88 18 75 4 16 3 13 3 12 
2.1.3 Prohibition of torture 22 92 21 88 1 4 3 12 2 8 
2.1.4 Wide range of activities 24 100 23 96 7 29 0 0 0 0 
Conditions of imprisonment 
          
3.1.1 Vulnerability and first days in custody 17 71 15 63 7 29 1 4 7 29 
3.1.2 Admission booklet 15 63 13 54 6 25 1 4 6 25 
3.1.3 Prisoner records (upon arrival) 23 96 20 83 6 25 1 4 1 4 
3.1.4 Medical examination (upon arrival) 15 62 10 42 8 33 1 4 9 38 
3.1.5 Injury detection 7 29 5 21 4 17 1 4 17 71 
3.1.6 Risk assessment 11 46 10 42 5 21 1 4 13 54 
3.1.7 Risk management - ongoing 12 50 12 50 3 13 1 4 12 50 
3.2.1 Prisoner allocation 19 79 15 63 6 25 1 4 5 21 
3.3.1 Individual cells 14 58 13 54 3 13 0 0 10 42 
3.3.2 Cell share assessment 10 42 7 29 4 17 0 0 14 58 
3.3.3 Cell size 9 37 8 33 2 8 1 4 15 63 
3.3.4 Design capacity and occupancy 13 54 12 50 3 13 0 0 11 46 
3.3.5 Lighting - heating - ventilation 18 75 16 67 4 17 0 0 6 25 
3.3.6 Cell alarm 20 83 13 54 2 8 0 0 4 17 
3.4.1 Sanitation and privacy 14 58 14 58 2 8 0 0 10 42 
3.4.2 Screened sanitation 15 62 13 54 4 17 1 4 9 38 
3.5.1 Appropriate clothing 17 71 17 71 10 42 0 0 7 29 
3.5.2 Access to bedding 18 75 17 71 2 8 0 0 6 25 
3.6.1 Adequate nutrition 20 83 20 83 5 21 1 4 4 17 
3.6.2 Clean drinking water 19 79 16 67 5 21 1 4 5 21 
3.7.1 Visits from legal advisers 22 92 22 92 4 17 1 4 2 8 
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3.7.2 Communication with legal advisers 21 87 20 83 3 13 3 13 3 13 
3.7.3 Restrictions on legal communication 22 92 22 92 3 13 1 4 2 8 
3.8.1.1 Contact family/friends 24 100 23 96 7 29 2 8  
0 
3.8.1.2 Visiting environment 22 92 21 88 6 25 0 0 2 8 
3.8.2.1 Searching of visitors 17 71 15 63 4 17 0 0 7 29 
3.8.2.2 Same gender searching 12 50 9 38 1 4 0 0 12 50 
3.8.3.1 Restrictions on visits 9 37 9 37 1 0 0 0 15 63 
3.8.4.1 
Information on death/illness of 
relatives 
11 46 10 42 2 8 0 0 13 54 
3.8.4.2 Humanitarian leave 21 87 21 87 3 13 0 0 3 13 
3.8.4.3 Communication with outside world 14 58 14 58 1 4 0 0 10 42 
3.8.4.4 
Information on death/illness of 
prisoner 
18 75 18 75 3 13 0 0 6 25 
3.8.5.1 Telephone censoring 19 79 19 79 3 13 1 4 5 21 
3.8.5.2 Correspondence (minimum) 12 50 11 46 1 4 0 0 12 50 
3.8.5.3 Correspondence (privacy) 15 62 15 63 3 13 1 4 9 38 
3.8.6.1 Access to media 23 96 22 92 5 21 1 4 1 4 
3.9.1 Constructive prison work 16 67 16 67 4 17 0 0 8 33 
3.9.2 Work as rehabilitation 20 83 18 75 7 29 0 0 4 17 
3.9.3 Prison work (remuneration) 23 96 22 92 3 13 1 4 1 4 
3.10.1 Out-of-cell time 16 67 16 67 4 17 0 0 8 33 
3.10.2 Exercise 23 96 22 92 5 21 2 8 1 4 
3.10.3 Access to library 13 54 13 54 0 0 0 0 11 46 
3.11.1 Individually tailored education 23 96 23 96 5 21 1 4 1 4 
3.11.2 
Integration - prison/community 
education 
21 87 18 75 5 21 0 0 3 13 
3.11.3 Vocational training 22 92 20 83 5 21 0 0 2 8 
3.12.1 Religion 24 100 23 96 5 21 0 0 0 0 
Health 
          
4.1.1 Healthcare equivalence 23 96 22 92 6 25 0 0 1 4 
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4.1.2 Hospital transfer 22 92 21 88 3 13 1 4 2 8 
4.1.3 Medical records 21 87 20 83 5 21 0 0 3 13 
4.3.1 Mental health care 21 87 19 79 4 17 0 0 3 13 
4.3.2 Transfer to psychiatry 18 75 17 71 3 13 0 0 6 25 
4.4.1 
Accommodation of vulnerable pris-
oners 
16 67 15 63 3 13 0 0 8 33 
4.4.2 
Monitoring of prisoners at risk of 
suicide 
10 42 7 29 5 21 0 0 14 58 
4.4.3 
Medical monitoring of prisoners in 
special cells 
13 54 12 50 3 13 0 0 11 46 
4.5.1 Medical personnel 21 87 21 87 3 13 0 0 3 13 
4.6.1 Addiction 21 88 19 79 8 33 0 0 3 13 
4.7.1 Forced feeding and hunger strikers 9 37 5 21 5 21 0 0 15 63 
Good Order 
          
5.1.1 Security assessment 15 62 15 62 3 13 0 0 9 38 
5.2.1 Protection status 15 63 15 63 4 17 0 0 9 37 
5.3.1 Searches and dignity 23 96 22 92 3 13 0 0 1 4 
5.3.2 Searches and gender 23 96 22 92 1 4 0 0 1 4 
5.3.3 Strip searches 15 66 13 54 3 13 1 4 13 54 
5.4.1 Discipline investigations 16 67 15 63 2 8 1 4 8 33 
5.4.2 Inter prisoner violence 15 62 15 62 4 17 0 0 9 38 
5.4.3 Discipline and language 17 71 17 71 3 13 0 0 7 29 
5.4.4 Discipline and defence 15 62 14 58 2 8 0 0 9 38 
5.4.5 Discipline and interpretation 13 54 12 50 3 13 0 0 11 46 
5.4.6 Discipline and due process 20 83 20 83 2 8 0 0 4 17 
5.4.7 Discipline and appeal 19 79 19 79 1 4 0 0 5 21 
5.4.8 Special cells/monitoring 17 71 16 67 3 13 0 0 7 29 
5.4.9 Special cells/recording 8 33 8 33 2 8 0 0 16 67 
5.4.10 Special cells/staff contact 9 37 9 37 1 4 0 0 15 63 
5.5.1 Proportionate use of force 21 87 21 87 4 17 1 4 3 13 
5.6.1 Access to requests and complaints 23 96 23 96 3 13 0 0 1 4 
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procedure 
5.6.2 
Legal adviser’s right to make a com-
plaint 
18 75 18 75 1 4 0 0 6 25 
5.6.3 Legal basis for complaints procedure 17 71 16 67 2 8 0 0 7 29 
5.6.4 
Explanation for denial or rejection of 
complaint 
17 71 15 63 2 8 1 4 7 29 
5.6.5 Protection against discrimination 11 46 10 42 3 13 0 0 13 54 
5.6.6 
Investigation of complaints between 
staff 
13 54 11 46 3 13 0 0 11 46 
Management & Staff 
          
6.1.1 Training of staff 19 79 14 58 7 29 0 0 5 21 
6.1.2 Specific training 9 38 5 21 4 17 0 0 15 62 
Inspection and monitoring 
          
7.1.1 Governmental monitoring 20 83 19 79 4 17 0 0 4 17 
7.2.1 Independent monitoring 14 58 14 58 1 4 0 0 10 42 
7.2.2 Monitoring and access 15 62 14 58 3 13 1 4 9 38 
7.2.3 
Monitoring and international coop-
eration 
7 29 6 25 1 4 0 0 17 71 
Sentenced prisoners 
          
8.1.1 Reintegration 20 83 20 83 6 25 2 8 4 17 
8.1.2 Long-term prisoners 14 58 13 54 5 21 0 0 10 42 
3. EU level – high-level compliance analysis 
a. General overview 
Nineteen of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 90% or more of the member states sampled. 
Twenty-seven of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 75% or more of the member states sampled. 
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Thirty-five of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 50% or more of the member states sampled. 
Fifteen of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 25% or more of the member states sampled. 
The average number of member states who had adopted the measures 
for a particular question was 17 (71%). The same percentage was ob-
tained when investigating legally binding as well as non-binding stan-
dards, which appears to indicate that the legal status of a commitment 
makes little difference as to whether or not a member state will adopt 
it. 
The highest degree of member state compliance was shown in the 
section of the questionnaire relating to the ‘Overarching Principles’, 
where on average 23 member states had adopted measures to comply 
with the provisions of international legal instruments/documents 
and/or ECtHR’s jurisprudence. In the sections relating to ‘Conditions 
of Imprisonment’, ‘Health’ and ‘Sentenced Prisoners’ on average 17 of 
the member states sampled had adopted measures to comply with 
international legal instruments/documents and/or ECtHR’s jurispru-
dence. The average compliance for the section concerning ‘Good Or-
der’ was 16 of the 24 member states sampled. Lower compliance aver-
ages were seen in the sections relating to ‘Inspection and Monitoring’ 
(14/24) and ‘Management and Staff’ (13/24). 
b. Overarching Principles 
General 
Three out of the four commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 90% or more of the member states sampled: 2.1.1 - Re-
spect for prisoners’ human rights, 2.1.3 - Prohibition of torture and 
2.1.4 - Wide range of activities. 
One of the four commitments set out in the questions has been 
adopted by 88% of the member states sampled: 2.1.2 - Human rights 
standards and prison management.  
Member states most commonly adopted these measures in law. 
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Legally binding commitments 
Two of the commitments in the ‘Overarching Principles’ section of 
the questionnaire derive from binding legal instruments/documents 
and/or ECtHR’s jurisprudence: 2.1.1 - Respect for prisoners’ human 
rights and 2.1.3 - Prohibition of torture. In both instances, more than 
90% of surveyed states have adopted commitments to comply with 
these instruments. 
c. Conditions of Imprisonment 
General 
Eleven of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 90% or more of the member states sampled: 3.1.3 - Pris-
oner records upon arrival, 3.7.1 - Visits from legal advisers, 3.7.3 - Re-
strictions on legal communication, 3.8.1.1 - Contact family/friends, 
3.8.1.2 - Visiting environment, 3.8.6.1 - Access to media, 3.9.3 - Prison 
work (remuneration), 3.10.2 - Exercise, 3.11.1 - Individually tailored 
education, 3.11.3 - Vocational training and 3.12.1 - Religion. 
Twelve of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 75% to 89% of the member states sampled: 3.2.1 - Prisoner 
allocation, 3.3.5 - Lighting/heating/ventilation, 3.3.6 - Cell alarm, 3.5.2 - 
Access to bedding, 3.6.1 - Adequate nutrition, 3.6.2 - Clean drinking 
water, 3.7.2 - Communication with legal advisers, 3.8.4.2 - Humanitar-
ian leave, 3.8.4.4 - Information on death/illness of prisoner, 3.8.5.1 - 
Telephone censoring, 3.9.2 - Work as rehabilitation and 3.11.2 - Inte-
gration-prison/community education. 
Sixteen of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 50% to 74% of the member states sampled: 3.1.1 - Vulner-
ability and first days in custody, 3.1.2 - Admission booklet, 3.1.4 - 
Medical examination (upon arrival), 3.1.7 - Risk management - ongo-
ing, 3.3.1 - Individual cells, 3.3.4 - Design capacity and occupancy, 3.4.1 
- Sanitation and privacy, 3.4.2 - Screened sanitation, 3.5.1 - Appropriate 
clothing, 3.8.2.1 - Searching of visitors, 3.8.4.3 - Contact with outside 
world, 3.8.5.2 - Correspondence (minimum), 3.8.5.3 - Correspondence 
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(privacy), 3.9.1 - Constructive prison work, 3.10.1 - Out-of-cell time and 
3.10.3 - Access to library. 
Six of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted by 
25% to 49% of the member states sampled: 3.1.5 - Injury detection, 
3.1.6 - Risk assessment, 3.3.2 - Cell share assessment, 3.3.3 - Cell size, 
3.8.3.1 - Restrictions on visits and 3.8.4.1 - Information on 
death/illness of relatives. 
Legally binding commitments 
Eleven of the commitments in the ‘Conditions of Imprisonment’ sec-
tion of the questionnaire derive from binding legal instru-
ments/documents and/or ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
Five of these commitments have been adopted by 90% or more of the 
member states sampled: 3.7.3 - Restrictions on legal communication, 
3.8.1.1 - Contact family/friends, 3.9.3 - Prison work (remuneration), 
3.11.1 - Individually tailored education and 3.12.1 - Religion. 
Four commitments have been adopted by 50% to 74% of the sampled 
member states: 3.1.2 - Admission booklet, 3.1.7 - Risk management - 
ongoing, 3.4.2 - Screened sanitation and 3.8.5.3 - Correspondence (pri-
vacy). 
Two commitments have been adopted by 25% to 49% of the sampled 
member states: 3.1.6 - Risk assessment and 3.3.2 - Cell-share assess-
ment. 
d. Health 
General 
Two of the commitments set out in the questions relating to health-
care have been adopted by more than 90% of the member states sam-
pled: 4.1.1 - Healthcare equivalence and 4.1.2 - Hospital transfer. 
Five of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 75% to 89% of the member states sampled: 4.1.3 - Medical records, 
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4.3.1 - Mental health care, 4.3.2 - Transfer to psychiatry, 4.5.1 - Medical 
personnel and 4.6.1 - Addiction. 
Two of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 50% to 74% of the member states sampled: 4.4.1 - Accommodation 
of vulnerable prisoners and 4.4.3 - Medical monitoring of prisoners in 
special cells. 
Two of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 25% to 49% of the member states sampled: 4.4.2 - Monitoring of 
prisoners at risk of suicide and 4.7.1 - Forced feeding and hunger 
strikers. 
Legally binding commitments 
One commitment in the ‘Health’ section of the questionnaire (4.1.1 - 
Healthcare equivalence) derives from binding legal instru-
ments/documents and/or ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and has been 
adopted by 96% of the sampled member states. 
e. Good Order 
General 
Three of the commitments set out in the questions relating to Good 
Order have been adopted by 90% or more of the member states sam-
pled: 5.3.1 - Searches and dignity, 5.3.2 - Searches and gender and 5.6.1 
- Access to requests and complaints procedure. 
Four of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 75% to 89% of the member states sampled: 5.4.6 - Discipline and 
due process, 5.4.7 - Discipline and appeal, 5.5.1 - Proportionate use of 
force and 5.6.2 - Legal adviser’s right to make a complaint. 
Twelve of the commitments set out in the questions have been 
adopted by 50% to 74% of the member states sampled: 5.1.1 - Security 
assessment, 5.2.1 - Protection status, 5.3.3 - Strip searches, 5.4.1 - Dis-
cipline investigations, 5.4.2 - Inter prisoner violence, 5.4.3 - Discipline 
and language, 5.4.4 - Discipline and defence, 5.4.5 - Discipline and 
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interpretation, 5.4.8 - Special cells/monitoring, 5.6.3 - Legal basis for 
complaints procedure, 5.6.4 - Explanation for denial or rejection of 
complaint and 5.6.6 - Investigation of complaints between staff.  
Three of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 25% to 49% of the member states sampled: 5.4.9 - Special 
cells/recording, 5.4.10 - Special cells/staff contact and 5.6.5 - Protec-
tion against discrimination. 
Legally binding commitments 
Eleven of the commitments in the ‘Good Order’ section of the ques-
tionnaire derive from binding legal instruments/documents and/or 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Two of these commitments have been 
adopted by more than 90% of the sampled member states: 5.3.1 - 
Searches and dignity and 5.3.2 - Searches and gender. One commit-
ment has been adopted by 79% of the sampled member states: 5.4.7 - 
Discipline and appeal. Five commitments have been adopted by 50% 
to 74% of the sampled member states: 5.3.3 - Strip searches, 5.4.1 - 
Discipline investigations, 5.4.3 - Discipline and language, 5.4.5 - Disci-
pline and interpretation and 5.4.8 - Special cells/monitoring. Two 
commitments have been adopted by 25% to 49% of the sampled 
member states: 5.4.9 - Special cells/recording and 5.4.10 - Special 
cells/staff contact. 
f. Management and Staff 
General 
Commitment 6.1.1 (Training of staff) has been adopted by 79% of the 
member states sampled. Commitment 6.1.2 (Specific training) has 
been adopted by 38% of the member states sampled. 
Legally binding commitments 
No commitments in the ‘Management and Staff’ section of the ques-
tionnaire derive from binding legal instruments/documents and/or 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
 
ANNEX: INTERNATIONAL & EUROPEAN DETENTION-RELATED STANDARDS 
 
 
131 
 
g. Inspection and Monitoring 
General 
Commitment 7.1.1 (Governmental monitoring) has been adopted by 
83% of the member states sampled. 
Two of the commitments set out in the questions have been adopted 
by 50% to 74% of the member states sampled: 7.2.1 - Independent 
monitoring and 7.2.2 - Monitoring and access. 
Commitment 7.2.3 - Monitoring and international cooperation has 
been adopted by 29% of the member states sampled. 
Legally binding commitments 
Two commitments in the ‘Inspection and Monitoring’ section of the 
questionnaire derive from binding legal instruments/documents 
and/or ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Both of these commitments (7.2.1 - 
Independent monitoring and 7.2.2 - Monitoring and access) have been 
adopted by 50% to 74% of the sampled member states. 
h. Sentenced Prisoners 
General 
Commitment 8.1.1 (Reintegration) has been adopted by 83% of the 
member states sampled. Commitment 8.1.2 (Long-term prisoners) 
has been adopted by 58% of the member states sampled. 
Legally binding commitments 
One commitment in the ‘Sentenced Prisoners’ section of the ques-
tionnaire derives from binding legal instruments/documents and/or 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence (8.1.1 - Reintegration). This standard has been 
adopted by 83% of sampled member states. 
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4. EU member states115 – compliance overview table (adoption rate)116
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Finland 95 100 86 91 10 11 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 93 98 86 91 15 16 0 0 3 3 
Estonia 92 97 88 93 10 11 0 0 4 4 
Hungary 88 93 86 91 87 92 0 0 8 8 
Germany 80 84 77 81 1 1 26 27 16 17 
Belgium 78 82 72 76 55 58 7 7 18 19 
Malta 74 78 74 78 0 0 0 0 22 23 
Denmark 70 74 59 62 25 26 0 0 26 27 
Slovenia 70 74 68 72 13 14 1 1 26 27 
Spain 70 74 65 68 3 3 2 2 26 27 
Italy 68 72 67 71 2 2 2 2 28 29 
Cyprus 66 69 64 67 3 3 0 0 30 32 
Latvia 64 67 60 63 5 5 0 0 32 34 
Czech Republic 63 66 61 64 0 0 0 0 33 35 
Austria 62 65 62 65 0 0 0 0 34 36 
France 62 65 60 63 26 27 0 0 34 36 
Romania 62 65 62 65 0 0 0 0 34 36 
Greece 59 62 58 61 18 19 0 0 37 39 
Netherlands 57 60 55 58 8 8 6 6 39 41 
Lithuania 52 55 52 55 0 0 1 1 44 46 
UK 52 55 35 37 34 36 0 0 44 46 
                                                            
115 In the context of the study conducted by Vermeulen et al. (2011) 24 out of the 27 
member states have provided information. 
116 Please note that for most member states the "yes - in law", "yes - in policy" and "yes 
- in jurisprudence" numbers surpass the total "yes" number, since they may e.g. com-
ply with certain standards both in the law and in policy (and/or jurisprudence). 
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Bulgaria 50 53 49 52 2 2 0 0 46 48 
Poland 48 51 48 51 0 0 0 0 47 49 
Ireland 30 32 2 2 27 28 1 1 66 69 
 
5. EU member states – high-level compliance analysis 
Four of the sampled member states have adopted 90% or more of the 
measures set out in the questions relating to both binding interna-
tional legal instruments and documents and/or ECtHR’s jurispru-
dence and non-binding international legal instruments: Finland, Slo-
vakia, Estonia and Hungary. 
Three of the sampled member states have adopted 75% to 89% of 
these measures: Germany, Belgium and Malta. 
Sixteen of the sampled member states have adopted 50% to 74% of 
the measures: Denmark, Slovenia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Spain, Aus-
tria, France, Romania, Czech Republic, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Lithuania, the UK, Bulgaria and Poland. 
One member state has adopted 32% or more of the measures: Ireland. 
The member states who had the highest rate of adoption in law were 
Finland, Slovakia, Estonia and Hungary. 
The member states who had the highest rate of adoption in policy 
were Hungary and Belgium. 
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The member state with the highest rate of adoption in jurisprudence 
was Germany. 
 
The member state with the highest adoption rate is Finland, which 
has adopted all 95 commitments (100%), whilst Ireland has adopted 
the fewest commitments (30, 32%). 
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Historically, little attention was paid to the execution of sentences passed at the level of international courts and tribunals. Capital punishment was still used, and custodial sanctions were imposed in the relevant states. It was not 
until the 1990s, with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals, that the execution of sen-
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international justice, and one that is likely to make the reintegration and rehabilita-
tion of offenders (a greater) part of it.
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